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ABSTRACT  
  
Nearly a decade ago, a Government of National Unity (GNU) was established in Zimbabwe based on the 
Global Political Agreement (GPA) which was mediated by the Southern African Development 
Community (SADC). The unity government was a result of questionable elections which had seen 
President Robert Mugabe being defeated by Morgan Tsvangirai and Zimbabwe African National Union 
Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF) losing its parliamentary majority to the two Movement for Democratic 
Change (MDC) formations. Such a trajectory occurred in a country that had been ravaged by socio-
economic woes for decades. The establishment of the GNU brought about short-term positive economic 
and political changes to the state of Zimbabwe. However, approximately seven years after its end, 
Zimbabwe has returned to the crisis that was meant to be addressed by the GNU. Consequently, the 
rationale behind this research was to establish whether the GNU in Zimbabwe was a lost opportunity 
upon which Zimbabwe’s crisis could have been solved. The study was informed by the Ripeness Theory, 
the Readiness Theory and the Elite Theory. It used a qualitative analytical approach in which data was 
collected through in-depth interviews, focus group discussions and documentary search. The findings of 
the research revealed that the SADC-mediated GNU provided an opportunity to end Zimbabwe’s crisis 
but was affected by the approach used in its formation and implementation. While the SADC-mediated 
GNU ignored certain sections of the Zimbabwe community throughout its life, the differing interests of 
the parties impacted negatively on the operations of the agreement. The different political parties that 
constituted the GNU pursued party interest often ignoring the Global Political Agreement (GPA) itself. 
As a result, the set objectives of political, economic and security sector reforms among others were not 
realised. The SADC-mediated GNU thus failed to address Zimbabwe’s crisis. However, the GNU 
experienced some short-term successes especially in temporarily stabilizing the economy and bringing 
about political tolerance.  Against such a backdrop, the study argued that GNU-related negotiations 
should be all-involving and all-encompassing for them to be successful. The SADC bloc’s elite-driven 
approach in dealing with crises situations ought to change as it has not yielded positive results. 
Additionally, the early warning signs of the bloc have failed and require reconsideration. At the national 
level, the state of Zimbabwe needs to consider adopting traits of the developmental state model to solve 
its unending crisis. These and some of the suggested solutions in the study will go a long way in solving 
crisis situations that may require unity governments and/or even assisting states to deal with economic 
and politically-related woes within the SADC region.   
  
Key words: negotiated settlement, unity government, elite settlement, negotiated government, 
government of national unity, global political agreement.  
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CHAPTER ONE  
GENERAL INTRODUCTION  
1.1 Introduction   
  
The Southern African Development Community (SADC) is a grouping of countries on the Southern part 
of the African Continent, consisting of 16 countries; Angola, Botswana, Comoros, Democratic Republic 
of Congo, Eswatini, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Seychelles, South 
Africa, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe. SADC was established in 1992 (following the transformation of 
its precursor, the Southern African Development Coordination Conference, SADCC) and is committed to 
regional integration and poverty eradication through economic development and ensuring peace and 
security. A historiographical overview of SADC and the Southern African region reveals that the latter 
was for over a century under colonial rule and until 1994 it had not enjoyed independence as a whole, as 
South Africa was still under the Apartheid system. Efforts at making the region a community that is an 
‘unrestricted open region’ can be traced back to the period between 1960 and 1970 when most of the 
countries in the region were under colonial rule.  National liberation movements coordinated their efforts 
in the political sphere to end colonial rule which led to the materialisation of an informal group of states 
known as the Frontline States which was established in the late 1970s. The purpose of the Frontline States 
was to ensure that the region would be redeemed from colonialism.   
  
When countries like Zimbabwe became independent, the Frontline States, by the Lusaka Declaration of 
April 1980, established a formal sub-regional grouping called Southern African Development 
Coordination Conference (SADCC) which would in time transform from politically oriented objectives to 
a more holistic socio-economic cooperation. On this, Gwaradzimba (1993:52) notes that in early 1980, the 
Organization of African Unity (OAU) promulgated the Lagos Plan of Action (LPA) and signed the Final 
Act of Lagos. The LPA envisaged the resuscitation of schemes that had performed dismally throughout 
the 1970s and the creation of an African Common Market by the year 2001, a landmark subsequently 
extended to 2025 at the Abuja OAU summit of 1991. Following the ratification of the LPA, in April 1980, 
Southern Africa witnessed the formation of SADCC.   
  
It was in August 1992 that SADCC was transformed into Southern African Development Community 
(SADC) by the Windhoek Declaration as has been mentioned in the foregoing. The 1992 SADC was all 
inclusive in approach covering more extensive and diverse issues ranging from the social, political to 
economic as well as security issues as insinuated in Article 5 of the SADC Treaty which covers the 
2  
  
objectives of the Treaty. Objective 1(a) of the SADC Treaty states the objective of SADC as being, to 
achieve development and economic growth, alleviate poverty, enhance the standard and quality of life of 
the people of Southern Africa and support the socially disadvantaged through regional integration.   
  
States in the SADC region are therefore guided by different regional and international regulations that 
deal with socio-economic and political relations. To this effect, Zimbabwe is an active participant and 
signatory to most of those regulations and thereby how it relates with other states and fares within its own 
boundaries is a cause for concern in neighbouring countries. Zimbabwe, officially Republic of Zimbabwe, 
formerly (1911–64) Southern Rhodesia, (1964–79) Rhodesia, or (1979–80) Zimbabwe-Rhodesia is a 
landlocked country in Southern Africa. It shares a 125-mile (200-kilometre) border on the south with the 
Republic of South Africa and is bounded on the southwest and west by Botswana, on the north by 
Zambia, and on the northeast and east by Mozambique (Ingham, Sanger and Bradley, 2020). Zimbabwe 
has 16 official languages (2013 Constitution of Zimbabwe).   
Since the adoption of its 2013 Constitution, Zimbabwe’s official languages are Chewa, Chibarwe, 
English, Kalanga, Koisan, Nambya, Ndau, Ndebele, Shangani, Shona, sign language, Sotho, Tonga, 
Tswana, Venda, and Xhosa. In terms of ethnic composition more than two-thirds of Zimbabweans speak 
Shona as their first language, while about one out of six people speak Ndebele. Those who speak Ndebele 
are concentrated in a circle around Bulawayo, with Shona-speaking peoples beyond them on all sides - the 
Kalanga to the southwest, the Karanga to the east around Nyanda (formerly Fort Victoria and now 
Masvingo), the Zezuru to the northeast, and the Rozwi and Tonga to the north. Generations of 
intermarriage have to a degree blurred the linguistic division between the Shona and Ndebele peoples 
(Nations Encyclopedia, 2018).  
  
Dating back to the colonial era, nation states within the same area have engaged each other in a bid to 
stabilize their geographical area with the main aim of achieving economic stability and national 
development, for instance the assistance given by Zambia under Kenneth Kaunda to neighbouring 
countries during their armed struggles for independence. Zimbabwe was a beneficiary of such 
‘brotherhood’ and that created a bond among regional liberation parties that makes them cover each 
other’s back when need arises. That being the case, Thabo Mbeki, the SADC Mediator, therefore had to 
cover a troubled brother’s back and intervened to help resolve the Zimbabwean crisis, in fulfilment of 
SADC commitment to regional peace and security. Matyszak (2010:1) pointed out that Thabo Mbeki’s 
statement in a letter to Morgan Tsvangirai in November 2008 noted that, realistically, Zimbabwe will 
3  
  
never share the same neighbourhood with Western countries and that it could not secure its success on the 
basis of friendship with these countries. He added that it could be for one reason or the other that 
Tsvangirai considered the region and continent as being of little consequence for the future of Zimbabwe, 
believing that others further away, in Western Europe and North America, were of greater importance. 
Mbeki clearly showed in his view that the region should be the first port of call for anyone who seriously 
considers resolving national problems.    
  
Zimbabwe fought for its independence from Britain, obtaining it in 1980 and since then it has been under 
governance of the Zimbabwe African National Union Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF) party and has been 
bedeviled by economic and political woes that warranted the intervention of the regional block, SADC.  
The Zimbabwean crisis dates back to the period after independence in 1986 with the introduction of 
Amendment No. 7 to the Constitution of Zimbabwe, which created the Executive Presidency and 
abolished the Prime Minister’s position. After its first elections in 1980, Zimbabwe held subsequent 
elections thereby creating the impression of a nation immersed in democracy (Matyszak 2010). The 
elections were, however, won consistently by President Robert Mugabe and his party, the ZANU-PF. 
Against a backdrop of imploding economy, increasing political and media repression and massive 
corruption, the authenticity of the victories started to be questioned, more so by the late 1990s, when the 
quality and accessibility of basic services such as education and primary health care had plummeted 
drastically. The cost of living rose sharply while much of the land lay fallow (Coltart 2008: 44). As the 
cost of living rose, workers’ wages remained the same and were rendered useless. Inevitably, the 
consequent disillusionment led to the formation of a new political party in 1999 called the Movement for 
Democratic Change (MDC) which was led by the then leader of the Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions 
(ZCTU), Morgan Tsvangirai. The MDC quickly gained popularity as it vowed to restore democracy and 
revive the haemorrhaging (bleeding) economy (Chimbga 2011:12). In the 2000 parliamentary elections 
ZANU-PF lost seats to MDC for the first time in its history (Coady and Solomon, 2012:3). This change in 
political landscape gave ZANU-PF an awakening call that resulted in them reacting in a pre-emptive way.  
  
Upon realizing the potential of the MDC, ZANU-PF began to resort to violence, repression and 
intimidation to gain votes and support (Zimbabwe Elections Support Network (ZESN) Report 2002:14).  
Election-related violence and repression became a regular feature of Zimbabwe’s political landscape 
(Common Wealth Observer Group 2002:9). Tumbare (2014) commenting on Zimbabwean elections after 
the formation of the MDC states that, from 2000 to 2005 all parliamentary and presidential elections were 
held under repressive legislative measures; and the elections were blighted by intimidation and violence 
4  
  
inter alia voting irregularities. The irregularities and uncertainties surrounding elections in the 
Zimbabwean context led to the split of MDC in November of 2005 after a standoff between the leaders 
concerning participation in the newly introduced Senatorial elections. The main faction led by Morgan 
Tsvangirai became MDC-T, while the other faction which was led by Aurthur Mtambara became MDCM. 
Since independence, ZANU-PF had managed to thwart, conquer and co-opt opposition political parties, 
the likes of Zimbabwe Unity Movement (ZUM) led by Edgar Tekere, Zimbabwe Union of Democrats, led 
by Magret Dongo among others; such that having a formidable opposition party managing to withstand 
the pressure for a long period presented a real challenge and threat to their political hegemony. As such 
ZANU-PF brought in the senatorial seats in order to divide and conquer the MDC, which they achieved as 
the party split into two different groupings bearing the same name, over participation in the senatorial 
elections. Although the two MDC parties participated in the 2008 elections, the elections were marred by 
violence which led to contested results and the subsequent call for a presidential race run-off.   
  
Given that the run-off did not break the political impasse, Mbeki was called in to help conflicting parties 
to find an amicable solution. After prolonged and acrimonious talks, he convinced the leaders of a 
political settlement in the form of the Global Political Agreement (GPA), which led to the creation of a 
Government of National Unity (GNU). It was intended to be the tool to transport Zimbabwe from its 
undemocratic past into a new democratic dispensation. Matyszak (2010: 32) argues however, that GNUs 
are just a truce, merely meant to suspend hostilities for a short period. In 2007-2008 pre-election 
Zimbabwe was ripe for a lasting solution because the ruling ZANU-PF party, then, had reached a 
breaking point where they could not handle the situation. This was indicated by the move to agree to 
come to the negotiating table with opposition parties to find a lasting solution to the crises. The opposition 
and the ruling ZANU-PF, alike, did not consult their supporters thereby making it an elite negotiation 
meant to benefit political leaders alone. According to Olouch (2008), the power of elections to serve as a 
democratizing agent, evaporates though when political authority can be negotiated independent of 
institutions. Mbogo (2008), adds on by saying that GNUs may be good for peace but the casualty is 
democracy refusing to hand over power, even after election defeat may now become fashionable. The 
citizens only wanted a change in government, particularly the Head of State who had been in power since 
1980.  
  
In view of the above political developments, this thesis therefore sought to interrogate whether the SADC-
mediated GNU can be viewed as a lost opportunity that could have resolved the Zimbabwean crisis. In 
achieving this, the research made use of the qualitative analytical approach in which interviews and focus 
group discussions (FGDs) were used to gather primary data, while documentary analysis was used for 
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secondary data.  Field research was thus conducted with suitable participants who shed more light on 
what actually transpired before, during and after the GNU and also offered possible alternatives to the 
GNU approach. This was done mainly to answer the questions as to whether the GNU was the best 
solution, as shall be discussed later in this thesis.   
  
The thesis was informed by three main theories namely the Ripeness Theory which focused on the 
fundamental elements that inclined political parties in Zimbabwe to form a government of national unity; 
the Readiness Theory which helped in establishing the impetus behind the parties signing a global 
political agreement that gave birth to the Government of National Unity and the Elite Theory which 
divulged how the GNU in Zimbabwe was elite driven.  There will also be a discussion on the role of the 
SADC in the whole process of negotiating for a GNU and how the regional grouping fared in achieving 
its intended goals. There are, however, notable aspects of the GNU that will be discussed specifically to 
ascertain certain assumptions made in addressing the problem statement. The researcher noted that the 
challenges that faced the nation of Zimbabwe could not be addressed by the way the GNU operated. 
These include, the disagreements that rocked the GNU mainly arising from ministerial post allocations 
among the parties that pointed to the inherent differences that were entrenched in the parties to the 
negotiation, showing signs of mistrust and wanting to have an upper hand. Some of the ministers ignored 
the directives of the prime minister, simply because he was the opposition leader, yet he was supposed to 
be the head of government. There were expressions that revealed divisions within the government where 
each party stood alone instead of standing collectively for governmental actions.   
  
The post GNU political developments have thus raised questions which need answers, with regards to the 
lost opportunity during the period 2008 to 2013 which could have inevitably broken the political impasse 
for good. The situation returned to the period before the GNU although cases of political violence 
reduced. The SADC-led negotiation process only managed to bring the contending political parties to the 
negotiating table and temporarily shelved the problems that sadly resurfaced after the GNU. The GNU 
managed to temporarily suspend hostilities among contenting parties in Zimbabwe. Mwonzora (2014) 
argues that the GNU acted as a pacifier and gave ZANU-PF the opportunity to re-strategize and as a result 
won the 2013 elections. Having said that, the thesis examined whether the SADC-mediated GNU was a 
lost opportunity for Zimbabwe to solve its political and economic crisis. As pointed out earlier, the 
researcher embarked on extensive research to gather the facts of what transpired before, during and after 
the GNU and made inferences based on the findings, as shall be noted in this thesis.   
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This study was conducted as a way of trying to find alternative solutions to the GNU approach that was 
opted for under the SADC mediation. It is worth noting that unity governments are a solution that is 
gathering momentum in the contemporary world of politics. The question arises, however, whether it is a 
straight-jacket solution or there is need to tailor-make it to suit the political environment in question. It is 
also questioned whether negotiated settlements are a threat to democracy or not. In the case of Zimbabwe, 
Matyszak (2010) noted that the MDC President, Morgan Tsvangirai said that the continuation of the 
MDC-ZANU-PF negotiations after the election stand-off was not about power sharing but about a return 
to democracy. As such the MDC could not agree to anything that did not restore democracy and the rule 
of law. Various interviewees, as shall be discussed in the thesis, have put forward the thinking that the 
GNU in Zimbabwe was advanced as a way of pacifying the MDC that had won elections and at the same 
time awarding ZANU-PF unmerited advantage since they had lost but were refusing to relinquish power. 
The intrigue of the mediation process is what interested the researcher to dig more into the details and 
mysteries surrounding the GNU so as to understand more and find out what some of the citizens think in 
order to make informed arguments for or against any future proposals of such solutions. Mbogo (2008) 
pointed out that GNUs are good for peace but are a compromise to democracy. Olouch (2008) added that 
Africa is running away from free and fair competitive elections. The researcher delved to find out what 
really made the conflicting parties get into an agreement to share power, was it for individualistic reasons 
or it was for public good? Masunungure (2009) pointed out that the Agreement was about regime 
transition that is, it was a negotiated transition pact. He added that it was designed as a framework for 
unblocking the blocked democratization, noting that the electoral route to democratic transition had been 
blocked.  The GNU controversy is what made investigating it more appropriate to try and understand 
more why some argue against it while a layperson in the street would prefer a repeat of the GNU since it  
‘stabilized’ the economy.  
  
The emergency of the MDC just before the first post 2000 elections, marked the beginning of a new and 
more interesting era in Zimbabwe, where political contestations became very tense, witnessed by the inter 
party and intra party violence that was an occurrence during every electoral process in Zimbabwe. SADC 
Mediation was initiated after the violence at a Save Zimbabwe Campaign prayer meeting that left some of 
the opposition leaders wounded and others in remand prison, simply because they were freely expressing 
themselves. Masunungure (2009) noted that on March 11, 2007 the police prevented the Save Zimbabwe 
Campaign from convening a prayer meeting where they brutally assaulted opposition leaders, leaving one 
person dead, 50 hospitalized and nearly 200 arrested. This violence compelled the SADC to convene an 
extraordinary summit meeting in Tanzania that commissioned President Mbeki to facilitate dialogue 
among conflicting parties in Zimbabwe. Zimbabwe, then, was a democratic country (democracy being 
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defined mainly by the periodic elections that were held) but most of the tenets of democracy were not 
present. That being the case, the researcher thought it necessary to interrogate the effectiveness of 
political approaches that leave the general public out, having noted that the GNU in Zimbabwe was an 
elite settlement that was meant to serve the interests of the few at the expense of the majority. The 
research therefore interrogated why the public opinion was not considered important then and if any 
political solution in Zimbabwe can be effective without the participation of the affected public.  Such 
investigations will help inform future practice and decisions.   
  
While there is a plethora of literature on Zimbabwe’s GNU, there seems to be a gap in terms of academic 
research on whether the GNU provided an opportunity for ending political turbulence in Zimbabwe. 
Various researches, for instance by Bratton and Masunungure (2011), Machakanja (2010), Mapuva 
(2010), Mokhawa (2013) and Mwonzora (2014) have at least looked at the subject of the Government of 
National Unity. However, it is a common feature to note that coalition literature has been written with 
mixed views. In some cases, there have been pockets of scholar-cum-activists who are either pro–
ZANUPF or pro–MDC –T. To this end, there has been no substantial clarity with regards to the actual 
facts on the operations and appropriateness of the GNU. These authors have mainly focused on the 
effectiveness of the 2008 GNU without interrogating the opportunities provided by the unity government 
to address Zimbabwe’s problems. This study therefore was meant to fill a gap in the scholarly and 
empirical literature.  
  
In this regard, the rationale for choosing the topic is mainly rooted in the likelihood of a repeat of the 
events of the period 2007-2009 in future. The main reason being that of long political incumbency where 
the incumbent cannot easily let go of power and feels that no-one can do it better so they try as much as 
possible to hang on to power at the expense of all other democratic principles. Joseph R. (1999), argued 
that Zimbabwe has an inability to entrench democratic values since government uses the machinery of the 
state to minimize and marginalize opposition parties. This study thus had to dig deeper into the strategies 
and roles of the GNU that may be hidden to outsiders, in order to understand how it was possible to end 
the economic and political crises.   
  
The research is very relevant as power-sharing governments are emerging in the contemporary world, yet 
little attention is devoted in trying to unpack the relevance of such to initiatives in ending political and 
economic crises. Whittaker (1999) posited that Chapter VI of the UN Charter deals with pacific settlement 
of disputes and as such nations engage more in negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration 
among other peaceful options. Auittery (2009) made a comparative study of the performance of 
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governments of national unity in Zimbabwe and Kenya but did not highlight the opportunities provided 
by other governments. This study therefore seeks to fill in such a lacuna by offering alternative and 
wellgrounded theoretical and methodological approaches.   
  
Studies by Chigora and Guzura (2011) and Onslow (2011) were also reviewed as they examined the 
structure of the GNU and how the ministerial posts were distributed. Article 20 of GPA stated that the 
parties acknowledged that they had an obligation to establish a framework of working together in an 
inclusive government; accepting that the formation of such a government will have to be approached with 
great sensitivity, flexibility and willingness to compromise; recognizing that the formation of such a 
government would express the hopes and aspirations of Zimbabweans. In light of this, the GNU should 
have created conditions for returning Zimbabwe to stability and prosperity. Whittaker (1999:5) argued 
that, most states get into negotiation as a result of domestic events lie a surge of opposition by a dissident 
group or ministerial chances or by a stream of international disapproval. Zimbabwe was under a lot of 
international pressure as most regional groups and nations alike were calling for the urgent resolution of 
the crisis.  
  
Bratton and Masunungure (2011) made an assessment of the GNU and argued that years after the signing 
of GPA, Zimbabwe remained in a crisis. The political environment was gravely polarized and was largely 
characterised by a resurgence of violence, arrests, intimidation and hate speech. According to the IBAHRI 
Report (2011:7), the formation of an all-inclusive government, did not make hard-line elements within the 
ZANU-PF wish to share power with their political opponents. They continued to usurp power and used 
their control of state apparatuses in a blatantly partisan way. It became obvious that if political intolerance 
persisted, free and fair elections would be elusive and democracy entrenchment negated.  
  
The study of behaviour uses occurrences to help predict the future, making projections. This helps to 
avoid such events from happening again in future, people learn from past experiences and make the 
necessary adjustments in future. Going into details of the GNU era will help the electorate to make 
informed choices in future polls to avoid a situation where settlements have to be negotiated by the elite 
without the participation of the affected public. Grossman and Helpman (2001:1) are of the view that in 
idealized democracies, public policy is guided by the principle of ‘one man, one vote’ but in all real 
states, special interest groups participate actively in the policymaking processes. This implies that in 
future the general populace will be aware of the importance of their participation as a general right. It also 
helps in eradicating voter apathy and encourage participation thereby moving from parochial and subject 
political culture to participant.   
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In most texts, scholars have focused on the achievements and failures of the GNU and have not quite 
addressed the appropriateness of the GNU as an option for the negotiating parties then, especially 
considering that it was an ‘elite’ club negotiating on their own. It can be opinionated that the elite wanted 
to share power and give each other political positions in order to pacify the opposition, not really meant to 
serve the general will. Gready (2004) adds on that civil society is the engine behind a normative agenda 
seeking to establish and enforce contracts from below, meaning that ordinary people can and should make 
and monitor laws, which is simply participating in governance. The research will therefore also look at the 
importance of public participation and involvement.  
  
This thesis therefore looks at the effectiveness of the GNU approach to challenges in the governance of 
nations. Studies that have been conducted mainly focused on effectiveness of regional groups’ role in 
settling political disputes and on the effectiveness of mediation without really combining them to look at 
mediated governments as a solution being proffered in many situations and its effectiveness through 
breaking down the elements of the solution to understand it more. This research had that gap at its core 
and tried to break down aspects of mediation and GNUs as solutions to governance crisis in many 
countries particularly in Africa, looking at Zimbabwe in particular and using Kenya as a passing example. 
As the researcher wrapped up the study, there was serious debate on the GNU option and there were 
continued calls for another round of the GNU under the new leadership. This possibility was being 
discussed under the Political Actors Dialogue from late 2019 into 2020, results of which time will tell. 
Having such meetings has pointed to a likelihood of a repeat of the GNU era and it has been received with 
mixed reactions from some of the individuals interviewed.   
  
1.3 Problem Statement  
  
The creation of the GNU through the GPA was hoped to break the political impasse and usher in a new 
political dispensation. Amongst others, it called for a people-driven constitution, referendum, free media, 
respect for human rights, rule of law, depoliticization of state institutions and resuscitation of the 
economy. During its life, there was a lot of controversy surrounding the GNU and whether or not it had 
been successful in implementing the GPA. ZANU-PF blamed the MDC for being a stumbling block in the 
path to establishment of democracy amongst others, failing to convince the West to lift economic 
sanctions. MDC on the other hand accused ZANU-PF of hampering progress by not honouring the letter 
and spirit of GPA (Zondi and Bhengu 2011:13-15). Besides these political parties, other observers, for 
example academics and regional bodies, were skeptical about the wisdom or otherwise of a Zimbabwean 
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GNU. There was no consensus as to whether GNU had fulfilled its mandate or had simply remained what 
most critics suggested it would be, a betrayal of the will of the people. As Chigora and Guzura (2011: 23) 
put it from general point of view, “a government of national unity elevates the state above the will of the 
people; it is antithetical to democracy.” This study therefore, delved into the GNU and explored whether it 
was the right time for Zimbabwe to end its political problems. It endeavoured to establish the extent to 
which the GNU enhanced democratisation in Zimbabwe as it is arguably the root cause of the crisis that 
the country found itself plunged into.   
  
Richard Joseph (1999) argues that most transitions that have taken place in Africa have failed to inculcate 
the norms of democracy, Zimbabwe also shares that inability to entrench democratic values. It is alleged 
that the government uses state machinery to minimize and marginalize opposition parties. The GNU that 
was negotiated in Zimbabwe was meant to be a transitionary tool that would usher the country into a new 
democratic dispensation. As mentioned earlier, Masunungure (2009) held the view that the power sharing 
agreement was designed as a framework for unclogging the choked democratization since the electoral 
route had been blocked. Adding to that, Matyszak (2010) pointed out that Morgan Tsvangirai said that the 
negotiations were done in order to return to democracy, noting that the MDC was agreeing to all that 
worked to restore democracy and the rule of law but ZANU-PF and Robert Mugabe could not agree to 
such. Having noted that, in the proper operation of the GNU, there were instances where Robert Mugabe 
unilaterally made decisions thereby violating the provisions of the Agreement without any consequences 
to such action, for instance when he unilaterally allocated ministries in mid-October 2009 in the midst of 
deadlocked negotiations, Matyszak (2010). Despite having such indications that the power sharing deal 
was one-sided, the opposition parties remained in the unity government and that raised questions on their 
intentions and motives. The failure of the MDC to clip ZANU-PF’s wings thereby limiting the powers of 
the President, is what leads to questions about the effectiveness of power-sharing deals. The question is, if 
power-sharing does not resolve the crisis and end such, then what is its usefulness in the political 
discourse?   
  
1.4 Research objectives  
  
Against such a background of Zimbabwe’s deepening political and economic crisis; and its history of the 
GNU, this study aimed to examine whether SADC’s Mediation in Zimbabwe was a lost opportunity for a 
lasting solution to the Zimbabwe crisis, through discovering the factors that militated against its success.  
  
Within this, the study sought to attain the following objectives:   
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• To establish the relationship between Zimbabwe’s colonial history including the early years of 
independence and the formation of the GNU.  
• To ascertain whether the SADC mediation process achieved its goal of balancing political 
interests in the GPA.  
• To assess whether the GNU achieved its intended goals of establishing a conducive environment 
for restoring political and economic stability in Zimbabwe.   
• To evaluate the extent to which national dialogue for political change under the GNU involved a 
variety of all social actors at all levels in Zimbabwe.  
• To recommend ways of enhancing the effectiveness of inclusive governments vis-à-vis crises 
situations in states.   
• To recommend ways of enhancing the effectiveness of SADC intervention in Zimbabwe and for 
other crisis situations in member states.  
1.5 Research Questions   
  
The main research question of the study was, “Was the SADC Mediation a lost opportunity for a lasting 
solution to the Zimbabwe crisis?”  
Within this, the research also answered the following questions”  
• How effective was the role played by SADC in resolving the crises in Zimbabwe?  
• Is there a relationship between Zimbabwe colonial history, the early years of independence and 
the formation of the GNU?  
• Was the SADC mediated GNU successful in fulfilling its mandate of creating conditions 
conducive for restoring political and economic stability in Zimbabwe?   
• Was the general populace consulted prior to the establishment and implementation of the GNU?  
• How best can GNU be used to end crises situations in states?   
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1.6 Hypothesis  
  
The GNU as an option could have been more effective had political actors negotiated on equal footing on 
a level playing field, where all citizens were granted an opportunity to air their views. There was a better 
option to achieve long-lasting peace in Zimbabwe. Apart from a mediated unity government, any 
transition requires a committed, willing leadership that is politically neutral to move the country from one 
point to the next. During the transition period, the neutral government will put in place mechanisms that 
make government run more smoothly. The ordinary Zimbabweans only wanted a change of government. 
The GNU achieved little, if any positive thing during its tenure. After the GNU the country returned to its 
previous position with economic meltdown and partisan politics coupled with political polarization and 
tension. This status quo continues to bedevil the country years after the GNU and prospects of a lasting 
solution appear more remote.  
1.7 Significance of the Study  
  
The post-GNU Zimbabwe is a reflection of the inadequacies of the GNU era, the country plunged right 
back into the same scenario with economic meltdown and political intolerance intensified by a partisan 
uniformed force. The chances of Zimbabwe taking the GNU route again are high considering the Political 
Actors Dialogue that has been taking place in Zimbabwe among all the willing political parties. Political 
incumbency was the main trigger in the Zimbabwe situation, where one leader stayed in power for too 
long, setting bad precedence for all, as the incumbent leaders hold on to power at the expense of all other 
forms of liberty, (they become repressive, dictatorial and ruthless). Studying human behaviour uses 
occurrences to help predict the future, making projections, this helps avoid such events from happening in 
future. The challenges that the country faced and still faces require a wholesome approach in order to 
adequately address all issues at hand thereby proffering a lasting solution. Almond and Verba (1963) are 
of the view that learning from past experience helps the electorate make informed decisions on what 
happens in a poll where they vote resolutely for their preferred candidate. This helps to avoid electoral 
confusion which results in contested results. It also helps in voter education to encourage participation of 
the general public in order to change the political culture of a nation from parochial and subject to 
participant political culture.   
  
Looking at the literature in place, most of the studies have addressed the issues of GNU in isolation 
without combining the SADC effort, GNU set up, citizen participation and their effectiveness, all in one. 
Most scholars have focused on the achievements and failures of the GNU and have not quite assessed 
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whether the GNU was the best option given that it was never put out for public opinion or vote. Some 
argue that it was an elite deal meant to share power and give each other positions to pacify the opposition 
and not really meant to serve the general public. This study has attempted to address the issues all at once 
and come up with proposals as to how a lasting solution can be achieved. This makes it an important tool 
for decision makers to consider as they discuss options of resolving the current crises facing the country 
as they are similar to past experiences. This study was based on first-hand information gathered from the 
participants and as such their experiences matter in informing future action which is suggested in the 
recommendations section.    
  
1.8 Structure of dissertation  
  
The thesis is presented in the following eight chapters which are divided into 2 sections; the first part 
consisting of Chapters1 - 4, focusing on the aspects that the researcher set out to do and how it was done 
in order to achieve the objectives of the research. The second part, Chapters 5 - 8 focus on the feedback of 
the field research that the respondents aired out in answering the questions that were asked to get some 
relevant information based on their experiences of the GNU in Zimbabwe.   
  
Chapter One - The first part is the introductory chapter which explains the background of the problem, 
the purpose, research questions and rationale of the study.   
  
Chapter Two – This chapter focuses on literature review, paying particular attention to arguments for 
SADC Mediation and the GNU. It also discusses what participation, in the context of governance, entails 
and how it can be conceptualized.   
  
Chapter Three - This Chapter focuses on theoretical issues of coalition governments and power sharing, 
paying attention to the major theories used in the study that is Ripeness, Readiness and Elite Theories.   
  
Chapter Four - The chapter is concerned with the methodological choices that guide the research. The 
reason for conducting a two-step investigation is more thoroughly explained.   
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Chapter Five - Based on extensive empirical research, Chapter 5 traces the background of Zimbabwe’s 
GNU and factors leading to the negotiation process. The Chapter also sought to discuss the role played by 
SADC and other regional bodies in the mediation process which led to the creation of GNU.   
  
Chapter Six - The chapter interrogates the structure of the GNU for the period 2008 - 2013 with regards 
to the allocation of ministries and clearly defining the roles of the President and the Prime Minister with a 
view to unearth power imbalances within the GNU.   
  
Chapter Seven - The chapter extensively discusses the successes and failures of the GNU in order to 
understand whether it was the right time for Zimbabweans to end the political crisis.    
  
Chapter Eight - The final chapter brings the pieces together by summarizing the main findings, and then 
goes on to discuss conclusions and present some thoughts about future research.  
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CHAPTER TWO  
                                           LITERATURE REVIEW  
2.1 Introduction  
There exists abundant literature relating to mediation and governments of national unity. The following 
chapter is a presentation of the theoretical arguments for mediation and governments of national unity.  
The chapter, firstly examines and analyses mediation as a measure that has been used to prevent and 
resolve conflicts from an international perspective. The rationale is to analyse what the mediation process 
is and the necessities of mediators in conflict deterrence or conflict tenacity. In the realm of mediation, the 
chapter gives an overview of mediation in the context of African and sub-regional organisations on the 
continent. Secondly, the chapter focuses on governments of national unity which are brought about by the 
process of mediation. In this section scholarly definitions of governments of national unity and formation 
of governments of national unity are presented before a critique of such governments of national unity. 
The chapter makes use of empirical case studies in analysis of these two variables. The aim of this 
literature review chapter is to identify the gap that this study which focuses on, ‘SADC  
Mediation in Zimbabwe: Lost opportunity for lasting solution to the Zimbabwe crises’, sought to fill.   
  
2.2 Defining the Concept of Mediation  
Mediation remains a fundamentally critical element too relevant to snub in conflict resolution and 
prevention, (Kindu, 2017). According to Nathan (2005) in its simplest sense mediation can be defined as 
the act or process of mitigating the concerns of disputing parties by an intermediary who is not a party to 
the conflict, but who enjoys the trust of all parties and whose goal is to help forge settlements that are 
deemed acceptable. In the same line, Moore (2003) defines mediation as an extension and elaboration of 
the negotiation process that involves the intervention of an acceptable, impartial and neutral third party 
who has no authoritative decision-making power to assist contending parties in voluntarily reaching their 
own mutually acceptable and implementable settlement. Consequently, mediation as a conflict resolution 
or prevention method, is a method in which a third party intervenes and aims to encourage conflicting 
parties to produce a permanent solution to the conflict. Nathan (1999:52) takes a holistic approach to the 
definition of mediation asserting that;  
Mediation is a process of dialogue and negotiation in which a third party assists two or more 
disputant parties, with their consent, to prevent, manage or resolve a conflict without the use of 
force. The general goal is to enable the parties to reach agreements they find satisfactory and are 
willing to implement. Mediation should be regarded as a specialised endeavor, encompassing a 
body of knowledge and a set of strategies, tactics, skills and techniques  
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Such a perception reveals that mediation can be deeply rooted in the soft power realm where consent 
without the use of hard power is a priority.  Shaw (2003) from an International law perspective divulges 
the synonymous nature of mediation and good offices. Although the term applies to international law the 
scholar notes that the employment of the procedures of good offices and mediation involves the use of a 
third party, whether an individual or individuals, a State or group of States or an international 
organisation, to encourage the contending parties to come to a settlement. Fenham (2008:4) borrowing 
from Joseph Nye’s soft power perspective ramparts the views of Shaw (2013) by asserting that mediation 
involves the use of a third party in a manner that is distant from the use of condign power but of 
attraction, co-opting and of persuasion as a means to avert or even terminate the escalation of a 
disagreement. As such mediation is hence a solution-oriented process because they view people in 
conflict as clients in need of a solution so they view conflict as a problem to be solved through 
collaboration, which is mediation by another name.  This is in contrast with the realistic view of conflict 
which says conflict is never ending so they employ the conflict transformation or conflict management 
lens. However, Shaw (2003) states that mediation is a process that aims at persuading the parties to a 
dispute to reach satisfactory terms for its termination by themselves and provisions for settling the dispute 
are not prescribed. Mediation in this sense is a measure in the soft power circle that is aimed at either 
preventing the escalation of a conflict or from halting an ongoing conflict.    
Involvement of a third party under the mediation process does not necessarily and literally mean that only 
a single group or individual can lead the entire process, but a combination of representatives from 
international, regional and sub-regional organisations can all participate as third parties. For instance, 
Matunja (2012) in her research of the GNU case in Malagasy states that mediation efforts that were 
adopted in resolving the crisis in Madagascar involved the AU which established the International Contact 
Group (ICG) through which the AU coordinates and harmonizes her efforts with the UN, the relevant 
REC and other regional bodies as well as the permanent and the African members of the UN Security 
Council. The same scholar reveals the involvement of various organisations in mediation by stating that 
the Maputo Summit held in 2009 under the auspices of the AU, which was led by Mr. Joaquim Chissano 
included a joint mediation team which comprised of the AU, the SADC, the UN, and International 
Organization of la Francophonie. The, Malagasy political actors who were involved in the summit 
included Marc Ravalomanana, Didier Ratsiraka, Albert Zafy and Andry Rajoelina who later on formed a 
GNU, (Kotze 2013).   
Mediation henceforth is a soft power initiative aimed at resolving disputes that is recognized 
internationally as a measure that can be vital in preventing conflicts. Fenham (2008) is of the view that it 
is specious to focus on mediation without necessarily focusing on the third party because, conflict 
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resolution or prevention under mediation is hinged upon the effectiveness of mediators. Thus, mediators 
play a significant role in the outcomes of mediations because a mediator acts as both a bridge and a buffer 
between the disputing parties, (Maina, 2011). Citing Nathan (2005), Maina (2011) concurs with the 
former’s sentiment that any meaningful mediation lies in understanding, managing and transforming the 
political, economic, social and psychological dynamics of conflict that make disputant parties resistant to 
negotiations. Kindu (2017) buttressing such a view states that mediation is a complex holistic considerate 
soft power measure that finds its relevance and basis from Article 33 of the UN Charter; and has the 
ultimate objective of ensuring that parties to a disagreement reach a compromise for the sake of 
progression away from a conflict. Therefore, according to the scholar, for progression to be seen the 
organisation, individual or individuals tasked with the role to play the intermediary role must possess 
certain neutral characteristics which are acceptable to parties in a conflict. Mediation as a process, as 
history reveals has been a task that has been given to well-known individuals who have acted on behalf of 
international, regional and sub-regional organisations producing different results in each case. As a 
process it passes through various fundamental sequential stages, the mediation process, that involves 
disputants and the third party who is the mediator.   
Mediation has been used as a method of dispute resolution in a variety of different cultures for more than 
3,000 years. Tracing the roots of the practice has been a journey of culture, understanding, translation, 
war and peace. Romans for instance called mediators by a number of names, internuncios, medium, 
intercessor, philantropus, interpolator, conciliator, interlocutor, interpres, and mediator.  (Roman law in 
530-533CE).  Even in the Bible,  Paul directed the Corinthians to appoint people from their own 
community for the purpose of resolving disputes rather than submitting disputes to the court for resolution 
(I Corinthians 6:1-4). Even in the Arab world or Islamic traditions, there are most famous stories of 
Prophet Muhammad’s early life is that of him being chosen by feuding tribes to resolve a dispute around 
the reconstruction of the Ka’ba, (Fatahi, 2018).   
The history of mediation can also be traced back to Ancient Greece, where village elders used to mediate 
local disputes between the villagers. Within the African context, although informal and traditionally 
driven practices of mediation have existed for many generations, institutionalized and African-driven 
mediation became more important following the end of the Cold War, (Gounden, 2017). Mediation 
initiatives have thus been undertaken over the past 25 years, partly as a consequence of the increase in 
intra-state conflicts on the continent. Perhaps the first post-1990 African-driven mediation processes were 
the Arusha Peace Process for Burundi and the Inter-Congolese Dialogue (for the Democratic Republic of 
the Congo (ibid). It is therefore important that the concept of mediation is not new to the African 
continent but its modern conceptualization maybe new to the continent.    
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2.2.1 The Mediation Process   
Mediation has been perceived as a process within which certain stages have to be followed for the 
achievement of better results, (Slaikeu 1989, 396; Smith 2008; Smith and Smock 2008; Kumar 2010).  
The process involves a sequence of events that often obviously has differing results.  The trajectory of 
mediation as a process of resolving disputes has resulted in two differing opinions. While, Smith (1998:1) 
for instance denotes that mediation ought to be perceived as a generally quick and relatively inexpensive 
method that has the added objective of maintaining a good relationship between parties. Ironically and 
differing from the sentiments which were put forth by Smith (1998), Eppson (2014:88) commenting on 
mediation in the 21st century, states that mediation is a cumbersome process in which a lot resources, 
activities and mediations personnel are involved. Scholars have none the less emphasised on six or seven 
factors that inform mediation as a process as noted in the figure below. Kumar (2013:154) even mentions 
that a full scale mediation typically involves at least six stages, which are diagrammatically presented as 
below.  
Figure 1: Stages of the Meditation Process   
Mediator’s Opening  Statement   
Stage One    
Disputants’ Opening  Statements  
 
Stage Two    
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Final Negotiation &    
Deal-Making      
Stage Five    
Closure       
Stage Six   
  
  
 Source: Kumar (2013:153)  
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2.2.1.i Stage One: Mediator’s Opening Statement   
Scholars have cited this as the first stage of the negotiation process. In conflict resolution Kumar 
(2013:155) notes that the commencement of the mediation is typically marked by an opening statement by 
the mediator and this serves as the introductory stage vital to the establishment of a relationship that will 
facilitate the rest of the mediation process. Therefore, this is a critical juncture in the mediation process as 
it is the stage at which the mediator introduces the rationale behind the engagement and the goals that are 
pinned down.   
Giles (2008:44) attempts to reveal what actually happens at the initial stages of the process by stating that 
after the disputants are seated at a table, the mediator introduces everyone, explains the goals and rules of 
the mediation, and encourages each side to work cooperatively toward a settlement. Such sentiments are 
also buttressed by Kumar (2013) who notes that the mediator must provide initial structuring, gain the 
participant’s trust and cooperation in the process by highlighting the advantages of mediation. It is at this 
stage that participants are also introduced and the mediator is obliged to describe his/her role, explain the 
mediation process, and sets out any ground rules that guide the process, (Spence and Brogan 2006).  
Slaikeu (1996:67) in line with this noted that the seating arrangement should not square the parties off 
directly across from one another in order to maintain an atmosphere of cooperation.  Stage one of the 
mediation process maybe the most difficult stage as it may be the first time that parties to a conflict meet. 
It is usually difficult for the parties to the conflict and the mediator as the situation is often tense. As such 
the mediator has a role to identify and briefly discuss benefits of the process, the legal parameters, such as 
confidentiality and enforceability of settlement and the goals and objectives from the mediator’s 
standpoint must be set out (Kumar 2013; Giles 2017). It is important to note that mediation should take 
place on neutral ground, in a room which ensures confidentiality, (Smith 2008:4). The rationale behind 
considering all these factors is to ensure that nothing is to the benefit of the parties to the conflict.   
2.2.1.ii Stage Two: Disputants’ Opening Statements  
The second stage in the process is for disputants to contribute towards the mediation process through 
sharing their standpoint in the entire dispute realm. Giles (2017:47) in this regard, state that each party is 
invited to describe, in their own words, what the dispute is about and how they has been affected by it, 
and to present some general ideas about resolving it. While one person is speaking, the other is not 
allowed to interrupt. Following the opening statement by the mediator, it is then the turn of the parties to 
begin and each party is provided with an equal time to talk and the choice of who speaks first is left to the 
parties, although normally the person who initiates the dispute will speak first Bullen (2012). On this note 
Kumar (2013) refers to the stage as the ventilation stage where the parties, locked in bitter dispute, is 
likely to furiously air their grievances. Therefore, at this stage, the mediator should calm things down and 
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request parties not to lose their composure while making the opening statement. The parties and/or their 
representatives should be able to ventilate their views of the case or dispute. The opening statement stage 
provides a time for parties to fully express and explain to the mediator, and more importantly, to each 
other, how they view the dispute in their own words. Giles (2017) is of the view that it is the duty of the 
mediator to listen attentively to factors that will be raised by belligerents or disputants, with the mediator 
giving each party enough time without interruption from the other party or the mediator before forwarding 
a summary of the parties opening statements.   
2.2.1.iii Stage Three: The Caucus Phase  
Kumar (2013) states that the need for caucus or separate meeting between the mediator and each party 
(accompanied with or without advocate) may arise in certain situations. This stage is not always found in 
all the mediation processes but it is bound to happen when need arises. It is a phase that involves 
discussions in private settings. It has to be noted that the separate meetings are based on secrecy and 
information discussed has to be kept a secret, (Giles 2017). As a closed meeting of a group of persons 
belonging to the same political party or faction, caucus meetings are important as they sometimes allow 
members to meet behind closed doors without violating the Open Meetings law.   
This is important as it keeps the flares down in the actual mediation process. Secondly, political caucuses 
can be important because they allow members of the same faction to coordinate strategy and deliberate on 
the possible way to convince the other party to a conflict. Thirdly, issue caucuses can be important 
because they allow party members to meet with lobbyists and consult. A mediator must never disclose 
information discussed in caucus with the party, unless the disclosing party had authorised the mediator to 
do so, the mediator can use such information to assist both parties in settling on options that will satisfy 
their interests, that is balancing interests of disputing parties (Kumar 2014).  
2.2.1.iv Stage Four: Joint Discussion Stage   
The fourth stage in the mediation process relates to the mediator trying to get the parties talking directly 
about what was said in the opening statements. This is the time to determine what issues need to be 
addressed, (Giles 2017). After caucuses, the mediator may bring the parties back together to negotiate 
directly. Smith (1998:4) notes that at this stage the mediator then tries to bring the two sides as close to an 
agreement as possible. Since joint meetings can be much more productive and efficient than meeting with 
each party separately and shuttling between them, it is up to the mediator to decide if and when they are 
ready to get back into joint meetings for negotiation. According to Slaikeu (1996) the SOS Model (for 
summaries offers-summaries) is vital at this stage. Smith (1998) commenting on the SOS Model stipulate 
that it is a threefold model in which   
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1. The parties should summarize their current position and their feelings about each outstanding 
issue.   
2. The parties must discuss possible solutions to the problems they face: the parties generally offer 
trades to one another. The mediator’s main role at this stage is as facilitator and coach. S/he may 
need to reframe the problems when the parties begin to reach an impasse or when emotions run 
high.   
3. The mediator then needs to summarize what the parties have agreed to and accomplished so far 
and what they are yet to accomplish. If the parties are not ready to meet face-to-face, the entire 
process may need to proceed through shuttle meetings with the mediator moving back and forth 
between the parties, summarizing the other side’s views and possible movement, (ibid).  
2.2.1.v Stage Five: Final Negotiation and Deal-Making   
The final negotiation stage involves activities initiated by both the parties and the mediator to reduce the 
scope of substantive and procedural differences between parties, so as to move toward a formal agreement 
leading to the termination of conflict, (Kumar 2013). This is the final joint meeting between the parties in 
the presence of a mediator before the closure of mediation. In this round, the results of the separate 
meetings are carefully considered. If there remains any miscommunication or misunderstanding, then 
those are discussed and removed, before parties reach the resolution of the disputes. If deadlock worsens, 
then they may, however, take a realistic decision to discontinue mediation and settle their dispute in other 
forums like courts, (Giles 2017).    
2.2.1.vi Stage Six: Closure  
The closing of a mediation process is an important final step. It is the last opportunity that the mediator 
has to ensure that all of the concerns and interests of the parties, including relationship issues, have been 
addressed, (Giles, 2017). This can significantly impact the parties’ substantive and psychological 
satisfaction with the process and impact their adherence to any resolution achieved. A mediation process 
may close in three different ways: with agreement; with partial agreement; and without agreement. Kumar 
(2014) states that this is the end of the mediation. If an agreement has been reached, the mediator may put 
its main provisions in writing as the parties listen. The mediator may ask each side to sign the written 
summary of agreement or suggest they take it to lawyers for review. If the parties want to, they can write 
up and sign a legally binding contract. If no agreement was reached, the mediator will review whatever 
progress has been made and advise each party of their options, such as meeting again later, going to 
arbitration, or going to court, (ibid).   
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Therefore, the information in the foregoing reveals that mediation is a multi-stage process designed to get 
results. It is less formal than a trial or arbitration, but there are distinct stages to the mediation process that 
account for the system’s high rate of success. Throughout the process, the mediator generates a climate of 
cooperation. Each stage is important and has to be taken seriously as it often leads to the other. Therefore, 
the mediation process is key in mediation. In as much as there are various characteristics that should be 
considered in the mediation process, there are vital and core pillars that are profoundly important in the 
mediation of a situation where parties to a disagreement are about or are pursuing actions that are perilous 
to international peace and security.  
2.3 Characteristics of Mediators    
In the entire mediation process involving disagreements between states or parties within a state  which has 
to be pursued by chosen mediators, the UN Guidance for Effective Mediation (2011) states that mediators 
confront five basic challenges, namely, mandate, impartiality and inclusivity, entry and consent, strategy, 
and leverage. Mancini and Vericat (2016) contend that these are the five key challenges that mediators 
confront in which their performance has to be tested. These elements are also found in the UN Guidance 
for Effective Mediation, which the Department of Political Affairs’ (DPA) Mediation Support Unit 
developed to identify “a number of key fundamentals that should be considered in a mediation effort”,  
(ibid).   
2.3.1 Mandate  
The principle relates to a directive that should exist from an authorizing body at an international level, 
regional or sub-regional level, (Hakim 2015). In this way Mancini and Vericat (2016) state that the 
relationship between mediators and their authorizing agency, in this, is established by the mandate, which 
defines the goals of the mediation and much of the success or failure of a mission depends on this. Kotze 
(2013) focusing on the Malagasy case, notes that when the Ravalomanana administration was overthrown 
by the military and the Rajoelina regime in March 2009, the African Union and the Southern African 
Development Community (SADC) immediately responded by declaring it an unconstitutional change of 
government. In this way as events proceeded SADC initiated a major intervention to address the stalemate 
in the form of an extraordinary summit in Sandton, Johannesburg, on the 11th and the 12th of June 2011 
where a roadmap was adopted, (ibid). The SADC mediator, former President Joaquim Chissano was 
given a mandate by SADC and this scenario applies to Thabo Mbeki when he mediated the GNU in 
Zimbabwe.  
In the same vein after the escalation of the Syrian war in 2011, the UN and the Arab initiated mediation 
plans, where the former UN Secretary General Kofi Annan was mandated by the organizations to develop 
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a ceasefire mediation strategy and was tasked to act as the UN-Arab League Joint Special Representative 
for Syria. However, when the mandate and his plan failed he was replaced by Lakhdar Brahimi whose 
mediation mission lasted twenty-one months, from August 17, 2012, to May 14, 2014 meeting the same 
fate as his predecessor, (Mancini and Vericat 2016). Mandate henceforth is granted to mediators by an 
organisation of some sort and the mediators act on behalf of the organizations concerned.   
However, Mancini and Vericat (2016) taking a case study approach of the Libyan scenario note that after 
the Security Council referred the situation in Libya to the International Criminal Court (ICC) in February 
2011 on the basis of alleged crimes against humanity, the UN Secretary General appointed Abdelelah 
alKhatib, former foreign minister of Jordan, as special envoy but there was no equal support for al-
Khatib’s mandate. In fact, al-Khatib’s failure to mediate a peaceful transition in Libya was in large part 
due to bitter divisions within the various organizations involved in the peacemaking effort. Beyond the 
consensus reached over Security Council Resolution 1970, the members of the council were strongly 
divided, with none of the unity they showed in supporting the UN envoy’s work in Yemen.  
  
2.3.2 Impartiality and inclusivity  
One fundamental tenet that mediators must possess is impartiality in their efforts to run a balanced 
process that engages with all actors and deals with them fairly, (UN Guidance for Effective Mediation, 
2012). On this note Mancini and Vericat (2016) state that a related issue, inclusivity of the interests of the 
different parties to the conflict is vital as well because the greater the impartiality, the more it is possible 
to be inclusive; but the more inclusive the process, the greater the likelihood of a diluted settlement. 
Therefore, mediators tasked with mediation must show impartiality and inclusivity for parties to a conflict 
to be inclined to the negotiation process. The UN Guidance for Effective Mediation (2012) bluntly states 
that third parties must be faithful and trustworthy transmitters of words and ideas, balanced in their efforts 
to contact and listen to all parties, and dedicated to eliciting an outcome that is the product of the parties.  
This element henceforth requires detachment at every stage of the process.   
  
2.3.3 Entry and Consent  
On this view, the fundamental question to be asked is, “Do the parties to the conflict want mediation?” 
(Kindu, 2017). However, ideally, mediators are invited to engage in a conflict by the warring parties 
which is not a common feature hence it is the task of regional and sub-regional organisations to act when 
conflict hits Zartman’s “mutually hurting stalemate” the point where the parties perceive that they have 
more to gain by negotiating than by fighting. The case of Mozambique is vital as, after attainment of 
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independence from Portugal in 1975, the country was plunged into a civil war between the government’s 
Mozambique Liberation Front (FRELIMO) and the Mozambique National Resistance (MNR) against the  
Mozambique National Resistance Movement (RENAMO) backed by South Africa’s Apartheid regime, 
(The United Nations Handbook 1998).  The civil war threatened securitisation of both parties that were 
involved in the clash such that after thorough negotiations, the two parties came to the negotiating table in 
1992 in Rome where they signed a General Peace Agreement.  The two parties in as much as they wanted 
to control Mozambique benefited nothing by the continued fighting. Entry and consent is situational but 
in most cases it is the mutually hurting stalemate that inclines parties to call for mediation. However, 
mediators can push for the mediation process to take place like the case of SADC in the Malagasy case 
where they reached out to fighting political parties to come to the negotiation table.   
  
2.3.4 Strategy  
The strategy refers to the plan that mediators have to initiate to be successful for instance Thabo Mbeki 
initiated a quiet diplomacy in the Zimbabwe situation while Kofi Annan devised a Six-Point Plan to 
resolve the Syrian crisis in 2012. Therefore, Mancini and Vericat (2016) are of the view that mediators 
have to consider how to achieve the goals defined in their mandate and “should they aim for a one-off 
comprehensive agreement or adopt a step-by-step strategy? And should they focus first on cease-fires or 
on peripheral issues?” Therefore, the strategy is initiated by mediators in the realm of the organs 
mandated and is approved by the organisation.     
  
 2.3.5 Leverage   
This is one of the most vital elements in mediation as it refers to the aptitude of go-betweens to direct the 
path of belligerents. Shaw (2003) notes that technically, good officers or mediators attempt to influence 
the opposing sides to enter into negotiations and actively participate in the negotiating process. Mancini 
and Vericat (2016) on this aspect present an interesting yet complex element by stating that at an 
international level for instance the greatest challenge UN mediators face in leveraging power is that they 
represent a multilateral organisation made up of a large number of member states, each with its own 
competing agenda. In this way the scholars argue that under these circumstances the environment of 
disunity undermines, in particular the mediator’s coercive power. A mediator who faces either a divided 
Security Council for instance the case of Syria or a divided international community for instance like in 
the case of Libya is seriously hampered, (ibid).  On the other hand in regional or sub-regional groupings 
especially the latter a mediator’s leverage faces less obstructions which is even illustrated by how 
mediators that have participated as third parties in skirmishes on behalf of sub-regional blocs have been 
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successful in ending intra-state struggles within a limited timeframe, unlike; in the case of third party 
representing a multinational organization of some sort.   
  
The above factors mentioned therefore play a vital role in the success of mediation, which is one of the 
vigorous components of the soft power ring under the UN in its role to maintain international peace and 
security. They have also been considered in regional and sub-regional organizations throughout the entire 
globe. The results of mediation have been twofold in international relations, as in selected cases mediation 
has worked and in some instances, the element has not worked.   
2.4 Mediation in the Conflict Prevention Discourse    
In view of the aforementioned factors on mediation, the United Nations which has the mandate to 
maintain international peace and security in Article 33(1), Chapter VI on Pacific Settlement of Disputes of 
its guiding charter; the UN Charter states that;   
The parties to any dispute, the continuance of which is likely to endanger the maintenance of 
international peace and security, shall, first of all, seek a solution by negotiation, enquiry, 
mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies or 
arrangements, or other peaceful means of their own choice.  
In this way Apaka (2013) not only states that the UN prioritise tenets of soft power in a bid to resolve 
conflicts but also states that there is growing support for mediation as a method for conflict prevention 
and resolution in regional, national and international levels due to its effectiveness. On the same note  
Shaw (2003) states that Article 52(1) of Chapter VIII of the UN Charter provides that “nothing in the 
Charter precludes the existence of regional arrangements or agencies for dealing with such matters 
relating to the maintenance of international peace and security as are appropriate for regional action, 
provided that such arrangements or agencies and their activities are consistent with the purposes and 
principles of the UN”. Thus, as noted by Apaka (2013) the UN confers powers to regional and even 
subregional blocs to settle inter-state or intra-state skirmishes. However, Article 52(2) of the UN Charter 
even stipulates that;   
members of the UN entering into such arrangements or agencies are to make every effort to settle 
local disputes peacefully through such regional arrangements or by such regional agencies before 
referring them to the Security Council, and that the Security Council encourages the development 
of the peaceful settlement of local disputes through such regional arrangements.  
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Consequently, mediation of disputes for instance is initially made by regional or sub-regional 
arrangements before the United Security Council can intervene. The fundamentality of mediation is noted 
by Cantekin (2015) who states that the UN General Assembly unanimously accepted a resolution about 
“strengthening the role of mediation in the peaceful settlement of disputes, conflict prevention and 
resolution” on 28 July 2011. The United Nations (2012) stipulates that the resolution adopted in 2011 
recognised the increased use of mediation, reflected on current challenges facing the international 
community in such mediation efforts, and called on key actors to develop their mediation capabilities. 
Therefore, mediation, besides direct negotiations between the parties, is one of the most effective methods 
to avoid, manage and resolve international disputes and conflicts.  In some instances, all the groups can be 
involved depending on the situation and crisis at hand. Kindu (2017) states that events that have unfolded 
internationally regarding conflict prevention and even resolution where the mediation was used, show a 
compromise to amalgamate diverse or divergent ideas to form one compatible progression outcome.  In 
the African expanse where elections have been contested more than any continent in the world, mediation 
has been used as measure to prevent or halt escalation of internal crises. Mediation to be specific has of 
late been used in the governance discourse to establish governments of national unity. Kotze (2013) notes 
that conceptually, a unity government is designed to incorporate diverse political interests, including the 
main antagonists in the preceding conflict and in this sense, it is meant to compel them into political 
cooperation. Mediation has accordingly been used to form political cooperation and countries such as  
South Africa, Sudan, Zimbabwe, Kenya, Madagascar and Côte d’Ivoire among others have formed 
governments of national unity out of various cumbersome and lengthy mediation processes.   
2.4.1 The Essence of Mediation: A Human Security Perspective   
Mediation as an approach to conflict resolution aims at ensuring the security of individuals in a society. In 
this regard there is a strong nexus between the human security conception and mediation as a process. 
Kofi Annan cited in Kondo and Makanza (2014:35) states that, in its broadest the concept of human 
security embraced far more than the absence of violent conflicts, it encompasses human rights, good 
governance, access to education and health care and ensuring that each individual has opportunities and 
choices to fulfil his or her own potential. In this regard, accomplishing the human securitisation 
perspective of Kofi Annan calls for thorough mediation between parties to a conflict. In this manner 
mediation is just but an attempt that aims at ensuring that human security elements are attained, (ibid). 
Although the definition of Human Security is subject to much debate its first, most-commonly cited usage 
came in the United Nations Development Program’s (UNDP) 1994 Human Development Report.  
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The 1994 UNDP Report defines human security as people’s freedom from chronic threats and protection 
from sudden hurtful disruptions in patterns of life.  Kondo and Makanza (2014:35) in support of the 
definition by the UNDP denote that, an essential part of human security approach is its focus on 
interlinkages between the multiple threats and issues such as socio-economic deprivation, health, 
education, environmental issues and physical threats and violent conflicts.  This thus entails that the 
elements of human security are intertwined such that deprivation of one element possess a threat to the 
other elements for instance if economic insecurity leads to health insecurity and insecurity in the political 
spheres is a threat to personal freedom.  The scope of human security includes seven areas which are 
economic security, food security, health security, environmental security, personal security, community 
security and political security. Therefore, as noted by Kupps (2017:66) the deleterious effects of the inter-
state and instate conflicts of the post-cold war epoch particularly in the Middle East and the African 
continent has been a result of the use of condign power instead of pacific measures. In this regard pursuit, 
confrontations and skirmishes within states and between states in the international milieu have occasioned 
massive deaths, destruction and anguish among others; which is human insecurity in short. However, 
mediation has been used in some instance and the results have been positive in specific instances. The 
following section aims at highlighting the regional and sub-regional approaches to conflict resolution 
through the use mediation.   
Archarya (2011:482) is of the view that the concept of human security represents both a vertical and 
horizontal expansion or deepening and widening of the traditional notion of national security defined as 
protection of state sovereignty and territorial integrity from external military threats. Archarya further 
states that in its broader sense human security is distinguished by three elements which are its focus on 
the individual or people as referent object of security, its multidimensional nature and its universal or 
global scope. Therefore, ensuring freedom from want and freedom from fear for all persons is the overall 
objective of human security. Human security has been compromised in the post-independent African State 
because of continued inter-state fighting. Dorrie (2016: 1) for instance asserts that “virtually every story 
coming out of the continent in the post 1990 era seems to showcase one atrocity or another”.  In 2014 
alone Africa experienced more than half of worldwide conflict incidents, despite having only about 16% 
of the world population, (Bruce 2015:8). Internal fights have thus atrophied the post-independent state in 
Africa. However, acting on the basis of Article 52 of the UN Charter the African continent has seen the 
birth of several regional bodies that have attempted to mediate in disputes that engulf the continent.  
 
2.4.2 Mediation Attempts in Africa: A Regional and Sub-Regional Case Study Approach   
Several mediation attempts have been made in the African continent at a regional and sub-regional level.  
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Tieku (2011) commenting on mediation in Africa notes that mediation is a major intervention tool in 
Africa as it has been used to prevent and resolve many violent conflicts in Africa. The commonly used 
type of mediation in African conflict is regional organization-led mediation processes. Although 
mediation has been used by organizations such as the Intergovernmental Authority on Development 
(IGAD), Southern African Development Community (SADC), Economic Community of West African 
States (ECOWAS) and the East African Community, this section aims at highlighting mediation in the 
African context at the African level and at sub-regional level using the case studies of ECOWAS and 
IGAD.   
  
2.4.3 The African Union   
The African Union, just like any other regional grouping, draws its mandate from the UN Charter. Article 
52 (1) of the UN Charter provides for Regional Arrangement and recognizes the creation of regional 
groupings that aim at maintaining global peace and security. To this end, the AU’s goals are consistent 
with the purposes and principles of the UN. The African Union Article 4(e) of the Constitutive Act of the 
African Union (AU) provides for the “peaceful resolution of conflicts among AU Member States through 
such appropriate means as may be decided upon by the Assembly.” This principle is elaborated in Article 
3 of the Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council, which outlines the 
anticipation and prevention of conflict, and peace-making, peace-building and post-conflict 
reconstruction, as part of its cardinal objectives.   
  
In this regard, mediation is at the heart of the AU process and during the past few years and due to the 
emergence and resurgence of conflicts in many parts of the continent, the AU has stepped up its mediation 
activities. African Union Mediation Support Handbook (2014) on this state that mediation has become an 
integral component of the AU peacemaking initiatives and is acknowledged as having the potential to be 
instrumental in preventing, managing and ending conflicts. African Union (2018) notes that there are 
currently about 20 AU special envoys, representatives and mediators deployed in conflict and post-
conflict countries across the continent. These envoys are appointed by the Chairperson of the 
Commission, often pursuant to a decision of the Peace and Security Council or the Assembly of Heads of 
States and Governments, or with their endorsement.   
  
According to African Union Mediation Support Handbook (2014), the AU has designed a strategy for 
mediation that informs its plan of action. The strategy is composed of 12 guidelines viz.  
I. the parties must own the agreement  
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II. mediation and negotiations should be inclusive of all significant political actors   
III. civil society must be involved in the mediation and negotiations  
IV. the mediator(s) must help the parties develop a relationship of trust and cooperation   
V. mediation must be a non-threatening venture for the parties    
VI. mediators must be impartial   
VII. there is no quick-fix solution in deep-rooted conflict   
VIII. mediators must help the parties address the root causes of the conflict  
IX. mediators must be flexible, creative, responsive and adaptive  
X. the drafting and implementation of peace agreements should be properly linked   
XI. the process must address the regional dimensions of national conflicts  
XII.   there is a need for systematic and rigorous approaches to mediation processes   
  
Bealktay (2017) notes that such a mediation approach has become central in the African Union’s approach 
to mediation on the continent.  To date the African Union has made mediation efforts to resolve conflicts 
in several on-going situations as well as responding to new, unprecedented situations. It has intervened in 
situations in Central African Republic (CAR), Darfur (Sudan), Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), 
Libya, Mali/Sahel, Somalia, the situation in Sudan, the South Sudan, and against the Lord’s Resistance 
Army (LRA) among others. It has to be noted that in its mediation approach the African Union has 
collaborated with sub-regional groupings and the United Nations due to various factors. Makinda and 
Okomu (2008) note that the AU has concentrated its resources and efforts mainly on conflict management 
rather than on conflict prevention and post-conflict peace-building.  
 
In this way African states have been unable to fully finance the operations of the AU Peace and Security 
Commission hence mediation has been affected to a greater extent. As a result, operations have been 
undertaken relying on resources of non-African funding authorities (Western powers). Today, over 90% 
of the AU’s peace and security efforts are funded by external actors. In the same realm Okhonmina (2010) 
argues that the AU has collaborated with regional groups and in most cases the latter have played the most 
significant role.  The AU has played a support role for instance after the eruption of conflict in the 
Republic of South Sudan in December 2013 efforts were undertaken by IGAD, with the support of the 
AU, where talks, under the facilitation of an IGAD mediation team led by Ambassador Seyoum Mesfin, 
and comprising General Lazaro Sumbeiywo and General Mohammed Ahmed Moustafa El Dabi,  
culminated in the signing on 23 January 2014 of the Agreements on the Cessation of Hostilities and on 
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the Status of Detainees. This can be said in the case of SADC in Zimbabwe (2009) and Madagascar 
(2009), ECOWAS in Gambia.   
  
2.4.4 Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS)  
During the past three decades, the West African region has witnessed violent conflicts, coups, civil wars 
and political instability (Benson, 2018). However, acting on the powers vested in regional organisations 
as enshrined in the United Nations Charter, Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) 
has initiated intermediary activities in assisting and encouraging parties to peacefully resolve their 
disputes. The Economic Community of West Africa States (ECOWAS) is a regional economic bloc 
created by the Authority of Heads of State and Governments of West Africa on the 28th of May, 1975 in 
Lagos, Nigeria. ECOWAS is composed of the following West African countries: Benin, Burkina Faso,  
Cape Verde, Cote d’Ivoire, The Gambia, Ghana, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, 
Nigeria, Senegal and Sierra Leone among others, (Letricia 2017:44). At the onset ECOWAS was 
established in 1975 to ‘promote cooperation and integration, leading to the establishment of an economic 
union in West Africa in order to raise the living standards of its people, and to maintain and enhance 
economic stability’ (Okyere and Amedzrator 2014:13). However, with time, due to the prevalence of 
political instability and conflicts in West Africa, ECOWAS included in its economic integration agenda 
the promotion of peace and stability.   
Adinoyi (2015:3) notes that Article 58 of the 1993 ECOWAS Treaty stressed the recognition and use of  
Mediation in conflict resolution, and this was further strengthened in the 1999 Protocol Relating to the 
Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peacekeeping and Security (the 
Mechanism). ECOWAS Mediation and Security Council (MSC) was established under the ECOWAS 
Peace and Security Architecture to respond to conflict situations, the MSC consist of three organs – the 
Council of Elders (CoE) or Council of the Wise (CoW), ECOWAS Standby Forces (ESF), and Defence 
and Security Commission (DSC), (ibid). In addition to such initiative ECOWAS adopted the (ECOWAS) 
Mediation Guidelines (EMG) and the Dialogue and Meditation Curriculum (DMC) in Abuja in May of 
2018. The ECOWAS Mediation Guidelines to inform and impact on effective mediation processes in the 
ECOWAS Region and West Africa. The Mediation Guidelines is composed of 11 principles that focus on 
early prevention to avoid the escalation of conflicts; inclusivity and sensitivity in mediation; inclusive 
participation; professionalism on the part of mediators, impartiality and neutrality among others. 
According to Article 10, Protocol Relating to the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, 
Resolution, Peacekeeping and Security, ECOWAS Doc (1999), the Mediation and Security Council 
(MSC) is the most powerful institutional decision-making body in matters of regional peace and security, 
and responsible for the implementation of all policies relating to conflict prevention, management and 
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resolution. Okai et al (2014) state that, at the sub-regional stage, the Council is the equivalent of the UN 
Security Council and meets at the level of Heads of State and Government, as well as ministerial and the 
ambassadorial levels. The MSC is composed of representatives of nine member states, of which the 
Authority of Heads of States and Government elect seven. The other two members will be, the current 
Chairman and the immediate past Chairman of the Authority. It can authorise and sanction all forms of 
intervention, including the decision to deploy political and military missions, as well as appoint special 
representatives and force commanders, (Article 58 of 1993 ECOWAS Treaty; 1999 Protocol Relating to 
the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peacekeeping and Security (the 
Mechanism); Okai et al 2014; Adinoyi 2015). Although ECOWAS established a mechanism for 
mediation in 1993, the subregional group resorted to mediation from the late 1980s. Since the first 
intervention in Liberia, ECOWAS has been actively involved in the political and security situations of 
member states such as Liberia, Sierra Leone, Guinea-Bissau, Guinea, Côte d’Ivoire, Niger, Mali and 
Togo.   
 
It has to be noted, as highlighted in the 2018 document on ECOWAS Mediation policy documents, that 
ECOWAS interventions have used a combination of soft power and hard power. Thus, although 
mediation has been at the core of the organization’s intervention, in some instances, military-related 
missions have been used to achieve and manage peace agreements. Adinoyi (2015:9) highlights that a 
case in point is that of Abdulsalami Abubakar of Nigeria who was appointed to mediate the election 
tension between the Liberian presidential candidates in which he successfully secured transitional 
agreement – Accra Comprehensive Peace Agreement in 2003 before the 2005 election. The scholar, 
however further notes that the initial peacemaking mediation efforts of 1990 failed, leading to the 
establishment of ECOMOG (Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group) with the 
aim to forcefully restore peace, but the intervention of ECOMOG fueled more conflict and prolonged the 
war from 1991-1995.  
  
2.4.5 ECOWAS mediation Efforts  
ECOWAS mediation efforts can be noted in the 20-year civil war that engulfed Liberia. The resentment of 
the indigenous Liberians against domination of the American-Liberians, led to successful coup by Samuel 
Kanyon Doe, a Liberian soldier, (The African-American Mosaic 2015:4).  It was welcomed in the state of 
Liberia as it gave a ray of hope to most of the Liberians who had been under the unequivocal unfair rule 
of the American-Liberians.  However, after the coup ironically, Doe assumed the position of general 
where he organized a People’s Redemption Council (PRC) which had himself and 14 other low ranking 
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officers as the leaders.  They thus ruled the country and suspended the nation’s constitution until 1984, 
when a new constitution was approved by referendum, ((Encyclopedia Britannica, 2015:6). A 
predetermined or rather a confirmation election was held in 1985 in the country which Doe resoundingly 
won but his empathic victory was denounced as the elections were said to be fraudulent by some 
observers, (Kings 2010: 16).  
Consequently, Doe faced opposition both at home and abroad, where his regime was often described as 
corrupt and brutal in a country whose deteriorating economic conditions worsened people’s living 
conditions, The African-American Mosaic (2015:8). His life was continually threatened by assassination 
attempts and plots, which he suppressed with considerable brutality, (Kings 2010:19). In November 1985 
for instance, one month after the 1985 election, PRC co-founder Thomas Quiwonkpa returned from exile 
in the United States and attempted a coup to topple Doe. The rebellion was violently quashed and Doe 
was inaugurated as the first president of Liberia’s Second Republic in January 1986. Earlier, Charles 
Taylor, a former supporter of Doe, and Director General of the government’s General Services Agency 
(GSA) was charged with embezzlement but he fled to the US, where he was arrested on an extradition 
warrant and after escaping the Massachusetts prison where he was being held, he underwent training in 
Libya before going to the Ivory Coast to raise an army against Doe, (Kings 2010:15; Encyclopedia 
Britannica, 2015:16).   
 
Taylor’s National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL) crossed the border into Liberia in December 1989 and 
it is the brutality, corruption and favouritism toward his own Krahn tribe of Doe’s reign that sparked a 
rebellion against him which began in eastern Liberia in late 1989, (Encyclopedia Britannica, 2015). The 
National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL) launched an invasion from neighboring Côte d’Ivoire and 
throughout 1990, Taylor and his group of fighters, began seizing control of increasing amounts of 
territory outside Monrovia. The Doe regime quickly lost control of most of the country to Taylor’s forces, 
and the war became a multi-dimensional power struggle between Taylor’s NPFL, Doe’s Armed Forces of 
Liberia, and a plethora of other armed groups that emerged at various stages of the conflict, (Kings 
2010:22). These included the Lofa Defense Force, the Liberia Peace Council, the United Liberation 
Movement of Liberia for Democracy–Kromah faction; the United Liberation Movement of Liberia for 
Democracy–Johnson faction, and the National Patriotic Front of Liberia-Central Revolutionary Council. 
Again, many Liberians, frustrated by Doe’s oppressive and inept rule, initially welcomed Taylor’s 
incursion. Within six months, Taylor’s NPFL had reached Monrovia and reports of human rights abuses 
and an impending humanitarian crisis demanded international action but Doe refused to yield power and 
as the civil war continued, he was captured and assassinated.   
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Fighting was complex as military factions often splintered into different militias, focusing on local 
conflicts and economic gains, (Marshalls 2009: 13). Therefore, several attempts to end the civil war were 
spearheaded by concerted efforts of the Economic Community of West African States’ (ECOWAS) 
Monitoring Group a multilateral armed force headed by Nigeria in 1990. ECOWAS henceforth, deployed 
a Cease-fire Monitoring Group peacekeeping mission, known as ECOMOG, to Monrovia in August 1990 
and a ceasefire agreement after years of unsuccessful attempts by various stakeholders was reached in 
August 1996. It marked the end of the first civil war and laid the groundwork for elections in 1997 and 
Taylor’s National Patriotic Party won the presidential elections with 75% of the vote, (Kings 2010: 8).  
A return to democracy after the 1997 elections did little to bring peace to the country as simmering 
tension and regional turmoil caused by Taylor’s support for the Revolutionary United Front rebels in 
neighbouring Sierra Leone, soon sparked more violence in what became the second Liberian Civil War, 
(Marshalls 2009:15). According to Kings (2010:21) the civil unrest persisted, in 1999, exiled Liberians 
formed armed groups to oppose Taylor. Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy (LURD) for 
instance, a group operating out of Guinea, attacked the Liberian town of Voinjama, effectively triggering 
a second civil war, (ibid). Other groups like the Movement for Democracy in Liberia (MODEL) also 
launched military campaigns against Taylor’s government.   
Taylor’s government was unable to hold back the rebels and after 4 years in 2003, Taylor controlled less 
than a third of the country. The Movement for Democracy in Liberia (MODEL) achieved rapid successes 
against the government, reputedly with the backing of the Ivory Coast, (Marshalls 2009:17). Heavy 
fighting in Monrovia and the entire conflict which according to UNDP (2004:1) estimates, left 150,000 
people dead and saw a third of the population flee to neighbouring countries, witnessed arrival of 
peacekeepers of the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) in August 2003. Abdallah and Okyere 
(2014) note that the prolonged ECOWAS-led mediation effort could arguably be described as successful, 
resulting in the signing of Comprehensive Peace Agreement in Accra in 2003  
ECOWAS was also called to intervene in 1991, after a violent conflict broke out in Sierra Leone that 
lasted until 2002. Brewo (2014:38) notes that the conflict, which mainly pitched the Revolutionary United 
Front (RUF) against the Government of Sierra Leone, degenerated into violence unparalleled in the 
history of the country. One of the reasons that led to the conflict was the bad governance of the All 
People’s Congress (APC). According to Biles (2008:44) an agreement to resolve the clashes was reached 
under the assumption that all parties would keep to the terms of the Agreement, but within approximately 
two months hostilities resumed between the RUF and the government forces. In the aftermath of the rebel 
attacks, ECOWAS in consultation with the Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General for Sierra 
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Leone, Francis Okello, initiated a series of diplomatic efforts aimed at opening up dialogue with the RUF, 
(Brewo 2014). The role in the Sierra Leon case is that the ECOWAS Peace Plan for Sierra Leone 
facilitated the signing of peace agreements such as Abidjan (1996), Conakry (1997) and Lomé (1999) and 
the deployment of UN peacekeeping missions including UN Observer Mission in Sierra Leone 
(UNOMSIL, 1998) and UN Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL, 1999).   
Again, in November 1996, ECOWAS and the international community initiated processes to bring a war 
that engulfed Ivory Coast to an end. Until September 2002, Côte d’Ivoire was considered as one of the 
relatively rich and stable countries in the otherwise troubled and impoverished region of West Africa. 
However, the death of the country’s founding father, Houphouët Boigny, marked the beginning of the 
country’s descent into conflict when complex issues such as identity, citizenship, migration and land 
ownership were given a bad dose of political expression (Brewoo and Nicholas Okai, 2014). Several 
attempts were made by ECOWAS to soft the conflict. Elowson (2015) notes that initially soft diplomacy 
was led by Ghana to achieve a cease-fire and was obtained through the Lina Marcoussis Agreement in 
2003 and 2004. However, as noted by Kings (2018:4) mediation efficiency was reduced by the struggle of 
leadership between Presidents Wade of Senegal and Eyadema of Togo over a lead role in the negotiations.  
President Kuffour of Ghana took the mediation role. ECOWAS also played a crucial role in the 2007 
conflict where the then ECOWAS chairman –Blaise Compaore of Burkina Faso facilitated a successful 
peace agreement, the Ouagadougou Political Agreement (OPA) which was shortlived as violence erupted 
in the post 2010 election. The 2010 Post Election Violence (PEV) mediation efforts failed, where 
Olusegun Obasanjo of Nigeria was appointed as ECOWAS envoy to Cote d’Ivore and the PEV resulted 
into a full blown war which forced ECOWAS, AU and the international community to resort to the stick 
conflict-resolution approach which restored peace in 2011, (International Coalition for Responsibility to 
Protect, 2015)  
The Efforts of ECOWAS can also be noted in the case of Guinea where it managed a transitional sure 
peaceful agreement in the transitional process. Adinoyi (2015) notes that Blaise Campaore, as the 
ECOWAS chairman used hard mediation strategy by suspending Guinea from ECOWAS and 
subsequently sanctioning the country after the coup in Guinea. The author notes that Blaise Campaore 
appointed as the mediator, successfully managed to secure peaceful agreement which facilitated 
transitional process (ibid). ECOWAS also mediated in the Malian Crisis, the conflict of Guinea-Bissau, 
fighting in Guinea, Niger and Togo. Although ECOWAS’s mediation processes have yielded positivity in 
terms of resolving conflicts in states in the Western expanse of the region, it has to be acknowledged that 
when push has come to shove the sub-regional group has resorted to the use of military power, combined 
with external assistance, (Marshalls 2009; Abdallah and Okyere 2014 and Brewo 2014).   
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2.4.6 Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD)  
The Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) is an eight-country trade bloc in Africa. It 
includes governments from the Horn of Africa, Nile Valley and the African Great Lakes. It was created in 
1996 to supersede the Intergovernmental Authority Against Drought and Desertification (IGADD) which 
was founded in 1986. The recurring and severe droughts and other natural disasters between 1974 and 
1984 caused widespread famine, ecological degradation and economic hardship in the Eastern Africa 
region.  The impetus for establishment of IGAD came from UN agencies that saw the urgent need for a 
regional coordination agency to address problems of famine and drought that had devastated Ethiopia and  
Somalia during 1984 and 1985 (Shaw 1995). In 1986, the governments of six countries − Ethiopia, 
Somalia, Sudan, Kenya, Uganda and Djibouti signed up to form the Inter-Governmental Authority against 
Drought and Desertification (IGADD). The name of the organization portrayed no political ambitions for 
greater regional integration. IGADD’s aspirations were confined to functional co-ordination on 
environmental protection, food security strategies and natural resource management.  
The 1996 IGAD Agreement included among its principles the peaceful settlement of conflicts, the 
maintenance of regional peace, stability and security, and the protection of human and people’s rights. A 
new objective was the promotion of peace and stability in the sub-region and the creation of mechanisms 
within the sub-region for the prevention, management and resolution of inter and intra-State conflicts 
through dialogue’ (IGAD 1996: Art.7g). The institutional mission and vision of IGAD ‘was to become the 
premier regional organization for the promotion of peace, prosperity, and integration by assisting and 
complementing the efforts of member states to achieve through increased cooperation (a) food security 
and environmental protection, (b) promotion and maintenance of peace, security, and humanitarian 
affairs, and (c) economic cooperation’(Solomon, 2014a: 4).   
Commenting with regards to IGAD’s role in the Sudanese conflict, Nyaganga (2016) notes that mediation 
as a tool in conflict resolution in Africa has got its successes and failures. The successes of the process, 
though, has depended on the acceptability of the mediators by the warring parties, the neutrality of the 
mediators in the process, the funding given to the process by the lead actors and the skill and knowledge 
of mediators on the causes of conflict, the parties, process and viability of the product of mediation. In 
this regard, the scholar notes that much of the success of the North-South dialogue in Sudan can be 
attributed to a massive diplomatic effort by IGAD. Such sentiments are also shared by Linjani (2018:55) 
who notes that the efforts to find a solution to the decades long civil war between the North and the South 
(the first phase lasted from 1955 to 1972, and the second from 1983 to 2005), had already started in 
1992/1993, when the Organization of African Unity (OAU) initiated the Abuja peace talks.  IGAD 
engagement began participating in the conflict in 1991.   
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Lanz et al (2017) with regards to the roles of IGAD in mediation notes that the organisation first explored 
institutionalizing its mediation support capacity in July 2007 during a meeting in Mombasa to review the 
lessons learned from the Somali and Sudan peace processes. The introspection was inspired by the 
success from the signing of the IGAD-brokered Comprehensive Peace Agreement in Sudan in 2005 and 
the desire to build momentum for the Somali talks. The Sudanese Civil War, was hence settled in 2005 by 
way of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) with the help of mediation by the Intergovernmental 
Authority on Development (IGAD), (Beber (2009). It has to  be noted that although IGAD initiated 
efforts that brokered an agreement in 2005, mediation effort that eventually led to the CPA began in 1994 
and the participation in particular of dignitaries at the negotiations (such as the foreign ministers or 
presidents of Ethiopia, Eritrea, Kenya, and Uganda brought success in ending the conflict, (Biles 2007).   
The case of Somalia is also a case in point in which IGAD mediated and has intervened since the conflict 
broke out in 1991 when Siad Barre was overthrown in 1991.  Fighting exploded over control of the capital 
and degenerated into conflict among multiple clan-based factions, (Beber 2009). The Somalian conflict 
case compared to the Sudanese case has been cited as a complicated crisis due to the emergence of 
Islamism. Islamism has thus emerged as a political force in Somalia that has occasioned a regional 
dimension to the conflict with implications for other countries such as Ethiopia and Kenya, which both 
have sizeable Somali communities within their borders, (Giles 2017). Akowari (2017) notes that the 
greatest conundrum in the context of Somalia is the de facto breakdown which has made life difficult for 
IGAD. Such sentiments are also supported by Lanz et al (2017) who are of the view that without a 
government, Somalia was unable to exercise its membership of IGAD, or indeed any other international 
forum, and IGAD had difficulty confronting the problem of state breakdown. Therefore, efforts were 
handed to OAU in 1993 which assigned Ethiopia the lead role in supporting peace and reconciliation in 
Somalia, but at that stage peace and security in Somalia was firmly on the UN agenda.   
A combination of hard power and soft power diplomacy was initiated by Ethiopia in the case of Somalia 
in 1996 and 1997. Initially the country used military power to destroy Al Itihad camps in the Gedo region 
of Somalia, claiming that these housed Arab and Afghan mujahidin and terrorists linked to Al Qaeda 
(Tadesse 2002). Secondly, Ethiopia organised a major reconciliation for Somali factions in the Ethiopian 
town of Sodere which, produced a 41-member National Salvation Council, headed by Abdulahi Yusuf 
with five co-chairmen and an 11-member National Executive Committee. Their task was to convene a 
465-member national reconciliation conference later that year. Although, it was Ethiopia that was at the 
forefront, the efforts were perceived as an IGAD effort. The reality of IGAD’s lack of prowess in the case 
manifested when a conflict between Ethiopia and Eritrea broke out in May 1998 which spelt the end of 
IGAD’s consensual approach to Somali reconciliation, (Lanz 2017; Giles 2017.  
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It is of paramount importance to note that IGAD though affected by the Eritrea-Ethiopia war reignited its 
efforts to end the Somali war by commissioning President Moi of Kenya to start a joint initiative with 
Ethiopia and Djibouti to bring the warlords of the Somali Reconciliation and Restoration Council (SRRC) 
SRRC into negotiations, (Agripah 2010) with the Transitional National Government (TNG). Meditation 
by Moi was concluded in August 2000 with the creation of a Transitional National Government (TNG) 
headed by Abdulqasim Salat Hassan. However, though efforts have been made in Somalia, mediation has 
not yielded positive results. Over a decade since IGAD added peace and security to its mandate there has 
been no appreciable reduction in the level of conflict in the Horn of Africa, particularly in Somalia. 
Khadiagala (2008b) on the region notes that it still lacks the most rudimentary regional security 
framework as IGAD member states continue to flout the old-fashioned inter-state rules of respect for 
territorial sovereignty and non-interference in each other’s affairs, ‘victims of their neighbour’s 
insecurities, or conversely, as threats to the neighbours.   
Therefore, mediation efforts in Africa at a regional and sub-regional level have both produced positive 
and negative results. Over the years the African Union and sub-regional groups set with the support of the 
UN, non-governmental bodies and international bilateral partners, have undertaken mediation in many 
countries, including Burundi, Chad, the Comoros, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Ivory 
Coast, Lesotho, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sudan and Zimbabwe, (Nathan 2009). However, the 
complex nature of some of the cases, rendered mediation ineffective. Results from most of the African 
cases reveal continued fighting in brokered agreements, which hence questions the effectiveness of the 
mediation process’. This is true in the case of Sierra Leone, and Zimbabwe where arguments and 
disagreement in power sharing agreements infused government, (Muliru 2014). As has been mentioned in 
the foregoing, meditation in Africa has produced twofold results. At one point it has led to ceasefire 
however producing peace which is fragile for instance in Liberia; and in some instances it has failed to 
work with support of hard power like in the case of Somalia.  
2.6 Government of National Unity   
The concept of a government of national unity is not new and it is, most of the time, associated with the 
ideal of power-sharing in the form of an over-sized coalition, (Kotzé 2013). However, there is no 
consensus among the academic and political circles on the precise definition of the concept of GNU as its 
meaning and application vary from one country to another, (Makuhlani 2014:172). A Government of 
National Unity (GNU) in its general form is an institutional model government that is formed by two or 
more political foes in order to resolve a political impasse by sharing power, (Muguti et al 2014:149).   
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Laws (2012) denotes that, the concept of GNU can be perceived from a fourfold window. The scholar 
thus, states that, while in some instances the term encompasses only ‘horizontal’ agreements between key 
elites; at other times it has been used to refer to the ‘vertical’ relations between states and societies. In the 
same vein, some conceptions point towards political settlements as 'one-off' events, or deals and others 
suggest that settlements are better used to describe the on-going institutional arrangements and political 
processes that both reflect and shape the (no doubt changing) distribution of power in a society, (ibid). 
Consequently, various definitions of GNU fit within the ambit of Law’s analysis. Creamer (2015:16) for 
instance describes governments of national unity, also known as national unity governments, or national 
union governments as broad coalition governments consisting of all parties (or all major parties) in the 
legislature, usually formed during a time of war or other national emergency. Kotze (2013) on the same 
note, states that the term GNU is used to refer to a case in which all the major political parties in a country 
form a governing coalition.   
  
Mukoma (2008) equates a GNU to a coalition government, however, parochially contextualizing it within 
the political demesne as he states that GNUs are designed specifically to accommodate all participating 
political players such as the presidium, legislature, cabinet, security sectors and the civil service in 
governmental structures.  Accordingly, GNUs in this way are a holistic amalgamation of different 
personnel and parties within governmental structures. Blake et al (2015:1) have also attempted to define 
Governments of National Unity (GNUs) by stating that GNUs are negotiated, formalized power-sharing 
agreements among opposing parties or elites that include provisions for power-sharing in political, 
economic, territorial, and military affairs. In this way the scholars note that GNUs are considered 
temporary or transitional, made in preparation for elections, the ratification of a new constitution or 
amendments, or the design and implementation of new governance institutions. Therefore, GNU entail the 
formation of a coalition government with various opposing parties in some instances from the civil level 
to the highest governmental tier within a nation-state; with the objective of bringing about securitisation 
of the state and its citizens.  
  
2.7 Mediation in the Formations of Governments of National Unity  
Virtually almost every continent of the international milieu has witnessed the creation of GNUs and 
GNUs have occurred in countries such as Israel, Greece, Italy, United Kingdom and Kenya, Zimbabwe 
and Luxembourg, (Mukuhlani 2014: 170). The establishment of GNUs has been occasioned by various 
contextual conundrums that hence depend and differ country by country. There are thus, various reasons 
behind the creation or formation of GNUs that have been cited by various scholars internationally. For 
Chigora and Guzura (2011: 20), the logic behind the formation of GNUs is that, equitable participation 
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will diminish the potential for conflict and enhance prospects for national stability, integration and 
development. Accordingly, the assumption behind this logic is that conflict arises from mere exclusion of 
key political players in structures and processes of national governance. The sporadic eruption of conflicts 
within various regions in Ethiopia before the establishment of the Transitional government in 1991 was 
occasioned by the exclusion of various (80 plus) ethnic groups of the country in the governance of the 
state, (Tsehaye 2014).   
  
Muguti et al (2012: 149) share a different view regarding GNU formation as they assert that GNUs are 
born out of circumstances in which the legitimacy of a party in office is severely weakened and the party 
is incapacitated to govern the country alone, making it imperative for such a party to seek legitimacy by 
forming a governance alliance with partners in opposition. Sisulu et al (2009) on their research on the 
GNU in Zimbabwe suggest that the GNU was a move that restored legitimacy to Robert Mugabe as 
President of Zimbabwe and above set the stage for an injection of western capital into the country’s 
beleaguered economy and the end of targeted sanctions. Thus, according to the scholars Zimbabwe’s 
Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) finally gave in to the arm-twisting of regional heads of State 
and agreed to become part of an inclusive government and this restored the legitimacy of the ZANU-PF 
party and robustly revived it to govern a country that was on the brink of collapse.   
  
Kotze (2013) on the same note is of the view that GNUs are formed to serve three purposes namely; the 
incorporation of diverse political interests particularly the main antagonists in the preceding conflict to 
compel them into political cooperation; secondly, for the public at large, it is meant to serve as a practical 
and symbolic form of reconciliation; thirdly and lastly, it is designed for the antagonists as a period during 
which they can learn to know each other better, to reduce the negative stereotypes about each other and to 
increase the level of trust in each other.  GNUs have, therefore been embraced in some African countries 
for smooth conflict resolution. On the same note, Mauve cited in Mapuva (2010) notes that these 
governments are meant to be transitional arrangements instituted to ensure short term reprieve from strife 
(Mauve cited in Mapuva, 2010). They are thus, roads to the establishment of political normalcy in 
situations where political contention has created a stalemate. However, Kotze (2013) clearly state that it is 
not realistic to expect that they will become allies during the transitional period but rather that the 
minimum level of trust necessary for any functioning political system should emerge.   
  
Formations of GNUs have also been occasioned by the need to fulfil a constitutional requirement, as 
transitional arrangements meant to ensure smooth transfer of power to majority rule or to resolve political 
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quagmire, (Muguti et al 2012). The post-independent eon in Africa has witnessed the rise of such  setups 
for  example at independence in Zimbabwe in 1980, a coalition government was formed by Zimbabwe  
African Nation Union Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF), Patriotic Front  Zimbabwe African People’s Union (PF 
ZAPU) and the Rhodesian Front after the general elections which resulted in majority rule in the country. 
Former Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) leader, the late Robert Mugabe announced on 23 
April 1977 that Rhodesia's political organisations, ZANU and ZAPU (the Zimbabwe African People's 
Union), were to be merged under one command after the political affiliation of the two groups in the 
Patriotic Front. The merged Patriotic Front helped Mugabe defeat the colonial government of Ian Smith in 
1980. This was in order to meet the dictates of the 1979 Lancaster House Agreement, (Tshuma 1997). 
Mtisi (2010) cited in Maina (2013) notes that the 1978 Zimbabwe arrangement known as Zimbabwe-
Rhodesia which was a union of the Ian Smith regime and the so-called progressive nationalists led by 
Bishop Abel Muzorewa; while it did not last for long, this government did pave the way for the Lancaster 
House negotiations which culminated in Zimbabwe’s independence.   
  
On the other hand, governments of national unity have particularly been established to resolve political 
disputes emanating from political stalemates. It is important to note that while current examples of GNUs 
are a result of election differences this has not always been the case, as the trend towards power sharing is 
a longstanding solution and has been utilised as a conflict resolution tactic or a preventive action solution 
in other instances, (Muguti et al 2012). Maina (2013: 2) for instance citing the case of Liberia states that 
the Liberian example where an Interim Government of National Unity (IGNU) was established with the 
clear intention of bringing about political transition through democratic election in July 1997 illustrates 
that GNUs are not only created as a result of election differences. The author further states that the 
Liberian interim government had the intention of bringing unity in Liberia so as to end hostilities and 
pave a way for a transitional government following an election.   
  
Eanglemore, (2013) cited in Mapuva (2013: 106) is of the view that GNUs are seen as a transitional 
measure, a vehicle to reduce tension and to create the space to drive durable peace and sustainable 
change.  In the case of Zanzibar an agreement was made with the intention of ending the long-term 
tension among the top political brass of the political opponents in the country by creating an environment 
for peaceful elections and addressing the anticipated fallout between the major political powers, (Maina 
2013: 3) The outcome of the referendum, which was held on 31 July 2010, provided for the creation of a 
GNU in Zanzibar which was a pre-emptive move. GNUs are therefore, a conflict prevention strategy that 
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seeks to curtail or minimise chances of political conflicts degenerating into civil unrest or fully fledged 
wars, (Mapuva 2013: 106).   
  
2.8 A Critique of Governments of National Unity  
GNUs have often been criticised for their application and operation, and most of the reservations against 
these forms of governments often tend to emanate from their history and reason for their formation, 
Maina (2013: 3). Kotze (2013: 10) states that any expectation that a GNU will be a general ‘success’ or 
will operate without periodic crises is unrealistic. Wanyande, (2010) cited in Maina (2011) thus, notes that 
while the label ‘Government of National Unity’ is the politically correct reference to these governments, 
in reality these unions are characterised by general mistrust and constant tension such that the unity 
narrative can only be seen as a misnomer. Mapuva (2010) buttresses such analysis by noting that GNUs 
are a fragile, acrimonious, usually transitional arrangement with a high risk of disintegrating at the 
slightest opportunity.  
  
GNUs being a subset of coalition governments that form specifically to end or forestall violence rise 
under difficult circumstances such as conflict, political instability, or the credible threat of either and the 
nature of the agreements themselves, and the broader socio-political and economic context in which they 
exist affect their stability. However, although unity governments are characterised by negativity and 
rigorous skirmishes within the top political brass within parties to the union, their main objectives are 
normally limited to containing the levels of political violence and conflict, to stabilize the political 
situation, to prepare for an election and quite often also to draft a new constitution that is finalized by a 
general referendum, Kotze (2013). Henceforth it has been realized that rebuilding a country after civil 
strife is not only about re-building visible infrastructure, but rebuilding emotional healing and stress 
management and GNUs have been fundamental in playing such a role especially in the African continent 
(Vengroff and Magala, 2001).   
2.8.1 Governments of National Unity and the Peace Discourse   
It is imperative however, to emphasise that despite their challenges these forms of government do have 
some positive attributes and provisions to the discourse of peace, (Maina 2013: 3). One attribute of GNUs 
is their contribution to the cessation of hostilities in instances of violent conflict. Following the 2007 
Kenyan Presidential elections, violence broke out in various parts of the country that led to the death of 
1220 people, 3600 injuries and internally displaced 300 000 people (OHCR Report, 2008). According to 
Tumbare (2014:9) the mediation process which was arbitrated by Kofi Annan, the former Secretary 
General of the United Nations under the auspices of the African Union (AU) ended the conflict through a 
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political agreement. Parties to the agreement thus included Mwai Kibaki of the Party of National Unity 
(PNU) as President and Raila Odinga of the Orange Democratic Movement (ODM) as Prime Minister of 
Kenya. Schreiber (2016:1) on the same note states that in April 1994, after a decades-long struggle for 
democracy and more than three years of arduous peace negotiations, Nelson Mandela’s African National 
Congress formed a power-sharing government with its rivals: the National Party and the Inkatha Freedom 
Party,) and such a move was vital to overcome lingering distrust between the three groups, which had 
been locked in a violent conflict. In this way GNUs have been fundamental in halting crisis and 
attributing to the discourse of peace and stability.   
  
Muguti et al (2012: 151) states that a GNU was also established in Madagascar in September 2009 in an 
attempt to bring peace and stop violence on innocent people following Rajoelina’s military takeover 
earlier in the year. The deal was brokered by the former Mozambique leader Joaquim Alberto Chissano 
who had been tasked by African leaders to revive deadlocked negotiations among Madagascar’s political 
rivals, namely Andry Rajoelina, Mac Ravalomanana, Didier Ratsiraka and Albert Zagy, (Lough 2012). 
The protagonists were impelled to make political concessions among themselves. The country has 
remained in political limbo ever since as the international community refused to recognise Rajoelina’s 
presidency.   
  
However, GNUs have not only had positive impacts on the peace discourse as the Media Monitoring Unit 
(2007: 3) reports that, despite, the establishment of  Palestinian National Unity Government in 2007,  
infighting between the two main factions, the Fateh and Hamas had peaked, and caused the death of many 
victims, including civilians, from both sides. In the Ivory Coast, former President of the state Laurent 
Gbagbo embarked on futile attempts to form a GNU in 2011 when he refused to step down after a 
presidential election defeat by opposition leader Quattara, Mudzungairi 2011 cited in Muguti et al 2012: 
151). The attempt was disastrous as many lives were lost in the civil war that ensued between Gbagbo 
loyalists and Quattara’s rebels. The fighting only came to an end with the capture of Gbagbo in his 
presidential palace by Quattara’s forces which were heavily backed by French soldiers. Therefore, GNUs 
have had different impacts on peace in different countries but to a greater extent they have been able to 
halt hostilities between political opponents creating a cease-fire in the various countries where they have 
been established.   
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2.8.2 Democratisation under Governments of National Unity  
Hinds (2011) states the importance and relevance of a Government of National Unity as its potential for 
the enhancement of democratization within the government and the state as a whole. Citing the 
governance systems in the Caribbean, the scholar notes that one of the problems of governance in the 
Caribbean, despite its general adherence to the tenets of formal democracy is the concomitant monopoly 
of power by the ruling party and the exclusion of the opposition. Accordingly, this democratic exclusion 
has led to a virtually one-party democracy, which has had negative consequences for the rule of law, 
respect for civil liberties, government accountability, economic management and development, political 
stability and national sovereignty. In ethnically polarized societies democratic exclusion and one-party 
democracy often mean ethnic exclusion and domination. This was the Ethiopian case since the rule of 
Menelik II of Shewa. According to Ayferam (2015) the history of Ethiopia, from the Shewan Expansion 
under Menelik II in the 1880s and the early 1990s is about expansion, thralldom, conquest and internal 
enslavement, Thus, up to the times of the Dergue which ruled Ethiopia between 1974 and 1991, Ethiopia 
endured tyranny which had been occasioned by Menelik II’s endeavour to unify different conquered 
ethnic and tribal groups, (Tsehaye 2014).    
  
However, as noted by Hinds (2011) in ethnically diverse societies, the ruling party’s obsession with 
remaining in power to protect its interests, certain race, tribal group or an ethnic group is deleterious in the 
long run. Therefore, the failure by the Dergue to amalgamate interests of different regions and ethnical 
groups in Ethiopia led to its demise. The Constitutionnet (2017) states that the demise of the Dergue in 
Ethiopia witnessed the formation of Government of National Unity between the Tiagrayan People’s 
Liberation Front (TPLF) and the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) which had 
overthrown Lieutenant Colonel Mengistu Haile Mariam leader of the Dergue in 1991. The two parties 
formed a Transitional Government of Ethiopia (TGE) and on July 1, 1991, the EPRDF called a national 
conference that culminated in the adoption of a Transitional Period Charter by decree to function as an 
interim constitution (Alemante  1992).   
  
Subsequently, the TGE created a Constituent Assembly comprising of 547 representatives, to draft a new  
Constitution in 1992, (Papoutsi 2014: 179).  Accordingly, the Constituent Assembly debated on the draft 
Constitution which carried several new provisions, including the proposal to set up a federal form of 
government in a way that allows accommodation of the interests of the various nationality groups in the 
country, (ibid). Ethiopia hence introduced its federal type of system after the adoption of the 1995 
Constitution which in its preamble refers to all its different ethnic groups as the Nations, Nationalities and 
Peoples of Ethiopia, (Constitution of the Federal Democratic Republic Of Ethiopia (FDRE) 1995). Article 
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39 (5) of the Constitution of the Federal Democratic Republic Of Ethiopia defines a Nation, Nationality or 
People as a “…group of people who have or share large measure of a common culture or similar customs, 
mutual intelligibility of language, belief in a common or related identity, a common psychological make-
up, and who inhabit an identifiable, predominantly contiguous territory. Thus, the new Constitution is 
inclusive and it was born out of a GNU.   
  
Such an analysis also applies in the South African context to a greater extent as Schreiber (2016: 1) states 
that, despite, the National Party’s withdrawal from the power-sharing cabinet in mid-1996, South Africa’s 
Government of National Unity oversaw the creation of a historic new constitution, restructured the 
country’s legal system and public service, and implemented a raft of social programs aimed at undoing 
the injustices of apartheid.  Thomas (2011) commenting on the case of the former Sudan posits that the 
signing of the CPA in Sudan brought historically under-represented Southerners into central government; 
established an autonomous Southern government with its own army and a share of Southern oil revenues 
in Juba; and invested in Sudan’s vast and impoverished southern zone. The scholar, further states that 
these outlying regions were left out of the colonial and post-colonial development and their diversity was 
mismanaged to create social divisions that are among the starkest in the world. The establishment of 
GNUs has thus, been fundamental in the upholding of traits of democracy.   
  
2.8.3 Governments of National Unity in Post-Crisis Situations   
Maina (2011: 2) contends that GNUs are arrangements that seek to manage conflict by bringing opposing 
parties together with the aim of inclusive governance, quelling violence and establishing an acceptable 
solution to different disputing parties. Kings (2010) thus, state that GNUs are fundamental in 
transforming the political, economic and social setup in some crisis ravaged countries.  A snap survey of 
successes and failures of GNUs in the Zimbabwean context by Makuhlani (2014) reveal that from 2009 to 
2013 with the inception of GNU, a de jure multi-currency system was introduced which witnessed 
inflation being pegged at single digits of below 5%. The period from 2005 to early 2009 was marred by 
uncontrollable hyper-inflation, (ibid). The African Economic Development Institute (2009) in the same 
way states that while the inflation rate in Zimbabwe was at 22.5% in 1995, in 2000 it had reached 58.4% 
and by July 2008, it was pegged at 231 million percent. This according to Makuhlani gave birth to 
stability in the financial sector. The survey by the scholar also reveal that the GNU had ‘positive limited 
social’ effects particularly in the media where reforms could be seen as independent newspapers were 
being allowed to operate for instance  the Newsday and the Dailynews, the opening up of various radio 
stations such as Zi-fm and Star fm. However, time and again there were reports of editors of the 
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independent media being arrested. Politically the author states that leaders from ZANU-PF, MDC-M and 
MDC-T were like oil and water which never mix but they managed to conduct meetings together.   
  
In his survey Makuhlani further notes that the advent of the GNU saw schools being reopened and 
universities opened their doors to the public. The government negotiated deals with United Nations 
Children’s Education Fund (UNICEF) and textbooks were availed to schools. Schools were given the 
leeway to use the incentive system and some teachers began to receive incentives from parents. With the 
use of the American dollar and other monetary systems civil servants’ salaries began regaining buying 
power. Many in the Diaspora began to flock back to Zimbabwe. Goredema (2013) henceforth states that, 
although there was an air of political stability, there were undercurrents between the political parties. The 
GNU thus brought economic, social and political changes but it was characterised by squabbles, 
disagreements, disengagements and reengagements among the main actors.   
  
Zinyama and Takavarasha (2014) share the same sentiments with those of Makuhlani (2014) however, 
differing on the magnitude of the positive impact of the GNU particularly in the economic sector.  
Zinyama and Takavarasha (2014: 458) state that, while there is no doubt that efforts were made to 
introduce economic policies aimed at improving Zimbabwe’s economic situation under the GNU, these 
policies did not bear noticeable fruits for the majority of Zimbabweans.  The scholars are of the view that 
the GNU changes benefited the top political brass in Zimbabwe. They thus argue that while the economy 
of Zimbabwe was stagnant during the GNU, a new rich class has blossomed in Zimbabwe as witnessed by 
the sumptuous mansions that sprouted like mushrooms in major cities. Dziva et al (2014: 91) also support 
the views of Zinyama and Takavarasha (2014) and Makuhlani (2014) by stating that the GNU in 
Zimbabwe made some notable strides, either willingly or by default in economic stabilization and 
decreasing direct human rights violations. Thus, the scholars note that the GNU spearheaded a people 
driven constitution-making process, gazetted the Constitutional Amendment 19, and established human 
rights and media commissions that issued new paltry print media licenses. However, Zinyama and 
Takavarasha (2014) note that the gains of a few were only realised at the expense of the many. Although, 
with mixed results, GNUs in the context of post-conflict and transitional situations are often utilized as an 
instrument of confidence-building and stabilization of a political situation.   
  
Muguti et al (2012) on this view state that a GNU was established in Sudan between the largely Muslim 
North and the Christian/Animist South following 20 years of a deadly civil war. The GNU was meant to 
bring about peace in the country. Negotiations between the North and South culminated in the signing of 
the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) on the 9th of January 2005 (Marsden, 2008) between the 
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National Congress Party (NCP) led by Omar Hassan al-Bashir and the Sudan People's Liberation 
Movement (SPLM) then led by John Garang. The agreement granted Southern Sudan some 
semiautonomy for the next six (6) years to be capped by a referendum in 2011 to decide on whether 
Southern Sudan wanted to gain full independence or remain part of the larger Sudan. Sudan had been 
divided into five provinces in the North and three in the South all governed by military governors on 
ethnic and partisan lines. This had created serious political turmoil and instability with the South 
complaining of political and economic marginalization. Peace which brought about by the CPA was 
fragile hence Maina (2011: 4) is of the view that GNUs are often seen as a conflict management 
mechanism which finds its basis on elite cooperation to achieve immediate peace. Therefore, this kind of 
arrangement to attain peace is only confined to a particular group of people, the political elites, at the 
exclusion of the masses. Fighting in former Sudan continued until the state was separated in 2011. 
Consequently, although GNUs are a mechanism to find peace it is vital to note that history has shown that 
peace achieved in this manner cannot be considered to be positive strong peace as it is not reflective of a 
general consensus but is only an agreement of a selected few, (ibid).   
  
2.8.4 Governments of National Unity and the 21st Century Security Discourse    
The evolution of the concept of security, from a parochial traditional window which focuses on the 
protection of sovereignty and territorial integrity of states from external military threats (Acharya 2011: 
480)  to a more holistic approach, gives relevance to the GNUs.   Kofi Annan cited in Kondo and 
Makanza (2014: 35) states that, in its broadest the concept of human security embraced far more than the 
absence of violent conflicts, it encompasses human rights, good governance, access to education and 
health care and ensuring that each individual had opportunities and choices to fulfill his or her own 
potential. Although the definition of Human Security is subject to much debate its first, most-commonly 
cited usage came in the United Nations Development Program’s (UNDP) 1994 Human Development 
Report. The 1994 UNDP Report thus, defines human security as people’s threats from chronic threats and 
protection from sudden hurtful disruptions in patterns of life. Kondo and Makanza (2014: 35) denote an 
essential part of human security approach is its focus on inter-linkages between the multiple threats and 
issues such as socio-economic deprivation, health, education, the environmental issues and physical 
threats and violent conflicts. This entails that the elements of human security are intertwined such that 
deprivation of one element possess a threat to the other elements for instance if economic insecurity leads 
to health insecurity and insecurity in the political spheres is a threat to personal freedom.  
  
The formation of GNUs except in the case of Zanzibar has been occasioned by the need to revive human 
security. In the case of Zanzibar, following a tension-filled political environment that had gripped the 
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country for a long time preceding elections, the outcome of the referendum, which was held on the 31st of 
July 2010, provided for the creation of a GNU in Zanzibar, Muguti et al (2012). Unlike other GNUs that 
were formed as a result of mediated talks following conflict among opposition parties (with intentions to 
end violence or come to a balanced power relationship), the Zanzibar case was more pre-emptive. In a 
research that was carried out by Muguti et al (2012) on an examination of GNUs in the African context, 
the authors reveal that infighting and violence had affected the human security of the countries that 
established GNUs. In countries such as Kenya, for instance, following the elections and the 
announcement of the winning presidential candidate, violence broke out in various parts of the country 
leading to 1220 deaths, 3600 injuries and 300 000 internally displaced people, (- OHCR Report 2008). In 
the same way other African countries such as Zimbabwe, Ivory Coast, Former Sudan, Madagascar 
(Muguti et al 2012) including, other world states such Afghanistan and Palestine where GNUs were 
established, witnessed the deleterious effect of human security elements before the establishment of 
GNUs.   
2.8.5 Challenges Associated with Governments of National Unity   
Literature on GNUs reveal that the greatest conundrum in power-sharing arrangements has been the 
failure by parties to the agreement or either one of the parties to honour their power-sharing agreements. 
Eaglestone (2013) notes with skepticism from the onset on the formation of GNUs arguing that it has 
been a move by the incumbent leaders to cling onto power in their respective countries especially in the 
African expanse. The formation of GNUs has thus, been a result of notorious despotic ruling elites who 
have plunged their countries into civil wars in an effort to cling to power, (Mapuva 2011:105). Sisulu et al 
(2009:2) citing the case of Zimbabwe states that the contested outcome of the 2008 local, parliamentary 
and presidential elections and the high level of violence initially undermined the legitimacy of Robert 
Mugabe and his ZANU-PF party, even in the assessment by African states and institutions. However, 
instead of leading towards a new democratic dispensation, the southern African heads of state chose to 
push for a power-sharing agreement, the Global Political Agreement (GPA), against the will of the people 
of Zimbabwe as expressed by the victory at the polls for the MDC. Thus, events that lead to the formation 
of GNUs are a cause for concern.   
  
Kotze (2013) in his study of the GNU and power sharing in Madagascar also presents the cause for 
concern that shroud the formation of GNUs. Citing the SouthAfrican.info (2009) the author states that 
after Ravalomanana administration was overtaken by the military and Rajoelina regime in March 2009, 
the African Union and the Southern African Development Community (SADC) immediately responded 
by declaring it an unconstitutional change of government in terms of the African Charter on Democracy, 
Elections and Governance (2007), and suspending its membership from the two organizations. 
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Accordingly, the unconstitutional nature of the events was, arguably, premeditated because already before 
the coup Rajoelina presented himself as an alternative transitional authority. Henceforth, after the military 
handed him the presidential powers, that authority was formalized and he became known as “la Président 
de la Haute Autorité de la Transition” (HAT). Kotze thus, notes that although his Authority did not enjoy 
any international recognition or legitimacy, SADC responded with a mediation process in 2009 which 
included the Mouvance Rajoelina as one of the four main participants resulting in the formation of a 
GNU.   
  
The nature and events in which GNUs are being formed though necessary in some instances deleteriously 
affect the need for democratic progress as is illustrated by the Zimbabwe and Madagascar case. Moreover, 
Dziva et al (2013:86) notes that  looking at the GNUs from the pricks of democracy, people of Zimbabwe 
were robbed of their right to choose independently political leaders of their choice, as guaranteed by 
international law and the Zimbabwean constitution through this marriage of convenience.  
The scholars further state that the marriage of convenience was an abuse to people’s rights as is enshrined 
under Article 21 of the Universal Declaration of Human and People‘s Rights (1948), Article 13 of the 
African Charter on Human and People‘s Rights (1986), and the Zimbabwean Constitution  emphasizes 
that; “Every citizen shall have the right to participate freely in the government of his country, either 
directly or through freely chosen representatives in accordance with the provisions of the law”.   
  
Wachira (2010) cited in Maina (2011:4) suggest that events that have led to the creation of GNU and the 
way that they have been created following election disputes is the tyranny of the elite. Kings (2010: 14) 
notes that in the post-election epoch in the African context, participants to elections all want to benefit 
from state resources by calling for inclusive governments despite losing the election. Maina (2011:4) 
using the example of Kenya notes that following the agreement reached in Kenya in 2009, other election 
disputes have seen those who have lost elections asking for the formation of these forms of government so 
as to ensure their continued inclusion in government. In this way the author is of the view that there is 
concern that the Kenyan example has set a precedent by which incumbents may refuse to leave office 
following an election or the losing party could refuse to accept election results. The case of Ivory Coast is 
a case on point because after the disputed 2010 elections in the country between presidential candidates  
Laurent Gbagbo and Alassane Ouattara, whereas the Independent Electoral Commission of Côte d’Ivoire 
declared Mr Ouattara the winner of the 28th November 2010 election, the Constitutional Court thereafter 
declared Mr. Gbagbo the winner of the presidential elections. The uncertainties and disagreements that 
engulfed the country were inclining the opponents to form a GNU, (ibid).   
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Parties to an agreement are often entangled in disagreements on the governance of states in power sharing 
arrangements. In Madagascar, after the creation of an inclusive government between Madagascar’s 
political rivals, namely Andry Rajoelina, Mac Ravalomanana, Didier Ratsiraka and Albert Zagy, (Muguti 
et al 2012:152), appointment of the government ministers experienced serious problems, (Kotze 2013: 
17). According to the scholar ministers were effectively identified by the President and not by the Prime 
Minister, the majority of the most senior portfolios went to the Rajoelina supporters, and the Mouvances 
Ravalomanana and Zafy received only five ministers each out of a total of 35, which made the allocations 
disproportional. To illustrate the gravity of the problems of the Malagasy GNU, Kotze (2013:17) notes 
that;   
  
…at the end of November 2011, the Mouvances Ravalomanana and Zafy therefore decided to 
declare a dispute in terms of clause 32 and 43 of the Roadmap and referred it to SADC for 
resolution. Their main complaints were the following (Ravalomanana Mouvance & Zafy 
Mouvance 2012, 5-6):- There is no balance in the appointments between the different political 
stakeholders, because the opposition received only 12 of the 35 ministerial positions in relatively 
minor portfolios while several of the most controversial and repressive members of the former 
government were simply reappointed to their positions.- The final composition was determined 
by the President (Rajoelina) and not by the Prime Minister (Beriziky). There was widespread 
interference and undue influence exerted on the process by the French government.  
  
Therefore, there was dissatisfaction on the part of other players who were part of the GNU in Madagascar. 
Governments of National Unity have thus revolved around political opponents or politicians from 
political parties focusing more on political posts for their leaders and self-aggrandisement as opposed to 
improvement of the economy and social lives of the people, (Sunday Opinion 2011 cited in Kuhlani 
2014). The allocation of ministries and sectors was a serious case in the Zimbabwean context as both 
parties were interested in strategic and influential positions and sectors.  
  
Bratton and Masunungure (2011) hence, citing Zimbabwe’s GNU are of the view that the failure by 
parties to agree on central provisions of the GPA led to repeated breakdowns in communication and 
cooperation between the principals, resulting in an opposing rather than cooperating partnership. Dziva et 
al (2013) supports such analysis by noting that Article 13 of the GPA in Zimbabwe for instance called for 
security sector reforms but it is the failure to reform the security sector, that was the chief reason for 
arbitrary arrests, torture, and abuse of the freedom of speech, association and assembly during the period 
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the period 2009-2012 of Zimbabwe’s GNU. The scholars further state that the security personnel 
continued to violate civil and political rights of Zimbabweans with impunity, as they were in the hands of 
ZANU-PF party with no desire for liberal democracy, while the so-called democrats, MDC-T and MDCM 
were afforded no such control. The fight for power and control plays second fiddle to none in power 
sharing agreements.   
  
2.9 Conclusion     
The chapter was a presentation of literature review. It revealed the concept of mediation and focused on 
theoretical arguments of governments of national unity from a scholarly point of view. Mediation as a soft 
power measure of conflict prevention and resolution was analysed and the expected characteristics of 
mediators in the realm of the challenges that they face in mediation were also scrutinized. Mediation is a 
fundamental variable that has led to the formation of GNUs in the African expanse. The chapter also 
focused on GNUs as a product of mediation.  Therefore, while different scholars have focused on defining 
governments of national unity after the mediation process including examining how they differ from 
coalition governments; other scholars have also focused on the formation of GNU that is, reasons, events 
and the rationale behind their formation. In the same realm, literature also reveal that there is gen on the 
relationship between GNUs and democracy; GNUs and the peace discourse; GNUs and security 
dimensions of the 21st century and GNUs in post crisis situations. There is also literature on the 
conundrums that are associated with GNUs after the mediation process. In all this literature data they are 
empirical cases hence the chapter also made use of various practical case studies relating to mediation and 
GNUs from a scholarly point of view. The rationale behind the chapter was to identify theoretical gaps 
that this research sought to fill. Hence, though there is a lot of literature on the GNUs that are born out of 
mediation, there is a gap on the best approach that can be used in the creation of GNUs hence this study 
seeks to fill such a lacuna by offering alternative and well-grounded theoretical and methodological 
approaches to GNUs. Chapter 3 of this social science research focuses on theoretical framework.   
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CHAPTER THREE  
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK  
3.1 Introduction   
Theory in the realm of social sciences studies serves as a framework within which research questions are 
addressed. It plays a central role as a basis of analysis, in this context, of domestic, regional or 
international politics and this study will be informed by three main theories viz. the Ripeness Theory, the 
Readiness Theory and the Elite Theory. The Ripeness Theory focuses on that which inclines parties in a 
clash to negotiate and reach an amicable solution and when to act while; the Readiness Theory which is 
an extension of the Ripeness Theory is deeply rooted in the motivation to end the conflict; and the 
optimism about the outcome of conciliation and negotiation or mediation. The Elite Theory on the other 
hand focuses on the view that society always has been and will always be controlled by a small group 
called the elite. Therefore, on one hand, the first theory, the Ripeness informs the study by focusing on the 
fundamental elements that inclined political parties in Zimbabwe to form a government of national unity 
because of the frenzied nature of the political-economic and even status-quo of Zimbabwe after the 2008 
Harmonised Elections. The Readiness Theory on the other hand is a framework upon which the impetus 
behind the three parties signing a global political agreement that gave birth to the government of national 
unity can be analysed, from an individual party window though. The Elite theory lastly focuses on the 
parochialism in the formation of the government of national unity in Zimbabwe from a democratic 
window. The theory is used to divulge the elitism notion that shrouded the SADC mediated government 
of national unity under the necessary vindication snubbing the element of public participation in the 
process.   
3.2 Ripeness Theory   
While, most studies on peaceful settlement of disputes see the substance of the proposals for a solution as 
the key to a successful resolution of conflict, a growing focus of attention shows that a second and equally 
necessary key lies in the timing of efforts for resolution (Zartman, 2000). With timing at the center of 
conflict resolution, William Zartman introduced Ripeness Theory in his 1985 book, Ripe for Resolution.  
The theory attempts to explain “why, and therefore when, parties to a conflict are susceptible to their own 
or others’ efforts to turn the conflict toward resolution through negotiations. In this, Coleman et al. 
(2008a: 4) note that Ripeness Theory is one of the most influential theories of motivation and conflict 
resolution in the field today. Its basic principle is that conflicts can only be successfully negotiated when 
participants are ready to do so.   
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The Ripeness Theory is William Zartman’s theoretical approach to the study of conflict resolution 
published in his several studies of 1986, 1989, 1995, 2000 and 2001, (Cantekin, 2015). Zartman (2000) 
connotes that the Ripeness Theory is intended to explain why, and therefore when, parties to a conflict are 
susceptible to their own or others’ efforts to turn the conflict toward resolution through negotiation. At the 
epicenter of the theory is the assumption that conflicts develop into a maturity level in which the way out 
is through a resolution. In this regard, parties to a conflict can only enter into an agreement to resolve their 
differences when it is no longer viable to continue on their own. In this regard, the Ripeness Theory by 
William Zartman explains events that took place in Zimbabwe leading to the formation of the 
Government of National Unity in 2009.   
  
The Ripeness Theory perceives a conflict from a historiographical point of view in which a conflict 
emanates. In the Zimbabwe context, confrontational contestations within the political space have a history 
that dates back to the colonial period where nationalist movements using soft and hard power engaged 
with colonial masters. However, it is the post-independent period that has witnessed the pronouncement 
of confrontations by different political parties. As noted by Laasko and Olukushi (1996) Zimbabwe in the 
post-colonial era under the tutelage of ZANU-PF is one of the many African states that attempted to 
establish a one-party state project, conversely, failing dismally.  The reasons lie in the prediction that was 
made by Francis Fukuyama in 1989 that the post-cold war era would be characterized by the triumph of 
democracy. As noted by Abrahamsen (2000) the post-cold war era has occasioned the robust emergency 
of democratic ethos such that every state is acceptable in the international society if it is perceived from 
the democratic realm. Therefore, although ZANU-PF embarked on a nation-state project, silencing 
various opposition forces, the potency of globalization made the party fall to democracy leading to the 
mushrooming of various political parties, however, giving them difficulties.   
  
ZANU-PF for close to two decades managed to keep opposition politics at minimal, often using force to 
silence opponents in what Mandaza (2015) termed the failure to overcome the temptation of colonial 
continuity.  Nonetheless, the emergency of the MDC party around 1999/2000 changed the political set up 
in Zimbabwe. The party immediately became a formidable force that ZANU-PF failed to legally deal 
with. In this regard, as was the case with ZANU-PF, the party resorted to the use of state-sponsored 
violence against opposition party members. In the same manner, allegations of the MDC party resorting to 
political violence from a ZANU-PF perspective dominated politicking of the Zimbabwe State in the first 
years of the new millennium.  
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The trajectory of the nature of confrontational contestations between the two political parties can be 
summed up by the sentiments that were shared by MDC-Alliance president Advocate Nelson Chamisa 
and MDC-Alliance Secretary General Tendai Biti at the Emerson Mnangagwa set up Commission of 
Inquiry over the August 1 shootings in Zimbabwe in November 2018. The two noted that the language of 
ZANU-PF in the post-colonial state has been violence. On the other hand, particularly in the First 
Republic, the Mugabe-led ZANU-PF always blamed the Tsvangirai-led MDC for instigating violence in 
Zimbabwe. In a nutshell, since the formation of MDC around the beginning of the new millennium, the 
political space in Zimbabwe was preoccupied with hostile contestations between these two parties from 
the highest tier of their structures to those who participate in grassroots politics as is highlighted below. 
The magnitude of the contention can be noted by the 2004 brawl in the Parliament of Zimbabwe between 
the late former Movement for Democratic Change Treasurer Roy Bennett and the former Justice Minister 
Patrick Chinamasa during a debate on proposed amendments to the country’s stock-theft laws, (News 24 
Archive 2004).   
  
However, the fights not only affected party members but it had a bearing on Zimbabwe as a state 
including its various sectors such as the economic sector. The economy for instance experienced a slump 
as the African Economic Development Institute (2009) states that as early as 1995 the inflation rate was at 
22.5%, in 2000 it was at 58.4% and in 2007 it was at 6 723.7%. With the nature of fighting that was 
taking place between the ruling ZANU-PF party and the main opposition party MDC-T put the country 
into serious crisis. While, the former fought tooth and nail to remain in power through whatever means, 
the latter engaged the international community to punish Zimbabwe through embargos. Therefore, by July 
2008 inflation in the Zimbabwean context was paged at 231 million percent and Zimbabwe State 
experienced stagnant development characterized by widespread poverty, a high youth unemployment rate, 
graduates moving to other countries, rising inflation, dwindled export earnings and unbearable living 
conditions.   
  
In this regard linking the Zimbabwean situation to the Ripeness Theory, Zartman (2008) states that parties 
resolve their conflict only when they are ready to do so – when an alternative, usually unilateral, means of 
achieving a satisfactory result are blocked and the parties feel that they are in an uncomfortable and costly 
predicament; hence at that ripe moment, they seek or are amenable to proposals that offer a way out. 
Consequently, in the Zimbabwe situation, prior to the formation of the GNU, the sentiments of the 
Ripeness Theory of Zartman (2000) provide a framework to explain the situation that transpired in the 
country.  As has been mentioned in the foregoing the post-independence era in Zimbabwe, particularly 
54  
  
after the new millennium witnessed severe detrioration of the socio-economic set-up of the country which 
was solely impugned on the ZANU-PF regime.   
  
Concurrently, as the events were unfolding, a new political party, the MDC-T with the objective of 
changing the clutter that ZANU-PF government had situated the country into emerged. Close to a decade 
of fighting between the two parties over control of a country that was economically sinking led to a 
Zartman ripe time, particularly after the 2008 Harmonised Elections. The need to revitalize factors that 
were leading to the tumbling of the economic set-up of the country became a priority for both parties. 
Such a situation required efforts from both parties because in as much as the ZANU-PF regime or 
government was the de facto government in Zimbabwe, the MDC-T was a catalyst to a breakthrough from 
a crisis that had ravaged the country because of its relationship with Western powers. The phenomenon 
hence required both parties to contribute a singular package to revive Zimbabwe which can be associated 
with the ‘way out notion’ of Zartman.  The Ripeness Theory henceforth focuses on that which inclines 
parties in a clash to negotiate and reach an amicable solution; and when to act, (Touval and Zartman, 
1985).   
  
The time for ripeness does not occur in a vacuum or does not come from nowhere but certain conditions 
necessitate ripe time in most given conflicting phenomenon. Therefore, the history of fighting coupled 
with vicious cycles of economic woes since the formation of the MDC party and even before led to a time 
for ripeness in Zimbabwe. Zartman (2000) states that within the Ripeness Theory is an unsophisticated 
position that negatively affects parties that have been in confrontation. In fact, it is known as the mutually 
hurting stalemate (MHS). According to Cantekin (2015) the mutually hurting stalemate is the first 
necessary element is the parties’ perception of the conflict. It is a position in which a situation around 
parties to a dispute is unsustainable such that they can move or attain any progress particularly in the 
realization of their goals. Zartman and Berman (1982) in this realm state that the concept of a ripe 
moment centers on the parties’ perception of a mutually hurting stalemate (MHS), optimally associated 
with an impending, past, or recently avoided catastrophe.  There are two trajectories that hence occasion 
the mutually hurting stalemate as noted in the previous statement and these are applicable in the 
Zimbabwean context when a retrospection of the period 2000 - 2008 is undertaken. Firstly; is the 
historical factor and secondly is the most recent event.   
  
With regards to the former, the MHS was necessitated by the confrontational history of ZANU-PF and 
MDC that started with the formation of the MDC which was ignored for over five years by regional and 
sub-regional organizations. However, it was state-sponsored violence that was used against opposition 
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members in March of 2007 in which opposition leader, the late Morgan Tsvangirai and high-ranking 
members of the MDC were attacked and arrested along with more than 110 activists by heavily armed riot 
police preventing a ‘Save Zimbabwe Campaign’ prayer meeting in Harare’s Highfield suburb that made 
the region intervene to settle matters between the two parties. Regarding the latter, the violence that 
gripped the period towards the June Runoff elections in 2008 where Masunungure (2010) notes that 
opposition party members were beaten and tortured but without any retaliation led to the avoidance of a 
possible catastrophe in Zimbabwe.    
  
The ripe moment is described as the juncture in a dispute when the parties are most inclined (perhaps out 
of exhaustion) to make a settlement and when, therefore, it is best to start a negotiation or force the pace 
of an existing one (Berridge and James, 2003:233). The idea behind the concept is that, when the parties 
find themselves locked in a conflict from which they cannot escalate to victory and this deadlock is 
painful to both of them (although not necessarily in equal degrees or for the same reasons), they seek a 
way out, (Zartman 2000: 228). This idea is greatly reflected in the events that transpired in Zimbabwe in 
the formation of the SADC-mediated GNU. It is by virtue of there being a mutually hurting stalemate 
(MHS) that parties can choose to find a solution to a crisis. In the Zimbabwean context both ZANU-PF 
and MDC-T were in a hurting situation. The former being victorious in a controversial election did not 
have the means to revive Zimbabwe which was under a crisis. The party having had won elections in a 
controversial fashion in a country that was on the verge of collapsing needed local and international 
support and the opposition party was a panacea to such a predicament because of its relationship with the 
powerful western world. The economy of Zimbabwe since the mid-1990s is perhaps the greatest manifest 
of ZANU-PF’s failure to deal with the Zimbabwe situation. On the other hand, the latter, the MDC-T 
party, which had won the March 2008 Harmonised Elections was devastated by the fact that everything 
had been overturned unfairly because of ZANU-PF’s access to state institutions and resources. The party 
won the elections on March 29 2008, and after a flawed environment where the ZANU-PF regime used 
intimidation methods the period towards the June 2008 Runoff, the MDC-T withdrew from the elections 
resulting in a victory for the Mugabe regime. Therefore, the two major parties to the GNU in Zimbabwe 
were under Zartman’s mutually hurting stalemate.  
  
Although, Schrodt et al. (2003, 2-3) relate MHS to lengthy periods of violence, from which neither of the 
fighting parties are likely to get out of through a unilateral victory, the Zimbabwean case slightly differs. 
Prior the signing of the GPA that created the GNU, Zimbabwe was characterised by lengthy phases of 
violence especially during election time. Thus, after both the harmonised and June Run-off 2008 
elections, both parties could not come out victorious independently. The ZANU-PF party could not come 
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out victorious in terms of reviving the country’s economic, political and social sectors, and; the MDC in 
terms of access to the government itself which was one of their top objectives. In such a way, the tension 
between the MDC party and ZANU-PF was lengthy starting as early as the formation of the MDC but the 
nature of physical fights was the talk of the day in the three phases of elections especially in the period 
towards the election (pre-election phase).  
  
The two factors above apply to the parties in a dispute but within the Ripeness Theory is the third element 
of an outside party. The third element also contributes towards the disputants realizing that the ripe time 
has come. Ripeness hence is twofold that it can either stem from that, that which has been recognized by 
both parties in a conflict or from a third party, who is external to the dispute.  In this regard, Zartman 
(2000: 229) states that;  
  
...ripeness is necessarily a perceptual event, and as with any subjective perception, there are likely 
to be objective referents to be perceived. These can be highlighted by a mediator or an opposing 
party when they are not immediately recognised by the party itself, and resisted so long as the 
conflicting party refuses or is otherwise able to block out their perception. But it is the perception 
of the objective condition, not the condition itself that makes for a MHS. If the parties do not 
recognize ‘clear evidence’ that they are in an impasse, a Mutually Hurting Stalemate has not (yet) 
occurred, and if they do perceive themselves to be in such a situation, no matter how flimsy the  
“evidence,” the MHS is present.  
  
In this way while, it was the ripe time for MDC-T and ZANU-PF to find an amicable solution to realize 
their results, it was the best time for sub-regional organizations to intervene and resolve the Zimbabwe 
situation after close to a decade of confrontational politicking. As a result, in the Zimbabwe situation the 
ZANU-PF party, the MDC-T party and the MDC-M including the SADC bloc which mediated in the 
Zimbabwean case had subjective perceptions of the Zimbabwean situation but had objective referents to 
the phenomenon. Implied in the previous statement is that all parties agreed that there was need to 
revitalise the economy of the country however differing on what triggered the collapse of the economy. 
The Zimbabwean situation affected human security in its totality as noted in the analysis of Kondo and 
Makanza (2014).   
  
Kofi Annan on Human security noted that, the concept of human security embraces far more than the 
absence of violent conflicts, as it encompasses human rights, good governance, access to education and 
health care and ensuring that each individual had opportunities and choices to fulfil his or her own 
potential. Although, the definition of Human Security is subject to much debate its first, most-commonly 
cited usage came in the United Nations Development Program’s (UNDP) 1994 Human Development 
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Report. Kondo and Makanza (2014:35) denote, an essential part of human security approach is its focus 
on inter-linkages between the multiple threats and issues such as socio-economic deprivation, health, 
education, the environmental issues and physical threats and violent conflicts.  This thus entails that the 
elements of human security are intertwined such that deprivation of one element possess a threat to the 
other elements for instance if economic insecurity leads to health insecurity and insecurity in the political 
spheres is a threat to personal freedom.   
  
Therefore, Zimbabwe in the post-2008 eon was marred with socio-economic deprivation, health, 
education, the environmental issues and physical threats and violent related conflicts. These factors had 
spill-over effects that affected neighboring countries such as Botswana and South Africa. Esterhuysen 
(2004:44) states that Mugabe’s clampdown on the opposition in Zimbabwe and the continued harassment 
of opposition leaders aggravated by the country’s political and social problem led to several Zimbabweans 
leaving the country for South Africa and the United Kingdom among others as refugees. The country’s 
economy, society and political systems have undergone considerable upheaval in recent years, prompting 
large-scale cross-border and circular movements of people including, shoppers, traders, migrant workers, 
refugees, asylum seekers and unaccompanied children (Long and Crisp, 2011:9).  
  
The effect has been the movement of people down South to seek refugee statuses. All these factors greatly 
reveal that the mutually hurting stalemate also applied to third parties especially states in the SADC bloc. 
As early as 29 March 2007 SADC convened an Extra-Ordinary Summit of the Heads of State and 
Government of SADC in Dar-es-Salaam, United Republic of Tanzania to discuss the political, economic 
and security situation in Zimbabwe. The leaders acting as third parties to the dispute in Zimbabwe 
realized the ripe time for the disputing parties. While, the ZANU-PF regime blamed the external factors 
especially sanctions imposed on Zimbabwe by sectors of the European Union and the United State of 
America; the MDC parties blamed the flawed rule and poor domestic policies of the ZANU-PF regime for 
the collapse of the entire system of the country. The objective condition that the two major parties could 
not continue without each other and enough evidence pointed to this mutually hurting stalemate. 
Therefore, this inclined them to form a GNU which was mediated by a SADC mediator with the aim of 
ending the crises in Zimbabwe and for the conflicting parties to move from the mutually hurting 
stalemate. In such a way the three parties to the MHS by Zartman (2000) is greatly reflected in the 
phenomenon understudy.   
  
As is noted by Cantekin (2015) William Zartman’s theoretical approach has two factors that are centrally 
important for finding a solution by negotiation or mediation to a conflict namely the substance of 
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proposals and timing of efforts.  The former according to Zartman are fruitless until the moment is ripe 
for parties. Therefore, unless and until the time is ripe, the substance of the proposal to end the conflict is 
irrelevant. This can be noted in events that took place in Zimbabwe for over 5 years after the formation of 
the MDC party and even after the 2008 elections.  The call by the MDC-T for the June Run-off to be 
called off and the stance it took to withdraw its candidate, the late Morgan Richard Tsvangirai citing 
unfairness prior the election inclined not ZANU-PF to negotiate as the moment was not ripe for the other 
party to engage in negotiations. ZANU-PF could not see the need for negotiation or mediation because the 
situation was in their favour.  
  
The position is different from the winners of the March 2008 elections who had been denied their chance 
to lead Zimbabwe and to them the moment was ripe for Zimbabwe to establish and implement better 
democratic guiding election principles.  Implied in the theoretical assumptions of Zartman (2000)’s theory 
is the point that ripeness is a necessary condition for the initiation of negotiations, bilateral or mediated. It 
must be seized by the parties or by the mediator. Consequently, in the Zimbabwean context the moment 
for ripeness was not only apprehended by either the ZANU-PF or MDC parties but the Southern Africa 
Development Community as well. As has been mentioned in the fore-going, following massive brutality 
on opposition party members in Zimbabwe for close to a decade, the SADC community through an 
Extraordinary Summit held in March 2007 mandated the South African president, Thabo Mbeki, to 
mediate in the Zimbabwean conflict by facilitating dialogue between the country’s warring political 
parties (Zimonline 2007 cited in Nyakudya (2014:89). Therefore, before the warring parties agreed to 
conduct a dialogue after the 2008 elections, SADC had already made strides towards facilitating a 
dialogue between the two parties as early as 2007.    
  
According to Zartman (2000:228) the other element necessary for a ripe moment is less complex and 
controversial; that is the perception of a way out. The theorist states that parties do not have to be able to 
identify a specific solution, only a sense that a negotiated solution is possible for the searching and that 
the other party shares that sense and the willingness to search too. Without the sense of a way out, the 
push associated with the MHS would leave the parties with nowhere to go. Therefore, the sense of a way 
out of the MHS for ZANU-PF and MDC was there but it came from different angles. Both parties were 
willing to search for a solution to end the crisis in Zimbabwe but in the interest of their political 
ambitions. In this way while ZANU-PF was concerned about clinging on to power, the MDC-T party and 
MDC-M to an extent were concerned with democratisation and reformation of the political system as it 
was the only solution that they had, that could get them into power. In this way from both ends it was a 
moment of ripeness.  The factor also applied to third parties in the conflict as South Africa and Botswana 
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were now heavily burdened by the influx of Zimbabwean refugees. Zimbabwean refugees were justified 
on the definition that has been provided by the United Nations. The 1951 UN Convention relating to the 
Status of Refugees (Geneva Convention) and the 1967 Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees Article 
1 (A2) defines the term refugee as any person who;  
  
…owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, 
membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his 
nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of 
that country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual 
residence as a result of such events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it.  
  
Zimbabwean refugees were vindicated on the basis of fear from the ZANU-PF led government because of 
holding different political opinion. Again, some were forced to leave Zimbabwe for South Africa on the 
basis of economic conditions which had limited opportunities. It hence is critical to note that South Africa 
and other SADC states such as Botswana received Zimbabwean refugees and immigrants which put a 
strain to their budgets. The Zimbabwean conflict had spill-over effects that inclined SADC states to act as 
the time was ripe to stop the influx of Zimbabwean refugees and immigrants into their countries.  
  
Zartman (2000) also notes that ripeness is only a condition, necessary but not sufficient for the initiation 
of negotiations. Therefore, the time maybe ripe but if there is no initiation from conflicting parties, 
negotiations cannot happen. One can note that even before the 2008 Harmonised Elections, the situation 
was ripe for political parties in Zimbabwe to unite and forge a way forward as living conditions were 
deplorable. However, because of power politics in which both parties wanted to control power through the 
ballot, the condition did not present them with MHS at least from before the elections. Thus, ripeness is 
not self-fulfilling or self-implementing and it must be seized, either directly by the parties or, if not, 
through the persuasion of a mediator. Though, both parties knew of the MHS, because of the rivalry and 
decades of serious fights which in some instances turned into physical fights they needed a mediator in 
the name of Thabo Mbeki to reach the negotiating table.  Thus, this illustrates Zartman’s analysis that not 
all ripe moments are so seized and turned into negotiations, hence the importance of specifying the 
meaning and evidence of ripeness so as to indicate when conflicting or third parties can fruitfully initiate 
negotiations is vital. Ripeness Theory is intended to explain why, and therefore when, parties to a conflict 
are susceptible to their own or others’ efforts to turn the conflict toward resolution through negotiation, 
(Zartman 2008)  
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Zartman in his various publications on the Ripeness Theory also notes that the basic reasoning underlying 
the MHS lies in cost-benefit analysis, based on the assumption that, when parties to a conflict find 
themselves on a pain-producing path, they prepare to look for an alternative that is more advantageous. 
The move by warring parties in Zimbabwe to engage in a dialogue was advantageous to both parties as 
they had their own interests.  This calculation is fully consistent with public choice of rationality by 
scholars like Sen (1970) and Arrow, (1963) and public choice studies of negotiation by scholars such 
Brams (1990) and Brams and Taylor (1996), which assume that a party will pick the alternative it prefers 
and that a decision to change is induced by means of increasing pain associated with the present 
(conflictual) course.   
  
Consequently, Zartman (2000:229)’s definitional proposition that ‘If the (two) parties to a conflict (a) 
perceive themselves to be in a hurting stalemate and (b) perceive the possibility of a negotiated solution (a 
way out), the conflict is ripe for resolution that is, for negotiations toward resolution to begin’, greatly 
explains the events that unfolded and inclined warring Zimbabwean political parties to form a government 
of national unity.  The scenario provided pain for both parties as MDC-T could not access office despite 
winning the first round of elections, while ZANU-PF which was the de facto government did not have the 
means to revive the country unlike its opposition partner. The costs of being out of government was 
perilous as the MDC-T sought to change the undemocratic system that the ZANU-PF government had 
used since independence and on the other hand ZANU-PF could face international and local resistance as 
the country was on the verge of failing. Both parties had interests at stake in the process.   
  
Zartman (2000) also notes that although, Ripeness Theory is not predictive in the sense that it can tell 
when a given situation will become ripe, it is predictive in the sense of identifying the elements necessary 
(even if not sufficient) for the productive inauguration of negotiations. Therefore, in the Zimbabwe 
situation after the June Run-off elections it was predictable that ZANU-PF needed to engage the MDC-T 
party because the country was in chaos. The catastrophe which Zartman mentions in line with the MHS 
provides a deadline or a lesson indicating that pain can be sharply increased if something is not done 
about it now; catastrophe is a useful extension of the notion of an MHS but is not necessary to either its 
definition or its existence. It is catastrophe that hit the ZANU-PF regime where it knew that it could not 
take the country anywhere after the controversial victory in the June Run-off Elections.  
  
In the same note, the MDC-T party had failed to secure influential public office posts since the 2000 
elections hence could not influence decision making which had impacted on its March Elections victory. 
To the MDC-T if it did not engage with ZANU-PF, the latter was going to do as it reckoned 
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indispensable, a phenomenon that could increase its pain as ZANU-PF’s grip could increase.  On the 
same note the ripeness theory views from a different set of window perceives the stalemate as the plateau, 
a flat and unending terrain without relief, and the catastrophe the precipice, the point where things 
suddenly and predictably get worse. The stalemate in Zimbabwe had started around 2000 as both parties 
needed each other but the year 2008 presented a catastrophe, the worst was to befall both parties.   
  
Although the Ripeness Theory is fundamental in answering some of the events that unfolded in 
Zimbabwe, one of the major weaknesses of the theory is that it treats all parties to a conflict in the same 
bracket. It thus ignores the grievances of the different parties to a conflict. It thus is a theory that concerns 
the thought processes of decision makers who forsake a “unilateral” approach (continued hostilities) and 
embrace a “bilateral” approach (negotiation, with or without the help of a mediator), (Pruitt 2015). 
Additionally, the Ripeness Theory has been criticized for being insufficiently dynamic and flexible. It 
lacks a political dimension, relying as it does on individual leader decision-making which may not have 
been the case in Zimbabwe for instance in the MDC formations that are advocates of democracy. Such 
weaknesses are thus circumvented by the Readiness Theory which analyses political processes by looking 
at the readiness for negotiation of the various factions that make up a polity rather than looking only at 
leader readiness.   
3.3 Readiness theory  
While, Zartman (2000) in the Ripeness Theory as has been mentioned in the foregoing, focuses on the 
mutually hurting stalemate and the way out perception, the Readiness Theory which was advanced in a 
number of articles by Pruitt (1997, 2005, 2007 and 2015) is a characteristic of a single disputant that 
encourages movement toward or participation in negotiation. According to Pruitt, Readiness Theory 
focuses on the conditions appropriate for commencing negotiations in the language of psychological 
variables (Pruitt 1997, 2005, 2007).  A “Readiness” is a characteristic of a party to a conflict that reflects 
the thinking of the leadership regarding the conflict, and it can vary within a wide scale of conciliatory 
behavior (Pruitt 2007). Readiness Theory, with the description of his author, is a revision and elaboration 
of Zartman’s Ripeness Theory. It is fundamentally critical to take note of the fact  that, both the Ripeness 
and Readiness theories do not apply to mandated negotiations or to negotiations that are aimed at 
impressing people or buying time rather than reaching agreement, (Pruitt, 2005).   
  
It is however, important to make a distinction between the two theories from the onset. Consequently, 
whereas the Ripeness Theory is all about conflicting parties’ perception of a mutually hurting stalemate 
(MHS), optimally associated with an impending, past, or recently avoided and the perception of a way out 
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as advanced by Zartman (2000), the Readiness Theory advances conciliatory behaviour, from each party’s 
point of view, (Pruitt, 2007). In this regard, factors that incline parties to the negotiation table can be from 
an external point of view or from an internal perspective. In the Zimbabwean context therefore, while, the 
Ripeness Theory focuses on the external factors that influenced ZANU-PF, MDC-T and MDCM to enter 
into a global political agreement such as economic factors, regional variables and even sociopolitico 
factors, the Readiness Theory perceives the inclination from an internal (party) point of view.  The 
readiness Theory henceforth advances focuses on the processes that lead the parties to sit at the table and 
the factors that influenced concession-making during negotiation (Pruitt 2005: 11–13, 30; 2007:  
1525).  
  
According to Geniblak (2009:12) in the Readiness Theory is the assumption that a low level of readiness 
fosters moderate conciliatory gestures but as the readiness level rises, the party’s behavior becomes more 
conciliatory and might take the form of a ceasefire or commencement of negotiations. Therefore, in the 
Zimbabwe case, particularly to ZANU-PF and the MDC-T that entered into the 2009 GNU with MDC-M, 
from each party’s party perspective, the level of readiness had risen. From a historiographical point of 
view, it has to be noted that ZANU-PF with low levels of readiness especially in the early 2000s because 
it was in firm control of the country. Although, there were signs that the economy was facing woes, it was 
in a position to have firm grip over events that took place in the country. From the perspective of the two 
MDCs which were still a single formidable force, they were not ready to enter into any agreement with 
ZANU-PF as they were treated as the enemy of the state which coincided with the conflation of the state 
and the ruling party (Mandaza 2015). In this regard, there was no way that the parties could have entered 
into negotiations as their levels of readiness were too low. Even after the 2007 Extra-Ordinary Meeting of 
the SADC bloc, both parties from Pruitt’s point of view had low levels of readiness with regards to 
negotiations. In order for the parties to initiate negotiations and make concessions, an additional increase 
in readiness is needed; thus, the greater the readiness on both sides, the more likely they are to negotiate 
(Pruitt 2005: 9–15, 2007:1525). According to readiness theory, each side might have different reasons for 
entering negotiations.   
  
Therefore, in as much as both ZANU-PF and the two MDC formations were at a mutually hurting 
stalemate and they had the perception of a way out of the chaos and conflict they had been involved in for 
close to a decade. After the 2008 elections in Zimbabwe (Ripeness Theory), they both had motivations for 
entering into negotiations. The impetuses behind their readiness to enter into negotiations despite the 
availability of a ripe situation can be explained by the theory of realism. According to Fossey (2009:216), 
realism is based on the premise that world politics is essentially unchangeable hence there exists a 
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struggle among self-interested states or power and position under anarchy, with each state pursuing its 
own national interests. It prioritizes national interest and security over ideology, moral concerns and 
social reconstruction.  Variously called “power politics”, “the billard ball mode”, “political realism” and 
“the state centric model”, realism as Masbach and Vasquez (1943:3) note is a paradigm which came up as 
critique of idealism an earlier theory.. Thucydides, Sun Tzu, Nicollo Machiavelli, Thomas Hobbes and  
Cardinal Richeliue among others are often cited as the “inspiration” or the “founding fathers” of realism. 
The central argument in the realist world is that the assumption that global politics is a contest for power 
among sovereign states in an anarchic environment. It focuses on state security and power above all thus 
early realists like E.H Carr and W.H Morgenthau argued that at an international level states are 
selfinterested power rational actors who seek to maximise their security and chances of survival. At a 
state level, realists like Machiavelli in the Prince (1513) focused on how power must be acquired and 
maintained through various necessary measures.   
  
Consequently, in the context of Zimbabwe the readiness of the political parties that entered into the GNU 
in terms of their reasons that inclined them is answered by realism.  The reason behind the readiness of 
the parties to the GNU in Zimbabwe was to pursue and maintain power. For ZANU-PF getting into 
negotiations with the MDC especially the Tsvangirai-led party revolved around the need for stability in 
the country which was frenzied because of an economy that had robustly deteriorated since the late 1990s. 
The argument is supported by the realist notion that there are no permanent friends or enemies but where 
interests coincide, one is bound to enter into an agreement. This, therefore was a way for the ZANU-PF 
party to be able to regain its dominance by engaging the enemy. It has to be mentioned that the Western 
World which greatly contributed to ZANU-PF’s problems sympathized with the MDC-T party, hence the 
former had to engage the latter for its survival due to the economic muscle of the latter’s supporters. The 
grievous nature of relations between ZANU-PF and the western world can be noted in the early 2000 
where sections of the international community, particularly the European Union and the U.S since 2001 
introduced sanctions and various measures against Zimbabwe over issues of disputed elections, 
governance and the Fast Track Land Reform Program.   
  
Scholars such Raftopolous (2009:217) assert that the response of the Western governments to a series of 
human rights violations before, during and after the 2000 parliamentary and 2002 presidential elections 
was to impose a series of what were called “targeted sanctions” against selected individuals from the 
Mugabe regime. In the Fast Track Land Reform Program of June 2000, acquisition of the farms was 
effected without awarding due compensation to the farmers as is required under international law thus 
property rights were violated, Dube (2007:8). The U.S government responded in 2001 by imposing 
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economic sanctions under the Zimbabwe Democracy and Economic Recovery Act (ZIDERA) which 
among other things prohibits budgetary assistance to Zimbabwe by International Monetary Fund, the 
World Bank and other lending institutions in which it has stakes. This international isolation of Zimbabwe 
has resulted in a negative view of the country thereby reducing the availability of credit lines and foreign 
investment contributing to the further decline of the economy and poor living conditions, worsening 
ZANU-PF’s position in government and its tutelage of the country.   
  
On the other hand, because the MDC-T had suffered numerous electoral defeats on alleged election 
rigging by the ZANU-PF government, getting into negotiation was vital as it meant that their party 
members were going to get influential ministerial posts that they intended to use in changing every factor 
that contributed to ZANU-PF’s survival. The MDC-M in the same line of thinking, sought to enhance its 
relevance as its continuation and survival in the environment where its leaders were perceived as 
turncoats would have been a difficult task. The split of the MDC-M from the MDC-T was perceived a 
move that divided votes that were supposed to have gone to the MDC party an event that could have made 
it possible for the party to reach the 51% threshold. The motivations were in the power realm, however 
cloaked under the notion of doing it for Zimbabwe. Therefore, the dialogue that transpired in Zimbabwe 
after the 2008 elections which were facilitated by SADC representative Thabo Mbeki can be analysed in 
the context of the readiness of each party to end political and economic turmoil in Zimbabwe, not 
excluding their perceived benefits to the pursuit of their different political agenda at the time and beyond. 
According to Pruitt (2005) readiness entails two psychological variables which combine in a 
multiplicative way: motivation and optimism. In this regard, while, motivation focuses on the need to end 
the conflict, optimism is about the outcome of conciliation and negotiation or mediation. Centrally, these 
variables encourage a party to a conflict to agree to conduct negotiations (Pruitt 1997, 2005, 2007).  
  
Cantekin (2016) notes that motivation is from a negative window as it is the sense that one is losing that 
creates greater motivation. Motivation in Pruitt’s conception of the Readiness Theory which focuses on 
the inclination to end the conflict is derived from threefold factors which are.   
(a) A sense that the conflict is unwinnable,  
(b) A sense that the conflict generates unacceptable costs or risks, and;  (c) 
Pressure from a powerful third party.  
  
With regards to the first factor (a) Pruitt (2015:9-10) states that from the perspective of one party, there is 
a sense that the conflict is unwinnable. Implied in such a notion is the fact that, there should the 
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perception that there is no way out for a party and they stand a chance to win or survive if the conflict 
continues.  The conflict that ZANU-PF and the two MDC parties which started as early as the year 2000 
proved unwinnable in the year 2008. For the ZANU-PF party, continued fights with the MDC party meant 
continued fights with their supporters and funders who were willing to make the path difficult for the 
party especially after the party’s brutality in the course towards the June 2008 Election Runoff.   
  
On the second aspect (b), the conflict had deleterious effects on the parties hence it was worth it for the 
parties to engage. It was the sense that the conflict generates unacceptable costs or risks (Pruitt 2007) that 
motivated the parties to the GNU to sign the 2008 Global Political Agreement. It is critical to note that 
ZANU-PF had painted a negative image about the Zimbabwean state and the most powerful states were 
not willing to engage with the state despite the predicament that the Zimbabwean state was in. In this 
context, continued fighting with MDC could result in robust restrictive measures from the international 
community. At the same time, the MDC party could continue facing brutality when there was a chance to 
enter into negotiation and change the status-quo of the country. Therefore, for the MDC party there was a 
motivation to enter into a truce of convenience to end the perils that were at hand which deleteriously 
impacted on the human security of their party members.   
  
The third element relates to the availability of an arbitrator. According to Pruitt (2005) pressure from a 
powerful third party was critical to motivate opposing parties to a ceasefire. The stronger the third party 
and the greater the pressure it applies, the more the parties will endeavor to demonstrate that they seek an 
end to the conflict (appearance of motivational change). The choice of Thabo Mbeki by the SADC bloc to 
mediate in the Zimbabwean case came out of the need to end internal and external conundrums that 
continued to engulf the Zimbabwean state and countries in the SADC region.  Internally, 
Esterhuysen(2004:44) states that Mugabe’s clampdown on the opposition in Zimbabwe and the continued 
harassment of opposition leaders aggravated by the country’s socio-political and economic problems led 
to several Zimbabweans leaving the country for South Africa, Botswana and the United Kingdom 
(external consequences) among others as refugees. The country’s economy, society and political system 
underwent considerable upheaval in recent years, prompting large-scale cross-border and circular 
movements of people including, shoppers, traders, migrant workers, refugees, asylum seekers and 
unaccompanied children (Long and Crisp, 2011:9). The effect was the movement of people which 
required powerful negotiators. Therefore, since 2007 SADC through Mbeki played a pivotal role to 
motivate the players to enter into a power-sharing government.   
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Pruitt (2005) also mentions that third-party pressure to end the conflict, which can come from mediators, 
allies, or other powerful parties is another variable worth considering in the parties’ decision to engage 
into conciliatory actions.  Consequently, the motivation to end the conflict by either of the three parties 
that were involved in the Government of National Unity, who had been involved in continued fighting in 
terms of the blame game and hate speech; inter alia, the skirmishes that gripped party supporters proved 
disastrous. The costs were unacceptable for instance on ZANU-PF as the brutal assault by police on 
opposition politicians and civic leaders which had happened in March 2007 attracted worldwide publicity, 
(Nyakudya, 2014). On the part of the MDC-T party, the continued suffering of brutality on party members 
and supporters proved costly. With a mediator of Thabo Mbeki’s caliber, the fighting parties therefore had 
to enter into an agreement, factors that are central in Pruitt’s Readiness Theory.    
  
It can be argued that there was pressure from various SADC member states to bring the issue in  
Zimbabwe to normalcy by ensuring that Mugabe and Tsvangirai’s differences were resolved.  The South 
African factor is hard to ignore in the analysis of the events that took place in Zimbabwe after the 2008 
elections. Although South Africa is semi-peripheral in the world system, it cannot be denied that it is 
regionally dominant and this comes from the fact that one of its leading trading partners Zimbabwe was 
from colonialism a dominant trade player as well. South Africa was thus deemed to be the hegemonic 
power by Western governments and as having a direct responsibility for ensuring peace in the region as 
the dominant power of Southern African Development Community (SADC) and as a leading player in the 
African Union (AU). At the same time South Africa was increasing its influence on the global stage as a 
member of the India Brazil South Africa Tripartite (IBSA) which promoted international cooperation and 
trade not excluding its involvement when South Africa joined Brazil, Russia, India and China to form 
BRICS.  
  
The other variable that Pruitt (2007) mentions in his Readiness Theory is optimism. It refers to the 
possibility of concluding negotiations with an agreement that is acceptable to both sides. (Pruitt 2007; 
2009). Optimism is written from a liberalism perspective whereby utopianism is at the center of the 
theory. Accordingly, the variable requires a certain degree of faith that the final agreement will meet its 
objectives, as well as the perception that the negotiator on the other side can in fact make a commitment 
on behalf of that side and will indeed adhere to the agreement (Pruitt, private communication, March 9, 
2008). With regards to optimism, ZANU-PF as a party that was in power since the independence of 
Zimbabwe in 1980 had its legitimacy in question because of the nature that the June 2008 Election Runoff 
was conducted hence entering into an agreement was one way that the government was going to be 
recognized as the de jure government of Zimbabwe from an international law perspective. MDC-T as a 
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party that inclines itself with the Western world perceived the Government of National Unity as a panacea 
to the democratisation process for instance reformation of the security sector and the electoral sector, 
sectors that ZANU-PF used to determine the outcome of elections since the emergence of the MDC party 
in 1999. Preserving the optimism requires an understanding that a formula acceptable to both sides and 
able to bridge their opposing positions is achievable. The greater the ostensible distance is between the 
parties, the lower the level of optimism (Pruitt 2005:8).   
  
Pruitt (2007) cited in Cantekin (2016) states that optimism about negotiation results from three states of 
mind: lowered aspirations, working trust and perceived light at the end of the tunnel. Lowered aspirations 
mean achievable goals. In the Zimbabwe case both parties after engaging in a dialogue that was facilitated 
by SADC a regional body was optimistic that their goals would be achieved. On the same note, working 
trust shows the belief that the other party also wants to escape the conflict. ZANU-PF perceived the 
negotiations as a remedy to the crisis that it had plunged the country into since 1980.  For MDC-T, it was 
a chance for the party to halt the anti-progressive and anti-democratic tendencies that had occasioned the 
Zimbabwe crisis.   The perception that an acceptable agreement would shape up was perceived as light at 
the end of the tunnel for either of the party that was involved in Zimbabwe after the 2008 elections. Pruitt 
(2007) states that the existence of both motivation and optimism are compulsory, even in some degree and 
these were extant in the Zimbabwean context prior to signing of the global political agreement which gave 
birth to the government of national unity in 2008.   
  
 Pruitt (2000) identifies four tactical courses of action that leaderships of the parties have in the events of a 
conflict viz.   
1. Continue current hostilities   
2. Escalate the conflict;   
3. Seek allies and,   
4. Finally, explore or enter negotiation or mediation.   
  
In this view Pruitt is of the view that the first three tactics are unilateral, the fourth one is bilateral or 
multilateral. In the Zimbabwean context before the signing of the GNU, it is important to note that both 
parties had embarked on unilateral courses of actions. Even after the imposition of sanctions by the 
western world, ZANU-PF did not stop to be hostile to opposition parties. The same can be applied to 
MDC in the sense that, after its party members and leaders had been brutalized for close to a decade, the 
party continued to fight ZANU-PF. In the same vein, both parties sought allies from around the world 
with the ZANU-PF party embarking on a Look East Policy in the mid 2000 era. On the other hand, MDC 
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continued to receive support from the western world. However, in the 2008 era, it appears there was no 
way out for the political parties hence they made themselves ready to enter into an agreement, of course 
with the assistance of Mbeki representing the SADC bloc. Generally, although there is no evidence that 
points to the parties trying to explore Pruitt’s first three options in 2008, each of the parties to the conflict 
in Zimbabwe explored negotiation or mediation.  
  
From Pruitt (2015) the notion that pressure from third parties is vital for conflicting parties to enter into 
negotiation, the solution to the Zimbabwe crisis in which a former African president was involved was 
imperative if South Africa wanted to ensure its status as an emerging power in Africa as Zimbabwe has 
remained a market for South African products. The fact that Thabo Mbeki is South African meant that he 
had to pressurize parties to the conflict in the Zimbabwean context so as to maintain the trade balance 
between his own country and Zimbabwe which has been one of its leading trading parties for years. At the 
same time, the conflict in Zimbabwe meant that there was no progression in every sector of the country 
hence it was having spill-over effects to other neighbouring countries as there was the continued influx of 
illegal immigrants to the country from Zimbabwe. In this way Thabo Mbeki to an extent was receiving 
pressure from SADC member states especially his own country and Botswana pressurised former 
adversaries to enter into a pact of power sharing an event that they never envisioned because of the 
serious rivalry that gripped the parties since the emergency of the MDC party towards the dawn of the 
new millennium.  The third-party notion of the Readiness Theory also provides a frame upon which 
events that unfolded in Zimbabwe after the 2008 elections which led to a SADC-mediated GNU between 
ZANU-PF, MDC-T and the MDC-M parties can be explained.   
  
According to the readiness theory, motivation and optimism have the following qualities;  
1. They are necessary variables, and they must exist to a certain degree in order to proceed towards 
negotiations.   
Implied in the sentiment is that there should be a degree of motivation and optimism for there to be 
negotiations. The motivations of ZANU-PF and the two MDC parties were shrouded with realist notions. 
Even the motivation behind the SADC bloc especially having a former statesman of the South African 
state as the mediator.  In the same vein, all the parties that were involved were optimistic that an 
agreement would end the status-quo bettering their positions in terms of political standing.   
  
2. They are mutually related in a number of ways: First, optimism determines the extent to which 
the motivation to de-escalate shapes behavior (Pruitt 1997, 2005, 2007). Second, motivation to 
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end the conflict can foster optimism through a number of mechanisms, which can potentially 
generate a confidence-building cycle leading to negotiations (Pruitt 2005: 19–21; 2007: 1529)  
Therefore, being optimistic of ending the conflict instilled great senses of motivation for the 
parties that participated in the creation of the GNU in Zimbabwe.   
  
3. Motivation moderates the parties’ demands, thereby encouraging greater optimism regarding the 
success of negotiations.   
  
In this way, motivation often leads to the accumulation of information that challenges preexisting states of 
mind. The motivation of a third party to end the conflict can encourage it to take the initiative in bringing 
the disputing parties to negotiations (Pruitt, 2007:1530). These third-party efforts can increase optimism 
on both sides and eventually lead to full negotiations. This therefore is the notion in the Readiness Theory 
that for the peace process to succeed, a higher level of optimism must develop in the form of a perception 
of “light at the end of the tunnel” (Pruitt 2007:1529) – that is, a perception that an acceptable agreement is 
taking shape and that the other side is prepared to make the necessary concessions, that inclined parties to 
partake in the creation of a GNU in Zimbabwe.   
  
According Pruitt (2005) each side might have different reasons for entering negotiations and reaching an 
agreement as has already been mentioned above regarding the involvement of MDC-T, ZANU-PF, 
MDCM and the SADC body including the SADC mediator. The scholar also notes that when readiness is 
unequal, the party with a higher level of readiness needs to make more concessions and, therefore, will be 
in a less desirable position in the final agreement. Regarding the Zimbabwean situation ZANU-PF was in 
a higher level of readiness compared to the two MDC parties in the sense that the party was completely 
blank about the recovery agenda having won elections in a controversial fashion. Therefore, after having 
controlled all sectors and all ministerial posts for 28 years, it had to give in some of its power to MDC for 
the sake of progress.  Henceforth, it was left in a less desirable but powerful position compared to the 
previous years preceding the year 2009 when the 2008 signed global political agreement that gave birth to 
the government of national unity came into effect.    
  
Therefore, the Readiness Theory refers to a number of conditions that have the potential to bring parties to 
negotiation, as well as factors that encourage them to make concessions during negotiations and to reach 
an agreement, (Schiff, 2013). It therefore is a powerful theory that informs this study by its focus on the 
parties that were involved in mediation process that led to the signing of a global political agreement 
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between the three main political parties in Zimbabwe. The focus of the theory from a third-party point of 
view is vital in explaining the rationale behind the parties that were in conflict in Zimbabwe agreeing to 
negotiate. The motivations from fear and the optimism of the three parties concerning Zimbabwean 
situation vis-à-vis their political agenda is revealed by the notions of the readiness theory. At the same 
note the theory also focuses on a third party which can play a vital role in inclining parties to a conflict to 
be ready for negotiation to end a conflict or crisis. In the context of this study the third-party pressure 
concept explains the involvement of the SADC mediator, Thabo Mbeki and the rationale behind SADC 
involvement in the Zimbabwe crises. The theory henceforth provides a framework upon which parties get 
to the negotiation table. However, there are limited case studies conducted to rate the explanatory power 
of the readiness theory. One of them is Schiff’s study (2013) on the Aceh (Helsinki) peace process. The 
analysis of this process in the Aceh conflict demonstrates that readiness theory (motivation and optimism) 
enables the researchers to identify and map many more factors that influence conflict resolution processes 
than any other theory in the field. Despite this conclusion, some shortcomings are highlighted and they 
derive from its comprehensiveness and complexity (Schiff, 2013, 54). In the Djibouti-Eritrea dispute, 
motivation and optimism, key concepts of the readiness theory, are difficult to associate with Eritrea 
(Frank, 2015, 133). An explicit need for more case studies exists for measuring the explanatory power of 
the readiness theory. In the context of this study the Readiness Theory does not provide a hypothetical 
position on how this SADC-mediated GNU in Zimbabwe between 2009 and 2013 can be explained, it 
was associated with elitism.    
3.4 Elite Theory   
The Elite Theory is a theory that is based on the notion that in several different streams, society always 
has been and always will be controlled by a small group called the elite, (Anupam 2013). The elite are 
generally defined as a small group of powerful people who hold a disproportionate amount of wealth, 
privilege, political power, or skill in a society. These are hence those people or organizations that are 
considered the best or most powerful compared to others of a similar type. The Elite theory is deep-rooted 
in classical sociology, especially that of Weber (2005 [1922]), Pareto (1935), Mosca (1939) and Michels 
(2009 [1915]). The theory is often divided into two that is classical and current, with theorists from the 
different times sharing the ambition of explaining state outcomes through elite behaviour. Current Elite 
Theorists include Field and Higley, 2012 [1981]; Burton and Higley (1987); Higley and Burton, (1989); 
Dogan and Higley (1998); Higley et al. (1990) and Best and Higley (2010). It is from the elite theory 
window that events that transpired in Zimbabwe regarding the SADC mediated GNU can be analysed. 
From the onset since independence, the Zimbabwean system can be viewed as an elite driven society as 
the state tried to create a nation-state project soon after independence but it failed, (Laakso and Olukoshi 
1996); and such elitism was also witnessed in the formation of the GNU.  
71  
  
Elite Theory postulates a division of society into two groups: the Elite and the Masses, the former governs 
and the latter is governed, (Mosca 1939). In this it regards the “will of the people”, “sovereignty of the 
people”, “Government by the people” and other such characterisations created and adopted by the elites to 
cover, legitimise and make successful their rule over the masses, (Best and Higley 2010).  In the same 
realm, Duru and Ceazar (2012) note that in broad terms, the elite theory of politics hold that every society 
consist of two categories of men viz.   
(a) The elite or the minority within a social collectivity (such as a society, a state, a religious 
institution, a political party) which exercises a preponderant of influence within the collectivity, and;  
(b) The masses of the majority which is governed by the elite.  For some, elites are the decision-
makers of the society whose power is not subject to control by any other body in the society. For others, 
elites are the sole source of values in the society or constitute the integrating force in the community 
without which it may fall part.  
The two conceptions resemble the political parties in Zimbabwe that formed the GNU and the citizens in 
the country. This section looks at the interaction between these two major variables of the elite theory in 
the Zimbabwean context. Although, three major political parties namely MDC-M, MDC-T and ZANU-PF 
participated in the elite-driven settlement that led to the signing of the GNU in 2009, the section begins 
with a dissection of elitism from ZANU-PF perspective before the formation of the GNU which therefore 
led to the GNU, where other political players participated.  
Lopez (2013: 1), states that the concept of ‘elites’ is based on the notion that every society holds a ruling 
minority, a group that controls and disputes the most important power sources. Such a view of the elite 
informs this study as the formation of the GNU in Zimbabwe controlled and spearheaded a few people in 
the top political brasses of the three main political parties that became parties to the global political 
agreement that gave birth to the government of national unity. The Elite Theory from the view of Lopez 
(2013) is the ruling minority. The GNU was thus an offspring of the ruling minority in Zimbabwe from 
the MDC and ZANU-PF. The ruling minority with the greatest powers decided the fate of governance in 
the state of Zimbabwe between 2009 and 2013. This notion henceforth entails the entire process of that 
led to the formation of GNU snubbed public participation. The GNU was thus an elite-driven mechanism 
put in place to govern Zimbabwe though most people in the country had given their voice in the 2008 
March Harmonised Elections and the June 2008 Run-off.   
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It is however, important to note that within the elite theory is the notion that an elite recruits another elite 
in positions of power. Implied in this is the fact that there has to be an elite in the society that will be 
joined by another elite later in the control and governance of a society. This hence is an apt description of 
the trajectory of events that transpired in Zimbabwe in the context of the course towards the formation of 
the GNU. In this regard, the Elite Theory is based on the notion that in every society, power is really 
enjoyed by a small group of persons who have high prestige and widespread influence (Dogan and 
Higley, 1998). This group is called the governing elite or the power elite. In the Zimbabwean context this 
is the group that ruled Zimbabwe prior to the GNU – the ZANU-PF cabal. Lopez (2013) explicitly 
mentions that the elite is the ruling minority. Therefore, the elite, ZANU-PF cabal refer to the comprador 
bourgeoisie, the class that inherited power at independence. This is the elite whose origins are to be found 
in African nationalism itself, in its class ambitions and, in its (class) frustrations at the failure to become a 
national bourgeoisie. According to Mandaza (2015) the comprador bourgeoisie in Zimbabwe is a class not 
rooted in production; but one that thrives on back handers, fat rewards for crooked contracts and shady 
deals, official corruption and looting of state coiffeurs; not to forget the “casino economy” era during 
which the comprador bourgeois class thrived through the agency of the Central Bank, but at the expense 
of the economy in general and collapse of the national currency in early 2009. The power and prestige of 
the elite theory in Africa (Zimbabwe included) is summed up by the apt description of the post-colonial 
political pathology of the African state by Mutunga (1999:25) who noted that;   
His face is on money, his photograph hangs in every office in his realm, his ministers wear gold 
pins with tiny photographs of him on the lapels of their pinstriped tailored suits. He names streets, 
football stadiums, hospitals and universities after himself. He carries a silver inlaid ivory rungu or 
an ornately carved walking stick or a flywhisk or chiefly stool. He insists on being called doctor 
or being the big elephant or the number one peasant or nice old man or the national miracle or the 
most popular leader in the world, his every pronouncement is reported on the first page. He 
shuffles ministers without warning, paralysing policy decisions as he undercuts pretenders to his 
throne. He scapegoats minorities to show up popular support. He bans all political parties except 
the one he controls. He rigs elections. He emasculates the courts and he cows the press, he stifles 
academia. He gives the church. The Big Man’s off-the-cut remarks have the power of law. He 
demands thunderous applause from the legislature when ordering far-reaching changes in the 
constitution. He blesses his home region with highways, schools, hospitals, housing projects, 
irrigation schemes and a presidential mansion. He packs the civil service with his tribesmen… 
His enemies are harassed by youth wingers from the ruling party. His enemies are detained or 
exiled, humiliated, tortured or killed.    
Consequently, ZANU-PF as a party that was part of the GNU was and is composed of the most powerful 
and influential personnel in the Zimbabwean context who control the means of production and survive on 
suppressing the majority by making decisions on their behalf. Mosca, (1939:50) on the elite theory even 
state that among the constant facts and the tendencies that are to be found in all political organisms, one is 
so obvious that it is apparent to the most casual eye which is of the first class, the ruling class that is 
always the less numerous, performs all political functions, monopolizes power and enjoys the advantages 
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that power brings, whereas the second, the more numerous class, is directed and controlled by the first, in 
a manner that is now more or less legal, now more or less arbitrary and violent, and supplies the first, in 
appearance at least, with material means of subsistence and with the instrumentalities that are essential to 
the vitality of  the political organism. In this regard, the elites as defined by Mosca (1939) and the 
description of Mutunga (1999) resemble the ZANU-PF elite.   
It is critical to note that the elite theory is also based on the premise that the elites dispute power (reaching 
different levels of conflict and violence), but new elites also enter the game through different mechanisms 
of elite recruitment, (Lopez, 2013).  As has been mentioned in the foregoing the ruling ZANU-PF party 
controlled and ruled Zimbabwe as the elite for over two decades but due to disputes with the MDC 
apropos a serious economic meltdown, it recruited another elite from the opposition parties. It is a fact 
that the formation of the MDC party towards the dawn of the new millennium was an upset to the rule of 
ZANU-PF because of the way in which it challenged ZANU-PF especially in the 2000 referendum. The 
party in collaboration with Lovemore Madhuku’s National Constitutional Assembly inspired the NO vote 
to a ZANU-PF inspired anti-democratic constitution, which is often considered as ZANU-PF’s first defeat 
in the post-independence epoch, (Sachikonye 2009; Mandaza 2015). The party in a nutshell provided 
fierce rivalry to ZANU-PF.  
  
Despite, the nature of such rivalry between ZANU-PF and MDC, the former elite allowed the MDC elites 
to enter into the governance game through a political settlement, an idea advanced by Elitists.  Thus, the 
core of Elite Theory relies in explaining elite behavior, elite interaction, elite transformation and, 
ultimately, the connection between those instances and state outcomes, (Burton and Higley (1987); Lopez 
(2013)). It is the elite behaviour and interaction that brought about state outcomes in the Zimbabwean 
context in regards to the formation of the SADC-mediated GNU. The Elite Theory in this way has vital 
notions that resemble and explain events that unfolded in Zimbabwe after the 2008 elections. As noted 
already, the signing of the GNU was a result of the elite group in Zimbabwe who were mostly members 
of the ZANU-PF party that had been in power since 1980. These were the ruling minority that determined 
courses of action that were taken in the governance of Zimbabwe and these allowed their opposition elite 
counterparts to join government in a political settlement.   
  
Higley and Gunther (1992) argue that elite settlements are often a reaction to social or political crisis, 
where non-elites (or ‘the masses’) threaten elite positions or elite interests. Implied in such a sentiment is 
that in an elite-driven society, settlements that are made aim at addressing social or political conundrums 
that would have impacted on the state. Such a view is vividly noticeable in the political settlement that 
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gave rise to the global political agreement, a politically elite-driven settlement that gave rise to the 
formation of the GNU. A historiographical gestalt of Zimbabwe’s economic history discloses that the 
country is one of the few states that inherited one of the most structurally developed economies and 
effective state systems in post independent Africa but poor economic management and domestic policies 
impacted on the country negatively within the first 10 years of independence, (Hazzlewood, 1999).  In 
this way the Government of Zimbabwe adopted the Economic Structural Adjustment Programs (ESAP) 
between 1990 and 1991 as it cut on spending. However, Bond and Manyanya (2003:32) state that ESAP 
failed miserably as GDP growth reached 5% during one year (1994) and averaged 1.2% from 1991-1995. 
As noted by The African Economic Development Institute (2009) by July 2008, inflation was paged at 
231 million percent.  
All the events took place in a country where the ZANU-PF government was losing support internally and 
externally and it made use of condign power to maintain the status-quo. Therefore, prior the formation of 
the elite-driven GNU in 2008, Zimbabwe was physiognomiesed by immobile progression with 
widespread poverty lessened export earnings and horrendous living situations. There was a political, 
economic and even a social crisis as families disintegrated in search of greener pastures. Consequently, 
the elite settlement in Zimbabwe was occasioned by crises that had gripped the country for over a decade 
but had become more pronounced after the 2008 Harmonised elections in which ZANU-PF lost to 
MDCT.  Though Elitists argue that the result of an elite settlement is some sort of democratic rule, be it a 
full democracy or an electoral or pseudo-democracy, (Lopez 2013: 5), the case is not palpable as the 
Zimbabwean situation witnessed an elite-driven set-up from the onset regarding the GNU. However, 
considering that the GNU was signed by the top three parties at the time that occupied such positions on 
the basis that the people had participated in their election, indirectly it was a settlement of elites 
representing people. Nevertheless, from the commencement of negotiation and dialogue, everything was 
simply elite driven as there was no public consultation as the parties vindicated their move on the basis 
that the country was under a serious crisis that needed immediate intervention. This therefore, makes the 
elite theory a fundamental theoretical frame with notions that only a few members of the society take part 
in decision making, on behalf of the rest yet in actual fact it is done on their own behalf and interest.  
  
In Elitism by Pareto (1935), Mosca (1939) and Michels (2009 [1915] members of the governing elite 
occupy key positions and control the decision-making mechanism. In this regard, the fate of an elite 
driven society is in the hands of a few elite who make every decision in the country. One of the greatest 
conundrums that affected the functioning of the GNU in Zimbabwe revolved around the allocation of 
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governmental positions among the three parties that signed the global political agreement. While, the two 
powerful parties namely ZANU-PF and MDC-T engaged in scuffles over the control of the Home Affairs  
Ministry and the Finance Ministry among others, members of these two and the third political party 
(MDC-M) occupied key positions in the state because of the elite-driven settlement. They hence did not 
only occupy these positions but controlled the decision-making process.   
  
The notion by elite theorists that the elites in a society occupy the key influential positions of decision 
making resonates well with the notion within the theory that states that the elite is subject to change in 
every society known as the “Circulation of Elite.”, (Michels, 1915). The GNU signalled two trajectories 
in the governance of Zimbabwe. Firstly, is the notion of a joint compromise – an initiative of power 
sharing in the tutelage of the country; and, secondly was the change in the government set up in the 
country. For the latter it meant that the history of most ZANU-PF members occupying all the key 
influential positions in the country changed as noted in Figure 3.1 below which shows the allocation of 
ministerial positions under the GNU in Zimbabwe. Opposition party members hence occupied elite 
positions that were previously occupied by ZANU-PF members.   
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Figure 3.1 Ministerial Allocation   
Deputy Prime Minister    Thokozani Khuphe  MDC–T   
Minister of Public Service    Elphas Mukonoweshuro  
(late)  
MDC–T  
Minister of Women's Affairs, Gender and Community  
Development  
  Olivia Muchena  ZANU– 
PF 
Minister of Defence    Emmerson Mnangagwa  ZANU– 
PF 
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Minister of Youth Development, Indigenisation and  
Empowerment  
  Saviour Kasukuwere  ZANU– 
PF 
Minister of Science and Technology Development    Henry Dzinotyiweyi  MDC–T  
Minister of Economic Planning and Investment  
Promotion 
  Elton Mangoma  MDC–T  
Minister of Higher and Tertiary Education    Stan Mudenge (late)  ZANU– 
PF 
Minister of Industry and Commerce    Welshman Ncube MDC–M 
Minister of Regional Integration and International  
Cooperation 
  Priscilla Misihairabwi- 
Mushonga 
MDC–M 
Minister of Home Affairs    Giles Mutsekwa (cominister)  MDC–T  
   Kembo Mohadi (cominister)  
ZANU– 
PF 
Minister of Finance    Tendai Biti  MDC–T  
Minister of Health and Child Welfare    Henry Madzorera  MDC–T  
Minister of Local Government and Urban  
Development  
  Ignatious Chombo ZANU– 
PF 
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Minister of Justice and Legal Affairs    Patrick Chinamasa  ZANU– 
PF 
Minister of Agriculture    Joseph Made  ZANU– 
PF 
Minister of Education, Sport and Culture    David Coltart  MDC–M 
Minister of Environment    Francis Nhema ZANU– 
PF 
Minister of Tourism    Walter Mzembi  ZANU– 
PF 
Minister of Constitutional and Parliamentary Affairs    Eric Matinenga  MDC–T  
Minister of State Enterprise and Parastatals    Samuel Sipepa Nkomo  MDC–T  
Minister of Information and Communications    Nelson Chamisa  MDC–T  
Technology   
Minister of Public Works    Theresa Makone  MDC–T  
Minister of Labour and Social Welfare    Paurine Mpariwa  MDC–T  
Minister of Transport and Infrastructural  
Development  
  Nicholas Goche  ZANU– 
PF 
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Minister of Mines and Mining Development    Obert Mpofu ZANU– 
PF 
Minister of National Housing and Social Amenities    Fidelis Mhashu  MDC–T  
Minister of Energy and Power Development    Elias Mudzuri  MDC–T  
Minister of Foreign Affairs    Simbarashe 
Mumbengegwi 
ZANU– 
PF 
  
Source: GNU Ministerial List  
The elitist argument that the dominant minority cannot be controlled by the majority, whatever democratic 
mechanisms are used, (Lopez, 2013) is reflection of events that transpired in Zimbabwe during the period 
of the GNU. Allegations of vote rigging were the order the day since the emergence of the MDC party in 
Zimbabwe. The ZANU-PF party was voted into power in the 2008 elections but as the elites in the party 
engaged the MDC parties in an elite settlement, snubbing the majority voice that had granted them 
another term into office as the ruling party. The GNU in this way was a political settlement of the elite; 
the ruling minority.    
  
Similarly, Anupam (2013) notes that because of their power, their organisation, their political skill, their 
personal qualities, the members of the elite are always potentially capable of exploiting their positions so 
as to preserve the elite’s domination. Such a notion is illustrated in the case under study as the move that 
was made by ZANU-PF to enter into a dialogue with the MDC-T despite the fact the party claimed to 
have won the 2008 Run-Off Election was a way of preserving power as there was worldwide 
condemnation of the nature in which the elections were held. The ZANU-PF elites thus used their 
positions to maintain their rule in Zimbabwe.   
  
One of the core elements presented by classical elitists such as Mosca (1939) and Michel (1915) is the 
notion of elite inevitability. The theorist used the inevitability of elite rule as a premise to counter argue 
with political liberalism and Marxism by claiming that both democracy (as the government of the people 
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or demos) and socialism (as a classless regime) were impossible outcomes because society is necessarily 
elite-driven, (Lopez 2013: 2). The conception of elite inevitability was witnessed in Zimbabwe as a 
classless society and a government of the people remained a vision after the 2008 elections. The two main 
political parties in Zimbabwe represent two different ideologies, thus while ZANU-PF seem to have 
favoured the socialist model, the MDC-T party from its inception has had links with the Western world 
which favours the capitalist model. The parties clashed and had followers that favoured their ideologies 
and the masses went for polls in March and June expecting one of the parties to lead government. 
However, because society is elite-driven as advanced by elite theorists, the two parties the public knowing 
secretly negotiated a political settlement that gave rise to a government of national unity which led 
Zimbabwe for one term between 2009 and 2013. The signing of a global political agreement that gave 
birth to the GNU in a crisis Zimbabwe was a creation of the elite groups which made socialism and 
democracy impossible outcomes. The unfolding of events after the two rounds of the 2008 elections in 
Zimbabwe greatly bear a similitude to the notion of elite inevitability, a core principle advanced by elite 
theorists.    
  
Pareto (1935) argued that there was a biological reason for elite superiority; hence such a group is 
composed of those individuals who are superior performers in society. The elite, leaders from the 
ZANUPF having been involved in the armed struggle that redeemed Zimbabwe from the jaws of 
thralldom are viewed as superior performers. According to Lopez (2013) the superior performers rise to 
positions of power, authority, and control; and the masses of people are content to have these superior 
performers ‘run the show’. On the other hand; because the revolutionaries had failed the country by 
aching anticipations of inhabitants of an independent Zimbabwe, the emergency of the MDC provided an 
alternative for the masses. Vitally, not only that, but because the MDC members had robustly challenged 
the dominance of ZANU-PF which witnessed the latter initiating physical force on the former’s members, 
the latter valour laid them in the superior performer’s window. The negotiation of the political settlement 
in Zimbabwe was among the superior performers who henceforth gave birth to the government of national 
unity.   
  
In the classical elitist literature, elites were often (but not only) defined through capacity, personality and 
skill, for instance, Pareto (1935) distinguished elites between those who resembled the lion (domination 
by force) and those who resembled the fox (domination by persuasion and skill). Current elite theory 
defines ‘elites’ as actors controlling resources, occupying key positions and relating through power 
networks (Yamokoski and Dubrow, 2008). As noted in the latter version of the elite theory, the elite in the 
Zimbabwean context from the two political parties that were parties to the GNU controlled resources, 
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occupying key government positions.  Through the government of national unity, elites from three main 
parties that were parties to the global political agreement of 2008 that gave birth to the GNU in Zimbabwe 
distributed ministerial positions among themselves. Therefore, elites can be defined as those in possession 
of those resources (Reis and Moore, 2005).   
  
As Higley and Burton (2006: 7) argue, elites are persons occupying the top of powerful organisations and 
movements, thus capable of affecting political outcomes both substantially and regularly. The elite that 
signed the GPA occupied top powerful positions that determined the fate of Zimbabwe in various sectors 
of the country. The powerful nature of the elite that formed the GNU can be demonstrated by the fact that 
prior to the GNU, there was the de facto use of the dollarisation, a phenomenon that relates that to 
unofficial dollarisation which signify that foreign currency is extensively used in classified transactions 
(as a unit of account, a medium of exchange and as a store of value) but the local currency remains the 
only legal tender (Kessy 2011). The Mugabe regime launched a crackdown on those that were using 
foreign currency as it was not the legal tender but it was the de facto currency. After the elite driven GNU 
came into effect in 2009 the agreed adoption of the de jure multi-currency regime became effectively a 
singularity that reveals the vitality of the elite in the Zimbabwean context. The elite theory hence reveals 
the power and dominance of the elite, who are the ruling minority and it best explains the behaviour of the 
elite in Zimbabwe before and after the implementation of the government of national unity in the 
Zimbabwean context.   
  
The Zimbabwe GNU context is also best explained by the new elitist model. According to Lopez (2013), 
the new elitist model points to several cases in history where elites migrated from one type to the other 
(mainly from elite disunity to consensual unity), and how elite configuration is an important cause of 
political regimes. Elites from the main warring parties ZANU-PF and the MDC-T moved from the 
position of elite disunity to consensual unity because of the signing of the GNU. The two parties had a 
long history of physical and speech fights as has been mentioned in the foregoing. According to the 
scholar along with elite types, two important concepts are presented by the model: elite settlements and 
elite convergence. An elite settlement though a rare event in the history of national communities, in which 
previously confronting elites choose to negotiate a new political order, thus recognizing each other as 
legitimate political actors (Higley and Burdon, 2006; Higley and Gunther, 1992) materialised between 
ZANU-PF and MDC-T, elites who had been antagonists for close to a decade.  It is a fact that the two 
main political parties in Zimbabwe had a confronting history but the political order led to a new 
dispensation in which they recognised each other with respect in the new government. The elite theory in 
this way best explains events that unfolded in the Zimbabwean case concerning issues around the SADC 
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mediated GNU. The theory henceforth is of fundamental importance in informing the current study.  
However, the weaknesses of the elite theory show an unclear system of how it reaches its goals. It does 
not explain how it gathers and lumps all the minorities into the same group. It also does not consider the 
implications of a society that is not run by money but out of concern of future well-being of its citizens. In 
this context the elite theory fails to consider that the GNU was created by the elite to securitize the 
citizens of Zimbabwe from the freedom of want and freedom of fear.   
  
Consequently, the theories that have been used in this study greatly play a vital role as a theoretical base 
upon which this study is hinged. Whereas the Ripeness Theory focuses on the situation and time that led 
to the formation of the GNU, the theory fails to tackle what the Readiness Theory fills; the motivation and 
optimism of the political parties and including SADC members states inter alia some hidden motives of 
the SADC mediator of the South African state which saw the crises in Zimbabwe as perilous to its 
survival. However, the Readiness Theory also fails to account for the players that were involved in the 
conciliatory actions that led to the signing of the global political agreement which in turn gave birth to the 
GNU in Zimbabwe. Such a variable also applies to the Ripeness Theory. The Elite Theory hence comes in 
to fill such a gap but being the frame that best explains that the SADC-mediated GNU was elite-driven in 
Zimbabwe as has been mentioned and explained in this chapter.   
  
3.5 Conclusion   
In conclusion the chapter was a presentation of the theoretical framework in which three main theories 
namely Ripeness Theory, the Readiness Theory and the Elite Theory were used to inform the study which 
aims at ascertaining whether the SADC-mediated GNU was an opportunity to end the crises that had 
gripped Zimbabwe for close to two decades. Events that unfolded in the mediation of the GNU were 
occasioned by a mutually hurting stalemate in which the environment presented the conflicting parties 
with serious pains in their need to control Zimbabwe in the immediate and long run. In the same way both 
parties were optimistic of a way forward hence they agreed to negotiate and bring forth the GNU and this 
is explained by the ripeness theory in this chapter. This time was thus ripe for the conflict to be ended. On 
the other hand, the negativity in the future sense motivated both parties to negotiate in the hope that 
negotiation would lead to a resolution of the crises also gave the conflicting parties namely the MDC-T, 
the MDC-M and the ZANU-PF the stimulus to create a GNU. Such notions are core in the Readiness  
Theory which was also used to inform the study in this chapter. The theory also considers the third party’s 
role in pressuring the conflicting parties to negotiation. It would be erroneous not to mention the effects 
and impacts of the Zimbabwe crises to the SADC bloc economic wise, especially to South Africa which 
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has been Zimbabwe’s trading partner for years. Therefore, the return to normalcy of the Zimbabwe 
situation was a priority for SADC as a whole and for South Africa hence the use of Thabo Mbeki by the 
SADC bloc was a blessing in disguise for the state of South Africa as he had to make the agreement take 
place. The Elite Theory which focuses on how the elite snub the notion of majority in decision making 
has also been used as a theoretical frame that informs this study. The GNU in Zimbabwe was elite-driven 
and the general populace had no say in the negotiations. It was an elite-driven theory in which an elite 
group that had power enabled another elite group to come to power through a political settlement. Chapter 
Four deals with the research methodology of the study which focuses on SADC Mediation in Zimbabwe:  
Lost opportunity for lasting solution to the Zimbabwe crises.   
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CHAPTER FOUR RESEARCH 
METHODOLODY                 
  
4.1 Introduction   
This chapter is a presentation of the description of the procedures, processes and modus operandi that 
were employed by the researcher in collecting data in this research. The chapter focuses on the research 
methodology which was utilised by the researcher during the course of the study to explore the GNU and 
expatiate on its contribution in ending the Zimbabwean crisis. It thus, presents information on the research 
paradigm, the research approach, the research design, population and sampling, data collection methods, 
data analysis and presentation, validity and reliability and ethical considerations. The research focused on 
the usefulness of the GNU in achieving political stability in Zimbabwe, mainly aiming at assessing how 
relevant the GNU in Zimbabwe fared during its lifespan.  
4.2 Research Paradigm  
A research paradigm comprises of one’s ontological, epistemological and methodological premises, or 
even research methodology (Lincoln and Guba 2000). Mackenzie and Knipe (2006) classify variable 
theoretical paradigms or philosophies as positivist (post-positivist), constructivist, interpretivist, 
transformative, emancipatory, critical, pragmatic and de-constructivist, post-positivist or interpretivist. 
The nature of research determines the philosophical underpinning to be used. This research sought an in-
depth understanding of the phenomenon under study, that is the GNU’s relevance to solving the 
Zimbabwean crisis during the period 2009-2013, through inquiring various perceptions from different 
individuals who were informed by the interpretivist paradigm to establish whether the SADC-mediated 
GNU provided an opportunity to end the political and economic crises in Zimbabwe. The interpretivist 
approach being rooted in dialectical and hermeneutical traditions is based on the belief that the knowledge 
claims by individuals about the social reality is socially and mentally constructed (Denzin and Lincoln 
2005; Denzin 2010). This made the approach relevant to this study as the reality of whether the GNU 
provided an opportunity to end the Zimbabwe crisis both politically and economically was be socially and 
mentally constructed based on knowledge claims by individuals who were targeted by the research on the 
phenomenon understudy.     
The interpretivist approach to research is premised on understanding the world of human experience 
suggesting that reality is socially constructed (Cohen and Manion, 1994; Mertens, 2005). It is the 
experience of those individuals that directly and indirectly participated in the GNU, which is vital to the 
understanding of whether the GNU in Zimbabwe provided an opportunity to end the political and 
economic crisis that had deleteriously affected the country for decades.  The study therefore made 
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knowledge claims based primarily on how others interpret the reality about the phenomenon under study 
and not as it presented itself out there, (Harding, 1987). The different views, perceptions, attitudes and 
opinions of different people who interpreted the phenomenon understudy was be vital in constructing 
social reality on whether the SADC-mediated GNU provided an opportunity to end the political and 
economic crisis in Zimbabwe.  
Social reality in the interpretivist realm is about interpreting people’s standpoints, the deeper meanings, 
perceptions, attitudes and opinions relating to the phenomenon under study, in this case, whether the 
SADC Mediation in Zimbabwe was a lost opportunity for a lasting solution to the Zimbabwe crises. The 
different standpoints, perceptions, attitudes and opinions are fundamentally crucial in answering questions 
of the phenomenon under study which made the interpretivist paradigm relevant to this study. The 
multiple realities that are brought out by the paradigm are vital to this research. The interpretivist 
paradigm is based on the belief that social science research should be qualitative in nature so as to reveal 
multiple realities about the phenomenon under study rather than quantitative seeking a single objective 
reality of that particular phenomenon (Denzin, 2010). This interpretivist study made use of the qualitative 
research approach as it sought to reveal multiple realities from different knowledge claims by different 
individuals to construct social reality on whether the GNU provided an opportunity to end the Zimbabwe 
crises.   
4.3 Research Approach  
In social science research, there are three research approaches namely; the quantitative approach, the 
qualitative approach and the mixed or combined approaches. Given the vertical orientation of this study 
which sought to establish, whether, the SADC-mediated GNU provided an opportunity to end political 
and economic crisis, the study adopted a qualitative approach.  Wyse (2011) states that qualitative 
research is exploratory research, which is used not only to gain an understanding of underlying reasons, 
and motivations but to uncover trends in thought, opinions and dive deeper into the problem as well. The 
need to understand underlying reasons and motivations including the trends in thought on whether the 
SADC-mediated GNU provided an opportunity to end the political and economic crisis in Zimbabwe 
made the qualitative approach relevant to this interpretive social study. Dabbs (1982:32) on the same note, 
states that, the notion of quality derived from the word qualitative is essential to the nature of things as it 
refers to the what, how, when, and where a thing is, in its essence and ambience. Qualitative research thus 
refers to the meanings, concepts, definitions, characteristics, metaphors, symbols, and descriptions of 
things, (ibid). It is the meanings that will be derived from human experience, concepts that have been 
developed in relation to the GNU in Zimbabwe, definitions of the GNU and related issues, characteristics 
of the phenomenon under study from multiple angles, metaphors, symbols and description of the GNU in 
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Zimbabwe that is fundamental in answering the question on the vitality of the GNU in ending 
Zimbabwe’s economic and political crisis.  
Denzin and Lincoln (2005:3) on the same note are of the view that;   
  
Qualitative research is a situated activity that locates the observer in the world. It consists of a set 
of interpretive, material practices that make the world visible. These practices transform the 
world. They turn the world into a series of representations, including field notes, interviews, 
conversations, photographs, recordings, and memos to the self. At this level, qualitative research 
involves an interpretive, naturalistic approach to the world. This means that qualitative 
researchers study things in their natural settings, attempting to make sense of, or interpret, 
phenomena in terms of the meanings people bring to them.   
  
Consequently, the location of witnesses to the GNU and how these observers interpret whether the 
SADC-mediated GNU provided an opportunity to end the political and economic crises is key to this 
interpretive study. The interpretive study made sense of or interpreted the different meanings that the 
observers brought up in the field of research.  The fundamentality of qualitative research also is that it 
enables researchers to understand the meanings constructed by the people, their perceptions, 
interpretations and views about a phenomenon, (Neuman, 2014). Therefore, it is fundamental to 
understand the different perceptions, interpretations and opinions from the participants of the research to 
ascertain if the SADC-mediated GNU provided an opportunity to end political and economic crises in 
Zimbabwe.   
  
The qualitative approach is based on the belief that meanings about the social reality are mentally and 
socially constructed by people as they relate to, interact with and interpret the world they live in 
(Merriam, 2002; Schurink, 1998). It is therefore, about multiple realities and in this way this interpretive 
qualitative research is about multiple realities which were obtained through inquiring into the deeper 
meanings, perceptions, attitudes and views given to it by different individuals on whether the SADC 
mediated GNU provided an opportunity to end the economic and political crises in Zimbabwe. The 
qualitative approach to this research helped in gaining an understanding on whether the SADC mediation 
process achieved its goal in balancing political interests in the GPA and whether the GNU was successful 
inter alia the extent to which it achieved the intended goals through human experience. The qualitative 
approach also assisted to establish the extent to which the general populace was consulted prior to the 
establishment of the GNU and during its implementation, which made it relevant to this research which 
aims at ascertaining whether the GNU which was mediated by SADC in Zimbabwe was an opportunity to 
end the political and economic crisis in Zimbabwe.    
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Furthermore, Berg (2001:5) notes that qualitative research properly seeks answers to questions by 
examining various social settings and the individuals who inhabit these settings. In this research the 
questions that were asked related to whether the GNU in Zimbabwe was a solution to end Zimbabwe’s 
crisis and whether the social setting was within the context of Zimbabwe while inhabitants were those 
people that directly or indirectly participated in the GNU inter alia those who witnessed the 
operationalization of the GNU. The fact that certain experiences cannot be meaningfully expressed by 
numbers, (Berg 2001:5) makes qualitative research relevant to this study. In this research for instance 
numbers could not meaningfully reveal whether the SADC-mediated GNU was a lost opportunity to end 
Zimbabwe’s economic and political crisis but it was through the interpretation and analysis of people’s 
views, opinions, experiences and standpoints that such questions or questions around the phenomenon 
could be answered.   
4.4 Research Design   
Research design is a blueprint or plan for conducting a study and it describes how, where and when data 
was collected and analysed. Yin (2003:19) notes that “colloquially a research design is an action plan for 
getting from here to there, where ‘here’ may be defined as the initial set of questions to be answered and 
‘there’ is some set of (conclusions) answers”.  The design is thus, the logical sequence that connects the 
empirical data to a study’s initial research questions and ultimately to its conclusions (Burns and Grove 
2003:195, Parahoo 1997:142 and Creswell 2007:42). The procedure in this study was an exploratory 
single case study of SADC mediated GNU in Zimbabwe. Case study is a research strategy, which focuses 
on understanding the dynamics present within single settings. It tries to illuminate on a decision or a set of 
decisions; why they were taken, how they were implemented and with what result. In this study therefore 
the why and how questions were fundamental in ascertaining whether the SADC-mediated GNU was a 
lost opportunity to end the economic and political crises in Zimbabwe. The why part henceforth could 
relate to why the GNU could have been vital in ending the crises in Zimbabwe and how focused on why it 
was/was not a lost opportunity. This made a case study research design relevant to the phenomenon under 
study.  Yin (2003:33) states that a case study is an empirical inquiry that investigates or explores a 
contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context. The current study hence tried to illuminate, 
investigate and explore the GNU in Zimbabwe as a lost opportunity for ending the political crisis.   
  
Given the interpretive position adopted in this interpretive qualitative social science research and the 
nature of the research questions of the phenomenon under study, the case study methodology was 
considered the most appropriate approach to employ. The reason being that, the method provided a 
systematic way to collect data, analyse information, and report the results thereby enabling the 
understanding of a particular problem or situation in great depth. In this context a case study particularly 
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provided a variety of participant perspectives of the GNU and Zimbabwe’s political and economic crisis, 
by the use of multiple data collection techniques, which was vital in the construction of social reality. 
Thus, there is the ability to discover a wide variety of social, cultural, and political factors potentially 
related to the phenomenon of interest that were not known in advance in this research, (Bhattacherjee 
2012:40). Furthermore, in the use of a case study analysis tends to be qualitative in nature, but heavily 
contextualized and nuanced and in this context revealing whether the SADC-mediated GNU in Zimbabwe 
was an opportunity to end the political and economic crisis in the country.   
  
The case study research design has unique strengths over others such as phenomenology, grounded 
theory, ethnography and narrative analysis in that it reflects on four essential tests of validity, namely 
construct validity, external validity, internal validity and reliability (Yin, 2003 and 2009). Construct 
validity for instance has the aim of confirming facts thereby reducing subjectivity in gathering factual 
data. There was the need to confirm multiple realities on whether the SADC-mediated GNU was a lost 
opportunity to end Zimbabwe’s political and economic crisis, which was vital for the credibility of the 
findings and research. External validity is about confirming credibility of findings through repeatability of 
results from which they can be analytically generalized to other settings. Internal validity’s main objective 
is to demonstrate relationships among different factors in this case the relationship between the SADC 
mediated GNU in Zimbabwe and ending of the political and economic crisis that has gripped the country 
for decades. The aspect of reliability’s main objective in this study focused on revealing that analogous 
results relating to how and why the SADC-mediated GNU was an opportunity to end the political and 
economic crisis in Zimbabwe. Therefore, the case study research design became the most relevant 
approach because of its strengths in tests of validity.   
However, the case study does have the limitation of providing insight on one theme or idea and cannot be 
used to represent a wider population. Of significance nonetheless, is the appreciation that the case study, 
which is the Zimbabwean GNU in this instance, did not represent a sample. Its goal was to expand and 
generalize theories and not to enumerate frequencies. In other words, the case study method does a 
generalizing as opposed to particularizing analysis (Yin 2003:34).   
  
4.5 Population and Sampling   
This section discusses and justifies the population size and sampling techniques that will be adopted by 
the researcher during the course of the interpretive qualitative social science study that focus on the 
SADC-mediated GNU in Zimbabwe apropos its relevance as an opportunity in ending the political and 
economic crisis that rocked the country for years.   
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4.5.1 Population   
Burns and Grove (2003: 213) defined population as all the elements that meet the criteria for inclusion in 
a study, while Babbie (2002:109) referred to the population sample as that group which is viewed as the 
most appropriate for data collection. In light of this study, population is used to refer to that group of 
people or organisations that have knowledge or information about political trends in Zimbabwe such that 
they are familiar with the current political developments of the country. The focus henceforth was on a 
group of people or organizations that indirectly or directly participated in the SADC0mediated GNU in 
Zimbabwe because of their expertise and experience concerning the topic. However, there are other 
people who did not participate either directly or indirectly in the GNU but are well-versed with GNU 
issues because of the comments and literature that they have written on the GNU. These were also part of 
the targeted population. The target population also included a population that is or has studied politics in 
the Zimbabwean context so that they could be afforded an opportunity to contribute to the research from 
their academic lenses.   
Consequently, the population included persons or organizations identified as being knowledgeable, 
passionate or actively involved in the political matters of Zimbabwe regardless of being citizens or 
noncitizens and regardless of being situated in or outside the country. The researcher managed to conduct 
9 in-depth interviews with a member of parliament (MP), a Cabinet minister during the GNU era, a 
human rights lawyer, three academics, two political analysts and three former members of the GNU who 
participated in the negotiations. The rationale behind the selection of the target population was that, most 
of these individuals directly and indirectly participated in governance issues during the time of the GNU 
hence they are well-versed with events that unfolded during the time. Their in-depth knowledge of 
political developments in the country was the reason for their selection. Their different experiences during 
the time of SADC-mediated GNU and the understanding that the target population has on GNU-related 
issues made them suitable candidates that helped provide various opinions, views, perceptions and 
standpoints on whether the SADC-mediated GNU was an opportunity for Zimbabwe to end its political 
and economic crisis.   
The researcher also made use of focus group discussions in which 6 focus group discussions were carried 
out with undergraduate and postgraduate students at some of Zimbabwe’s universities. The FGDs had an 
average of 10 people though not all the participants participated in the discussions. It needs to be noted 
that on average the FGDs had more males than females and the ratio of 1:1 could not be achieved. On 
average 65% of the respondents were male while 35% were female. The researcher targeted final year 
undergraduate and postgraduate students and she was assisted by various departments of universities to 
identify the undergraduate students. For the postgraduate students, the students were informed prior to the 
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FGDs and the researcher was given slots during seminar time after her request was approved by the top 
management and departments at the targeted universities.   
4.5.2 Sampling process   
Burns and Grove (2003: 31) define sampling as a process of selecting a group of people, events, or 
behaviour with which to conduct a study. According to Magolakwe (2006), sampling is a method of 
selecting a trial to represent the entire population in a given study; thus, it is a category of non-random 
sample that is carefully chosen, grounded on the estimation of an expert. Hence, there are no equal 
opportunities for everyone in the society to participate. Sampling techniques are either probability or 
nonprobability sampling. The categories of probability sampling include systematic random sampling, 
multistage sampling, stratified random sampling, cluster sampling and multiphase sampling, while 
nonprobability techniques include purposive sampling and snow balling among others. This interpretive 
qualitative research employed non-probability sampling and this method allowed the researcher to reach a 
targeted sample quickly and it made it easy to get a sample of subjects with specific characteristics. The 
targets as highlighted above had some expertise on the SADC mediated GNU in Zimbabwe and the 
political inter alia the economic situation that has been prevalent in Zimbabwe for the past few years or 
so.   
4.5.2.i Non-Probability Sampling   
As has been alluded to above, this interpretive qualitative social science research that focuses on “SADC 
Mediation in Zimbabwe: Lost opportunity for lasting solution to the Zimbabwe crisis” made use of 
nonprobability sampling.  The technique refers to research sampling where samples are gathered in a 
process that does not give all the individuals in the population equal chances of being selected, (Bless and 
Smith 2000). Therefore, not all individuals in Zimbabwe participated in this research and above all, not all 
those who directly or indirectly participated in the SADC-mediated GNU in Zimbabwe participated in 
this research. The research thus selected participants based on a non-probability method confined within a 
few rationally chosen fundamental traits. The core characteristic of non-probability sampling techniques 
is that samples are selected based on the subjective judgement of the researcher, rather than random 
selection, (Gill and Jameson 1997).   
  
Non-probability sampling was as a result selected in this interpretive research because it gives the 
research the flexibility of choosing the most relevant participants to the research. This was therefore 
fundamental in obtaining the most relevant information that contributed in answering whether the SADC 
mediated GNU in Zimbabwe provided an opportunity to end the political and economic crisis that had 
deleteriously affected the country for years. Non-probability sampling can be classified into various 
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categories namely haphazard sampling, quota sampling and purposive/judgmental sampling and snowball 
sampling. Each and every category is employed depending on the nature of the phenomenon understudy 
and for the purposes of this interpretive qualitative social science research; purposive sampling was used 
to locate key informants of the research.   
4.5.2.ii Purposive Sampling    
According to Cavana, Delahaye and Sekaran (2003), purposive sampling is a non-probability sampling 
design in which the required information is gathered from special or specific targets or groups of people 
on some rational basis. In the same way Lincoln and Guba (1985) note that it is a deliberate attempt to 
select certain participants with unique features in the research process. Therefore, in this study the 
researcher selected respondents based on subjective judgement but basing on a few fundamental traits 
namely, the respondent’s position during the GNU; participation in the GNU directly (by being members 
of those who led the Government of National Unity in Zimbabwe) or indirectly (by being members who 
had an influence on those that participated in the GNU in Zimbabwe); by having a series of publications 
on the GNU; or organisations particularly civil society organisations that followed the day to day running 
of the GNU in Zimbabwe and various students that have been involved in the study of GNUs  especially 
in Africa. The selection of these responds based on the aforementioned traits using the purposive 
sampling method will be vital as Parahoo (1997:232) states that purposive sampling is “a method of 
sampling where the researcher deliberately chooses who to include in the study based on their ability to 
provide necessary data”.  These basic traits enabled the researcher to select a sample that have expertise 
and know-how of the SADC-mediated GNU in Zimbabwe which was vital in answering whether it was 
an opportunity to end the political and economic crises that rocked Zimbabwe for decades. These 
provided the necessary data relevant to the study.     
  
To add, these qualitative samples consisted of “key-informants” as they are “information rich” (Lodico, 
Spaulding and Voegtle 2010). The term key-informants refers to persons who have specialist knowledge, 
are passionate about political trends or actively involved in the political developments of the Zimbabwean 
GNU. These assisted the researcher to gain insight into the SADC-mediated GNU, related issues on the 
political and economic crisis in Zimbabwe and the nexus between SADC-mediated GNU and the 
Zimbabwean crisis, particularly on whether the former provided an opportunity to the latter. The key 
informants were drawn from civil society and state institutions and included four Members of Parliament, 
two Cabinet Ministers during the GNU period, four political analysts, four human rights lawyers, four 
academics, former political players in GNU and students of Political Science and its related disciplines. 
To limit bias and partisanship, an equal number of key informants were also interviewed or sampled from 
all political parties who composed the GNU. Civil society organizations and churches represented by 
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relevant persons were also interviewed. Extra effort was made to find neutral but informative sources by 
including within the sample, key informants such as non-partisan organizations for example, the Institute 
for Democracy in Africa (IDASA) and Zimbabwe Lawyers for Human Rights (ZLHR). Purposeful 
sampling was also used for ordinary Zimbabweans. The purpose of obtaining data from them was to 
capture their views and attitudes accordingly. These key informants were relevant in answering the 
research questions of the study from the various qualitative data collection methods that were selected for 
this interpretive research.   
  
Also, it is of paramount importance to note that because researchers are often interested in an 
interconnected network of people or organizations, snowballing, a non-probability sampling technique 
was also used in this research. Snowballing is a sampling technique in which a researcher is referred to 
other possible relevant respondents to get information about a particular phenomenon under study by 
initial samples or samples chosen through purposive sampling. Respondents or the sample for primary 
data collection sources referred the researcher to other probable key informants that the researcher 
engaged in the course of gathering data in this research. Snowballing sampling was also used in soliciting 
data from other documents relating to subject understudy, which the researcher got to know through 
purposively selected samples. This was vital in answering the research questions on this study which 
focused on “SADC Mediation in Zimbabwe: Lost opportunity for lasting solution to the Zimbabwe 
crisis”.   
4.6 Data Collection Process  
The study made use of primary data sources and secondary data sources. The sources complemented each 
other, circumventing weakness associated with utilizing either one of the data sources concerned. This 
helped increase the reliability of findings as the researcher approached the research from diverse angles. 
First-hand information and data from past studies therefore enriched the findings of the study.  
4.6.1 Primary Data      
The study made use of primary data sources to ascertain whether the SADC-mediated GNU was an 
opportunity to end Zimbabwe’s political crisis.  Primary source in social science research is the original 
source of evidence, an artefact, a document, recording or other information that was created at the time of 
a certain study, (Bridges 2010). It consequently, serves as the original source for the study. Primary data 
collection was of paramount importance to this research as tailor made questions were used to elicit the 
data in the field of research. Primary data collection methods henceforth assisted in addressing specific 
research issues, as the researcher had control over the research questions and research design. However, 
using primary data collection method had shortfalls of being costly and somehow unreliable because of 
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bias or respondents who withheld some information, particularly on sensitive topics for security reasons.  
The researcher circumvented such weaknesses by using secondary sources.   
 
4.6.1.i In-depth Interviews   
Yin (2009) notes that interviews are one of the most significant sources of case study data since most case 
studies are about human affairs hence, in-depth interviews were used in this study. An interview refers to 
an occasion for constructing, not merely discovering or conveying information (Nieuwenhuis, 2007:87). 
They are a form of conversation with a purpose (Burgess, 1982, 1984) and are open-ended, discovery 
oriented, and deeply examine the participant’s thoughts, feelings, opinions, perceptions, viewpoints and 
perspectives as well as analyzing fresh issues in-depth (Boyce and Neale 2006; Guion, Diehl and 
MacDonald 2011). Thus, interviews were used in this study and as the conversation proceeded well, the 
researcher took note of the thoughts, feelings, opinions, perceptions; viewpoints and perspectives of 
respondents on the phenomenon understudy which aimed at ascertaining whether the SADC-mediated 
GNU in Zimbabwe was a lost opportunity to end the political and economic crises in Zimbabwe. 
Interviews were conducted in a language comfortable for the participant such that respondents were able 
to fathom the interview questions and air out their views as they were in their thoughts, mind; or as they 
experienced events that transpired during the SADC-mediated GNU which inclined them to the 
viewpoints that they gave out during those interviews.  A voice recorder was used to capture responses in 
some interviews after agreeing with participants, thereby making it possible for the researcher to capture 
every point that was stressed during the different set of interviews. These were in turn transcribed and 
later coded into relevant themes to form a research portfolio.   
  
Interviews have the advantage of engaging the participants on a deeper and active mental level, which will 
be vital in answering the research questions of the phenomenon understudy. The benefits of using in-
depth interviews in this research which focuses on whether the SADC-mediated GNU was an opportunity 
or a lost opportunity to end the Zimbabwean crisis is that, they have the ability to allow further probing.  
Therefore, the use of in-depth- interviews in the study enabled unclear issues that were raised by 
interviewees to be probed further by the researcher in a manner that did not affect the interviewee but for 
clarity. The rationale was being able to reveal deeper issues that are associated with the SADC mediated 
GNU apropos end of the political and economic crisis in Zimbabwe. The physical encounter with 
individual respondents allowed for deep exploration of the issue understudy.   
  
To add, the face-to-face interaction allowed the researcher to capture non-verbal communications such as 
facial expressions, which were highly essential for deep understanding on whether the SADC-mediated 
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GNU provided an opportunity to end political and economic crisis in Zimbabwe. Ritchie & Lewis (2003) 
notes that the face-to-face interaction allowed by utilisation of in-depth-interviews allowed the researcher 
to capture non-verbal communications such as facial expressions, which are essential for deep 
understanding, and its interaction orientation allowed knowledge generation that depended on ideas, 
perceptions or feelings given by the respondents. These were vital to the findings of this interpretive 
qualitative social science research. Key informants were contacted prior to the interviews and were 
briefed about the topic understudy. In general, interviews are prone to bias and the researcher tried to 
circumvent such a weakness by using other primary and secondary data collection methods such as 
documentary analysis.   
  
4.6.1.ii Focus Group Discussions   
Hopkins (2010:4) defines a focus group as a form of qualitative research in which a group of people is 
asked about their opinions, perceptions, beliefs and attitudes towards a product, service or an issue. This 
method was utilised as a primary data collection tool in this interpretive qualitative study. Questions were 
asked and answered in an interactive manner in (FGDs). Therefore, the interactive session was between 
the researcher and main targets of the type of method. The main targets of this method were university 
students from four established universities in Zimbabwe, as it was easy to coordinate the meetings that 
they participated in. FGDs targeted universities in Zimbabwe that have well-established departments that 
teach politics and governance issues within the realm of Zimbabwe. The researcher made all 
arrangements prior to the conduct of the FGDs so that those to be involved had an idea of the topic that 
was covered. This strategy was important in the need to gather relevant information to this study.     
  
It is vital to note that FGDs are an informal type of an interview of a group of people between six to ten 
hence; they have the advantage of producing data and insights that are less accessible without interaction 
found in group settings. The interaction within different group settings during the course of the research 
managed to produce great insights and data that was vital for findings. The main targets were Political 
Science, International Studies and Law students especially those in their final year of study because of the 
information that they acquired during their studies and research. These students were selected by 
engaging their various respective departments that assisted the researcher with willing students in chosen 
departments of the said universities. It should be noted that students were considered for this type of 
method mainly because they are used to such kind of set ups and were not scared to air out their views on 
the phenomenon under study.  
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The major advantage of the method is that it helped to yield data and insights that would have been less 
accessible without interaction found in group settings. Therefore, listening to others’ verbalized 
experiences stimulated memories, ideas and experiences in respondents which were vital to the findings 
of this interpretive qualitative social science research. The method was also vital in that points raised were 
questioned from various angles enabling participants to help the researcher with well-articulated points 
that were easy to fathom. The various ideas that emerged in a discursive environment entailed that there 
was the provision of clearly articulated responses that will provide various themes to the research. This 
will robustly contribute to enrichment of themes that will be developed by the researcher and the data that 
will be gathered.   However, the discussions in FGDs tend to focus more on issues that ran parallel to the 
objectives of the research. The researcher will circumvent such a possible weakness by reminding the 
participants to stick to the objective of the research in a language and tone that will not affect the 
respondents of the FGDs.    
4.6.2 Secondary Sources  
According to Scott (1990:123) a document is an artifact, which has as its central feature an inscribed text. 
The sources consist of readily available compendia, statistical statements and reports whose data was of 
great importance in the study. In this research secondary data sources that were used did not only consist 
of published records but unpublished records as well. This made the secondary data sources relevant as 
the latter sources consist of records and registers maintained by firms, the government and organizations. 
Secondary data sources were vital as they are cheap and easy to access and are readily available. Though 
they may be designed for other studies making some of the gen in them irrelevant to the study, combined 
with the use of primary sources, use of secondary sources helped enrich research findings of this study.   
4.6.2.i Documentary Analysis   
This research made use of documentary analysis to gather relevant data. Documentary analysis is a 
qualitative data collection technique that focuses on investigation of various textual data from different 
primary and secondary data sources from both the private and public domain (Mogolakwe 2006). As 
such, various primary and secondary sources were examined and analysed to address the research 
questions of the study. The data gathered was used to buttress information that was gathered using 
primary data collection methods.  Documentary analysis can provide an objective and historical source of 
data for a research study (Robson et al., 2001:37). The historical development of the GNU was vital to 
this research as it provided insights on whether it was an opportunity to end the economic and political 
crisis in Zimbabwe and this made documentary analysis relevant and important to this research.   
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Burns (2000:68) connotes that documents can be used to corroborate evidence from other sources and 
specify “events and issues in greater detail” than available through other data gathering methods.  
Evidence gathered through in-depth interviews and FGDs  was corroborated with evidence from 
documentary analysis, thereby enriching the findings. Documents are found in ministry and departmental 
libraries, office shelves of officials, newspapers ‘morgues’ and even store rooms and the Central Statistics 
Offices in many countries produce statistical bulletins on various topics such as health, economics, 
employment, the cost of living, economic growth, housing and the population census reports and other 
topics, (Magolakwe 2006). The main sources of information to this research were the relevant books, 
reports and online databases from relevant authorities in the Zimbabwean context or internationally.   
Documentary analysis was vital to this research as it was utilized in counter-checking potential kerbs that 
could have been occasioned by biases associated with the subjective nature of primary sources of data. 
Bias was inevitable during in-depth interviews and FGDs but the use of documentary analysis enabled the 
researcher to verify information that had been given by respondents during the use of the primary data 
collection methods. Nevertheless, Burns, (2000:68) cautioned that documents as sources of evidence may 
not be accurate and may contain bias and specific points of view which must be questioned. The 
researcher circumvented the kerbs associated with documentary analysis by using other methods of data 
collection such as interviews. This helped to enrich the findings thereby increasing their reliability and 
validity.   
4.7 Data Analysis Procedure  
Data analysis can be defined as the process of inspecting, transforming, tiding, and modelling data 
gathered from research with the goal and objective of highlighting useful information, suggesting 
conclusions and supporting decision making, (Babbie 2007). Data in this research was analysed using 
thematic analysis and qualitative content analysis.  
  
4.7.1 Thematic Analysis     
The researcher made use of thematic analysis, a qualitative analysis tool that involves examining and 
recording patterns of emerging themes from the data collected, with the themes forming categories of 
analysis. Rice and Ezzy (1999), state that thematic analysis is about identifying themes through careful 
reading and re-reading of the collected data. In this research, data collected through in-depth interviews 
and FGDs to establish whether the SADC-mediated GNU provided an opportunity to end political and 
economic crisis was grouped into themes through a system of coding or indexing of the data with similar 
characteristics. The data was then analysed on a case-by-case basis. This was vital in presenting clear 
findings on a case-by-case basis, as themes formed categories of analysis.   
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After collection of data using the three primary data collection methods that were used in this research, 
the researcher had to first acquaint herself with the collected data by submersing herself into it through 
reading and listening to the recorded data. This helped to enable the researcher to depict possible themes 
and categorise the information under the themes. It was possible to attach themes to the data during the 
collection. Data transcription was done to come up with major themes, patterns and meanings. Thus, those 
issues that continuously recurred formed the themes of the research and the researcher then grouped 
transcribed data under the developed themes to provide answers to questions on whether the 
SADCmediated GNU was a lost opportunity to end the political and economic crises that continues to 
grip Zimbabwe even to this day.   
  
As Leedy and Ormrod (2005) state, when analysing qualitative data thematic analysis requires its 
organization into a logical way, followed by its categorization into meaningful groups, then interpretation 
scrutinizing it so as to establish major themes, patterns and meaning and finally to generalize. Therefore, 
the three-way approach of the scholars was used in this research in which organization of data gathered in 
a reasonable way was followed by categorization and interpretation which made the findings easy to 
fathom. Boyatzis, (1998) cited in Braun and Clarke (2006:6) assert that thematic analysis is a fundamental 
method of analysing data because it often goes further than analysis as it interprets an assortment of those 
aspects related to the subject matter or focus. The method was also useful in providing useful insights, 
patterns and meanings relating to the GNU in Zimbabwe from the data that was collected by the 
researcher. This approach aided in addressing the aims and objectives of the study and provide rich 
insights into Zimbabwean GNU.   
  
4.7.2 Qualitative Content Analysis  
Data collected through documentary analysis was analysed by the qualitative content analysis technique. 
Content analysis has an empirical approach, methodologically controlled analysis of texts within their 
context of communication, following content analytic rules and step-by-step models, without rash 
quantification (Mayring 2000).  The empirical and methodologically controlled analysis of texts was vital 
in buttressing data that was analysed using thematic analysis in this interpretive qualitative social science 
research.  According to Mayring (2014) this technique is about hermeneutical and dialectical 
interpretation of textual data through systematic coding of major themes, clusters, categories and or cases 
in an endeavor to extract deeper meanings and patterns within a written work. Therefore, the systematic 
coding of major themes to extract deeper meaning after analysis of artifacts provided meaningful data for 
this research.    
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The researcher had to break down all the gathered data into manageable units, coding them, synthesizing 
them and searching for patterns in the event.  The aim of such breaking down was to discover patterns, 
concepts, themes and meanings. In case study research, Yin (2003) emphasises the need for searching the 
data for patterns and this may explain or identify causal links in the data base.  Thus, the researcher 
searched for themes that properly explained whether the SADC-mediated GNU provided an opportunity 
to end the political and economic crises in Zimbabwe. The researcher initially focused on the whole data 
from text, then attempted to take it apart and re-constructed it again in a more meaningful way. Such 
categorisation was essential as the researcher was able to deduce evaluations and divergences between 
patterns, to reflect on certain patterns and complex threads of the text data deeply and to make sense of 
them. The method was vital to this study as it could be used to extract deeper meanings and patterns 
within a written work thereby revealing the truth about a phenomenon under study which is, “SADC 
Mediation in Zimbabwe: Lost opportunity for lasting solution to the Zimbabwe crisis”.   
4.8 Ensuring Validity of Research Findings    
Validity is defined as a process of establishing the authenticity, credibility and accuracy of findings of the 
research (Creswell, 2007). For the purposes of ensuring validity of research findings, which focuses on 
whether the SADC-mediated GNU provided an opportunity to end the political and economic crisis that 
has gripped Zimbabwe for years, the researcher adopted two important methods namely structural 
corroboration and respondent validation. Structural corroboration involves the use of multiple techniques 
of data collection and in this research in-depth interviews, focus group discussions and documentary 
search were used. This method accordingly, helped the researcher to check kerbs on each of the method 
by using other methods. The weaknesses of any of the primary sources of data, for instance, were 
circumvented by information that was gathered using documentary analysis or other primary data 
collection methods. Furthermore, to enhance validity of information that was given by respondents, the 
researcher employed respondent validation in which some participants were randomly selected to 
comment on the interview transcript and gathered data. This was based on the researcher’s judgment after 
conducting a series of interviews. In the collection of data in social research some samples are deemed 
more useful and possess the much-needed unique information of the phenomenon understudy than others. 
The researcher selected respondents that had provided rich data to participate in the process of respondent 
validation. The importance of such a technique is ascertaining whether the final themes and concepts that 
were created could adequately reflect on issues around the GNU in Zimbabwe and whether it was an 
opportunity to end the political and economic crises in the country.   
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4.9 Assumptions  
The key assumptions of this research were that, the key informants were willing and readily available to 
provide the required information and opinions and do so impartially and truthfully. The research tried to 
be unbiased and focused on alternatives to solving the Zimbabwe crisis that were available as options to 
the GNU setup.   
4.10 Ethical Considerations  
In the realm of Social Studies, research usually involucrates human beings hence there are potential risks 
for people who choose to participate in the research concerned. For this reason, this study had the 
following ethical considerations during the course of the research.  
4.10.1 Informed Consent  
The researcher explained clearly the nature of the study, its intention and goals using a language familiar 
with each and every respondent that participated in this research. Participation in this research was 
voluntary and assurance of withdrawal during the course of the research was guaranteed. None of the 
respondents was forced to take part in this research about the SADC-mediated GNU in Zimbabwe. The 
researcher also emphasized that the study would not be conducted in a compensatory power ring, where 
respondents were paid for the time and information that they voluntarily gave to the researcher.  
Participants took part in this study willingly and freely.  
4.10.2 Respect for Privacy, Anonymity and Confidentiality  
The researcher protected the privacy, anonymity and confidentiality of participants to the study, chiefly in 
the analysis of data. No names of individuals, organizations, state and non-state actors are revealed 
throughout the research especially in the presentation of findings. The participants were informed about 
such an ethic so that they would not be limited in airing out their views on whether the SADC-mediated 
GNU was an opportunity taken or an opportunity lost to end the crises in Zimbabwe. Therefore, taking 
into consideration the sensitivity of political topics and the corrosive nature of Zimbabwean politics, the 
researcher vowed to protect each and every individual or organisation that participated in this research.   
4.10.3 Permission to Conduct the Research and Avoidance of Harm  
The researcher asked for permission from relevant authorities to conduct research either on government 
institutions, non-governmental organizations and even individuals within the state and non-state actor 
realm. The researcher received an approval letter of the Humanities and Social Science Research 
Committee of the University of KwaZulu-Natal. No information was collected without formal 
authorisation so that the researcher could be in a position to gather data from targeted respondents 
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lawfully and above all without hindrance or whatsoever.  The research thus followed and complied with 
all Zimbabwe and University of KwaZulu-Natal protocols to avoid any form of harm to respondents and 
participants to the research during the course of research. Since the research also targeted key informants 
that were based outside Zimbabwe, the researcher made and followed all necessary protocols before 
soliciting information on the phenomenon understudy. A letter of confirmation of studentship from the 
University of KwaZulu-Natal was used in seeking audience with institutions and individuals alike. The 
researcher also acquired a letter of permission from the University of Zimbabwe which was used for data 
collection within their premises to their students and staff alike.  
4.10.4 Gender Considerations   
The researcher used purposive sampling in selecting respondents hence; both male and female 
respondents participated in this research, particularly in the group discussions. The research was gender 
sensitive because both males and females participated in the study on the SADC-mediated GNU and 
views from both gender to ascertain whether it was a lost opportunity to end the political and economic 
crisis in Zimbabwe was vital to the findings of the study. The rationale behind this principle is that 
political and economic issues affect these two genders differently and views, opinions, and standpoints 
among others from both worked to enrich the results of the study. The researcher tried as much as 
possible to ensure that the ratio of 1:1 was realised without compromising the consideration of willingness 
to participate in the research.  
4.11 Conclusion   
In this kind of research where one asks sensitive information at some point, respondents are not quite 
readily available but the researcher noted that for the record many people were willing to take part as 
there was increased talk of another unity government in Zimbabwe so most people interviewed really 
showed enthusiasm for a change in approach to GNU formation and indicated that the masses should have 
a say. As discussed in this chapter, the information for this research was gathered through primary and 
secondary sources where, primary covered the field research that was conducted with relevant information 
repositories, while secondary data was gathered from the literature that is available on GNUs in general 
and the Zimbabwean GNU in particular. For primary data collection respondent selection was done to 
include almost all parties that were involved under the circumstances prevailing. The fact that all 
respondents lived through the GNU was an added advantage that helped the research as it was not only 
opinion gathering but also gathering it from participants during the course of the GNU.   
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CHAPTER FIVE  
THE GNU IN ZIMBABWE: FORMATION, NEGOTIATION PROCESS AND THE 
ROLE OF SADC  
5.1 Introduction   
The following chapter is based on extensive empirical research and it traces the background of 
Zimbabwe’s Government of National Unity (GNU) and factors leading to the negotiation process. The 
information is based on data gathered using primary sources of data namely Focus Group Discussions (2) 
and three respondents, Herein Respondent 1 (R1), Respondent 2 (R2) and Respondent 3 (R3) who were 
interviewed on the subject matter. Both FGD 1 and 2 had 6 respondents each herein FGD1-R1, FGD1-R2, 
FGD1-R3, FGD1-R4, FGD1-R5 and FGD 1-R6 for the first group and FGD2-R1, FGD2-R2, FGD2-R3, 
FGD2-R4, FGD2-R5 and FGD2-R6 for the second group. The respondents answered questions that were 
meant to attain the objective on the link between Zimbabwe’s history and the formation of the GNU; and 
not for the other next chapters. The chapter therefore initially focuses on the sequential trajectory of the 
GNU formation where all events surrounding the GNU are analyzed.  The Chapter then presents the 
various dimensions that led to the GNU in Zimbabwe and these include the historical feature, the 
economic, political and social factors including the regime agenda notion. Also included in the chapter is 
the mediation process in Zimbabwe, including the role played by Southern African Development 
Community (SADC) leading to the creation of GNU in Zimbabwe. Analysis is done using themes and a 
discussion done on factors that were collected by the researcher in the field of study.   
5.2 Background of the GNU in Zimbabwe   
The background to Zimbabwe’s GNU has been analysed and examined widely but in data gathered during 
the course of the research, it emerged out that several historical, social, political and economic factors 
played a vital role in the background. There were several factors that played a role in the formation of the 
GNU and these are discussed below;   
5.2.1 The Sequential Trajectory leading to GNU Formation   
In an interview with Respondent 1, the respondent noted that the GNU’s formation is best examined 
focusing on a sequential trajectory of latent and explicit events that took place in post independent 
Zimbabwe.   
5.2.1.i The Concealed Battle  
The respondent noted that the first port of call in any examination of the GNU formation in Zimbabwe is 
the ‘concealed battle’ which means that there had been differences between individuals, political parties 
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and even organizations on the best government practice in Zimbabwe. The differences had emerged in the 
post-independent Zimbabwe because of the various conundrums that were engulfing the state.  In this way 
the respondent noted that the differences between the leaders in the government and leaders of various 
organizations became the order of the day especially the clash between Zimbabwe African National 
Union Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF) and the Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU) leaders. The 
respondent added that although the differences in terms of the best practice on the workers’ plight and 
how to improve the economy could be heard especially in various meetings by government leaders vis-
àvis trade union leaders before the new millennium, the economic and political situation was still showing 
signs of either worsening or improving. According to the respondent this was the first real fundamental 
factor that is worth noting in the trajectory of events that led to the formation of the GNU in Zimbabwe. 
Accordingly, the differences and clashes which were still in their infancy built a firm foundation for 
events that unfolded in the years following.  
   
5.2.1.ii The Manifest Battle   
This phase in the course of events leading to the GNU was the manifest of latent clashes between 
opposing structures of independent Zimbabwe. The respondent noted that the second event leading to the 
formation of the GNU was the manifest battle, where towards the beginning of the new millennium, 
especially the two years before the year 2000; a conflict could now be noticed between the leaders of the 
ZCTU and the ZANU-PF regime. Respondent 1, on this, said that there was the accumulation of 
differences between ZANU-PF and leaders of the ZCTU as the latter blamed the policies and practices for 
having a deleterious impact on the state of Zimbabwe. In this regard the latter, for instance, blamed the 
former for allowing corruption among the top political brass without any corrective measures when the 
workers were battling for survival and the economic mismanagement tendencies of the former were 
intolerable according to the leaders of the latter. In this way the leaders of the latter had to act leading to 
the massive stay away demonstrations and strikes of the year 1998, which the ZANU-PF regime 
responded to violently using the security machinery.   
  
Thus, such an altercation that erupted in Zimbabwe stem from the fact that the concealed battle that was 
dormant manifested in a public manner for instance the socialization that was pursued by ZCTU 
leadership. The differences in ideology led to the former leaders forming a formidable political party in 
1999 under the label the Movement for Democratic Change with the objective of changing the 
antidemocratic tenets that they claimed were the order of the day of the ZANU-PF regime. Therefore, the 
respondent in this way depicted that events leading to the formation of the GNU as being linked to the 
formation of the MDC party which was one of the major parties in the Global Political Agreement that led 
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to the formation of the GNU.  The battle of the leaders from the MDC (former leaders of the ZCTU) and 
those from the ZANU-PF regime intensified publicly from the dawn of the new millennium.   
5.2.1.iii The Battle ‘Boom’ Phase (BBP)  
The respondent further noted that in the BBP phase, the ZANU-PF regime was challenged with facing a 
vibrant opponent which made promises of turning around the economy which had started to face 
challenges and the political situation which were declining with insecurities of the individual in the state. 
Therefore, R1 noted that;  
…the BBP phase soon after the formation of the MDC party witnessed ZANU-PF being defeated 
for the first time in the 2000 Referendum, which became a wake-up call for the party that they 
were dealing with a powerful force. The party had to embark on policies meant to empower those 
who had not been satisfied with their remunerations and even those who had been disappointed 
on how the party dealt with their plights after gaining independence. At the same note the MDC 
party kept on promising better lives for the people and pin-pointing the errs of ZANU-PF. The 
battle intensified as proxy politically related violence incidents became sporadic especially 
towards election time.  The intensity of such a battle increased the severity of tactics used by each 
party to gunner support…While the ZANU-PF regime used state resources such as the land and 
the security forces to circumvent the threat posed by MDC, the MDC party relied on external 
forces particularly the Western World to also dent the image and practices of ZANU-PF…In this 
stage the battle escalated and started involving more people and other related issues…The parties 
began using their power and resources to make stronger threats and harsher sanctions…  
  
It is in this phase that the conflict between ZANU-PF and MDC escalated over the best governance 
practice, a phenomenon that started in the concealed battle phase. The clashes henceforth were manifest in 
periods towards elections. Sentiments given by Respondent 1 in this phase relate to a view that was 
expressed in FGD1 - R1 who noted that“…the period between 2000 and 2008 witnessed a cold war and 
patchy physical fights between leaders and supporters of ZANU-PF and the MDC party…but in these 
fights the economy and political situations were not improving”. Thus, according to Respondent 1 the 
resultant impact of the BBP on Zimbabwe as a state was disunity, continued economic problems and 
antidemocratic state practices which were meant to halt the MDC penetration into the Zimbabwean 
society. The next phase leading to the formation of the GNU according to the respondent was an impasse 
between the two parties.  
5.2.1.iv The Impasse Stage prior GNU formation  
The respondent in his clarification of the trajectory of the formation of the GNU noted that the way in 
which ZANU-PF and MDC fought for public positions left the country in an economic and political crisis 
as the former flouted the essence of holistically developing the economy fearing for loss of power because 
of the external hand that the MDC had. The respondent added that although a gridlock which had been 
inevitable hit the two political parties in the year 2008, an analysis of the previous years revealed that on 
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one hand MDC with the support of the Western world had the means and measures to revive the country 
and on the other hand ZANU-PF was in control of the state with no real external powerful forces capable 
of supporting its programmes. This was also noted by R2 who noted that, “…the gridlock between 
ZANU-PF and MDC in 2008 was a resemblance of their different ideologies coupled by their different 
positions, that is ZANU-PF was in control of resources and the country and had no means to exploit the 
resources at their disposal, something that the MDC were capable of doing, however not in a position to 
do so as they had no governing powers…”   
  
Therefore, the impasse stage according to R1 entails the scenario in which both ZANU-PF and the MDC 
could not win unless they compromised their positions. According to the respondent, after the 2008 June 
Runoff Elections, the ZANU-PF regime retained the power to rule Zimbabwe which was in a crisis and at 
the same time the MDC was crying foul because of the unconducive nature of the political environment in 
which ZANU-PF intimidated citizens to vote for them. ZANU-PF had no means to ensure that there 
would be economic recovery yet they were in power and on the other hand the MDC with its backing of 
the Western world was in a position to ensure the recovery of the economic and social fabric of  
Zimbabwe. R1 further noted that, “under this phase which was soon after the 2008 June Runoff Elections, 
both parties needed each other because in the stalemate, no party could walk out victorious”. In this 
regard, the gridlock that characterised the two major parties in Zimbabwe meant that both parties were not 
in a position to attain everything that they wanted as political parties. In the case of ZANU-PF, they could 
not revive the economy and the MDC could not become the de jure and de facto major political party to 
govern Zimbabwe.   
5.2.1.v The Battle De-Escalation Period   
The respondent further stated that because elections were over and fighting for political positions would 
occur years later, the rationale was towards building Zimbabwe. Accordingly, there was thus the need to 
change the party stances and positions as the parties knew that they needed each other for the revival of 
Zimbabwe. FGD2-R3 concurred that it has to be appreciated that ZANU-PF and MDC are political parties 
and even after the 2008 elections the changes or shift in their stance in trying to talk and accommodate 
each other was occasioned by futuristic political endeavours. Consequently, the political parties realised 
their party and immediate goals were unrealistic and had to change them for realistic solutions. Unrealistic 
in the sense that ZANU-PF could not effectively govern Zimbabwe without the support of the Western 
world backed-MDC and MDC could not govern Zimbabwe as ZANU-PF held on to power.  
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 R1 added that although a war of words still existed between MDC leaders over the controversy of 
elections and the ZANU-PF leadership on how they resoundingly won the elections, after the June 2008 
elections, transformation in Zimbabwe was necessary and it had to be done by a combined effort between 
the warring political parties. R3 in the same vein said that the, “…the fact that both parties knew and 
realised that political and economic recovery needed a combined effort made inclusivity inevitable and 
above all, being depicted as the champion of the people’s plights in a country that was in a crises became 
the goal of the two differing parties…” In this regard the two parties had greatly tried to demonstrate that 
their concern was for the improvement of lives and standards of living for the people of Zimbabwe. 
Henceforth, flouting their differences and focusing on a combined effort became the main agenda 
however with party and future interest in mind.   
5.2.1.vi The Settlement and Combined Effort   
The respondent hence noted that from the concealed battle to the stalemate, the trajectory of the GNU 
formation in Zimbabwe reached a phase in which a settlement was necessary. Thus, in this stage the two 
political parties started looking for ways to resolve their problems. Regardless of the close to decade 
rivalry, the two parties including the other MDC party agreed to resolve their disagreements with the aim 
of bettering Zimbabwe. The respondent noted that the Zimbabwean case had been an international agenda 
especially after the delay in the release of the 2008 March Harmonised Presidential Election results hence 
there was need for regional blocs to intervene in the Zimbabwean situation. In this way the Southern 
African Development Community (SADC) facilitated negotiations among the warring parties in 
Zimbabwe leading to a combined effort under the label of Global Political Agreement of September 2008 
which created the Government of National Unity that became effective in February of 2009. The 
respondent thus concluded by saying that the parties agreed to implement the resolution that they took in a 
way that was meant to strengthen their understanding, communication and relationship with each other. 
The six phases therefore attempted to explain the trajectory of the GNU formation in Zimbabwe where 
various events in the post-independent period of Zimbabwe reveal the steps that led to the formation of 
the GNU especially in the broad realm of politics and a bit of economic considerations.  
5.3 The Historical Factor and the 2008 GNU in Zimbabwe  
The formation of the GNU has a historical factor in the sense that an analysis of the post-independent 
period in Zimbabwe without reflecting on the period before the GNU formation paints a parochial 
depiction on the factors leading to its formation. Such a view was mentioned by FGD2-R1 who pointed 
out that, the history of the territory now named Zimbabwe greatly contributed towards the formation of 
the GNU in the country. The central argument in such an analysis is that after the 1884-5 Berlin 
Conference in which white European countries superimposed their dominion in the African continent, in 
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the famous ‘Scramble for Africa’ the conundrum leading to GNU was established. In this way the control 
of the territory by a chartered company, the British South Africa Company between 1890 and 1923; the 
territory turning into a British colony between 1923 to 1965 under the name Southern Rhodesia and lastly 
after the 6th of November 1965 Unilateral Declaration of Independence by the Smith regime from the 
British Empire, (Rhodesia), a cultural and political system was created.   
  
R3 in an interview on the subject literally concurred with such assertions by noting that the 
superimposition of dominance by the colonial powers on the state brought about vivid vicissitudes in the 
socio-economic and political status-quo of the territory. Thus, besides the involuntary mingling of Bantu 
speaking people with diverse histories, norms, cultures, language and religious identities, the colonial 
regimes devised a parochial system that was based on racial seclusion in order to easily operationalize the 
entire progression of their edification and every political, economic and social approach to the governance 
of the territory of Southern Rhodesia between 1890 and 1965; and of Rhodesia (1965-1979) was in the 
black subjugation lenses. The respondent stated that;  
  
The ultimate result of such an approach occasioned a state that had two different classes, i.e. an 
out-group and an in-group. The first group was the controller, which was powerful and ruled in a 
way that it reckoned indispensable. These were the whites who were few but benefited from the 
state and the governance, at the expense of the majority black. The term out-group has been used 
to refer to the fact that the settler was foreign to the original Bantu speaking societies in the 
territory that they termed Southern Rhodesia and later on Rhodesia. Members of the out-group 
whether in the political leadership of the country or not were potent because of the fact that the 
out-group was in power. Concurrently, as the out-group superimposed its dominance on the 
ingroup, who were the majority blacks, the in-group’s social, economic and political endeavours  
‘remained a vision’. The status-quo of the black circulated around subjection as the state was in a 
position and well-furnished to use condign power to impede any conceivable or recognised 
opposition. At the same time by virtue of being from the out-group, members of the grouping 
were supremacists, even beyond the law that applied to the state…  
  
Such an analysis was further raised in an interview with R2 who added that the essential precept that 
contributed to the continued survival of the colonial regimes for around 9 decades in the territory now 
Zimbabwe, as Southern Rhodesia and Rhodesia was the maintenance of a parallel gap between the native 
citizens and the white settlers. In this way the consequence of such a tactic was the preservation of the 
out-group/in-group connection and the hidebound system resulting in two consecutive armed struggles 
which were ended when the belligerent parties agreed to a cease fire at the Lancaster House Conference in 
1979.  
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This resulted in the redemption of the in-group from colonial bondage, a phenomenon that established 
great anticipations towards the elevation of the in-group; the black majority. The historical factor leading 
to the formation of the GNU from R1 and a few members of the FGD 1 is revealed in the sense that the 
old colonial strategies were never removed by the new African led government.  Thus, the old system 
favouring one group of a few individuals at the expense of the other was maintained as policies that were 
pursued by the post-colonial government of Zimbabwe and occurrence of events in the post-colonial eon 
of the country, particularly the 37 years rule of the Mugabe regime shade a portrait of the colonial style of 
governance in the country.   
  
In adding to such analysis FGD2-R6 stated that;   
  
The prejudiced governance practices pursued under most of the revolutionary cadres who were 
the top political brass in the Zimbabwean system between 1980 and 2017 under Robert Gabriel 
Mugabe are the very equivalent practices that they tussled to dismantle because of the way they 
affected the entire in-group while benefiting the out-group.  
  
Therefore, what changed were the faces and the race of the out-group and the resultant effect was the 
inheritance of a system that favoured a few black elites at the expense of the majority blacks and even the 
white populace. Respondent 1 and 2 and FGD1-R3 concurred that it is the need to preserve the colonial 
status-quo in post-independent Zimbabwe that led to unpopular and anti-majority policies by the Mugabe 
regime that led to an economic meltdown in Zimbabwe. The view from Respondent 1 that the Mugabe 
regime prioritised politically-related policies without focusing on economic consequences severely 
impacted on the economy especially after the 1990s.  
  
It thus, is the historical colonial factor in which a single group of elites benefited vis-à-vis the deleterious 
impact of such a scenario on the economy and the political environment that led to the rise of political 
parties like the Movement for Democratic Change. R2 was precise on this by noting that the rise of other 
political parties was orchestrated by politicization of economic endeavours by the Zimbabwe African 
National Union  Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF) such that fighting the status-quo and gaining political 
mileage became ZANU-PF’s primacy leading to a complete disregard of the economy. Consequently, this 
led to unending economic, political and policy reforms that aimed at aiding the ZANU-PF regime and not 
contributing towards the stability of Zimbabwe. The end result was strong opposition to ZANU-PF after 
the new millennium leading to the party losing the contested elections of 2008 but remaining in power 
and calling for the formation of a Government of National Unity. Hence, the approaches of the ZANU-PF 
regime that led to it losing power in Zimbabwe stem from the fact that the party inherited a system that 
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favoured a few elites at the expense of the majority, a colonial historical factor which in the long run 
contributed to the formation of GNU in Zimbabwe.   
5.4 Mugabe’s Need to Transform the Socio-Economic Plight of the black People   
The need to change the plight of the black majority after their 90 years of subjugation under colonial rule 
was another historically-related factor that was raised in the background examination of the factors that 
led to the establishment of the GNU in Zimbabwe. The central argument in the information according to 
FGD2- R2 and respondent FGD2-R4 was that it has been mentioned time and again that Zimbabwe might 
have inherited one of the so-called best economies in Africa but the economy really catered for a few 
white elites in the country. FDG2 – R2 for instance revealed that, although, Rhodesia had one of the best 
infrastructural development in the region, the system benefited the white minority as blacks were subjects 
of the whites. In this way, upon ascending to power in 1980, Mugabe was tasked to ensure that the small 
economy that catered for a small white minority had to cater for the majority blacks. The same sentiment 
was raised by a FGD2 - R4 who reiterated that, “…it has to be appreciated that the demand for public 
services and goods changed from a narrow window to one that is broad-based as the colonial system was 
meant for a few white minority…’. Accordingly, the need to extend central services to the majority of 
Zimbabweans increased government expenditure after 1980 in an economy that was designed and 
maintained in a parochial way to cater for a few white minorities. FGD2-R2 noted that;  
  
…this seemingly ambitious but noble as an agenda to redistribute services for instance the 
decentralization of the registrar’s office, local government and agriculture services among others 
soon proved to be costly to a limited national revenue base…as it was meant to cater for a few 
white minority… The funding deficit widened tremendously with years as Mugabe’s aim was to 
change the plight of the people of his skin…the deficit widened to an unsustainable level…Both 
internal and external debt became unsustainable and this led to the Government of Zimbabwe 
adopting Economic Structural Adjustment Programs between 1990 and 1991 as it cut on 
spending…All in the name of trying to redress colonial imbalances and emancipating the black 
populace…   
    
Extending several goods and services to various areas of an independent country constrained the budget of 
the economy that was tailor-made to cater for a minority. Respondents from FGD2 concurred that  
Mugabe’s ascendency to power in 1980 came with high hopes and expectations, not only from the fact 
that he promised to serve the people with his all but because, the 90 years of subjugation of the black 
populace, after an emancipatory war naturally required a complete change in their social, economic and 
political well-being. R2 in the same way, however from a different analytical window also mentioned in 
the equivalent manner that the “…problems leading to “the lost decade” in the Zimbabwean context 
which resulted in an elite agreement can be traced from the over-ambitious nature of Mugabe’s policies 
109  
  
after independence where he wanted to please everyone, including the international community”. In this 
way according to the respondent, Mugabe embarked on a socialist approach in an independent Zimbabwe 
robustly trying to ensure social and economic empowerment for the black people, however, flouting the 
economic consequences. In the long run, the respondent added that he could not keep up with the 
demands of a changing population vis-à-vis the changing times, thereby leading to disastrous wellthought 
but poorly planned and executed policies like the fast track land reform programme.    
  
According to the respondents the end result was a country that was engulfed by serious economic woes 
for over a decade and the Mugabe regime was met with serious opposition and it resorted to the use of 
hard power to maintain its legitimacy. In this way it was in a position to maintain its position in 
Zimbabwe but could not do the same in the economic circle and the opposition provided an alternative 
solution to Zimbabwe’s problems. R3 was precise on such a view by stating that the MDC in the 2008 
elections provided a better alternative to the ZANU-PF regime as seen in the March 2008 Harmonised 
Elections “…and ZANU-PF knew that MDC with its links with the Western World and its support in 
Zimbabwe could serve the economic situation but not as the ruling party, instead as co-author of 
governance works for economic recovery…” Thus, the Mugabe regime had to devise strategies to win 
elections and call for an inclusive government with the MDC party.   
  
In the same manner but from a different angle, R1 noted that “Mugabe made an awakening call” to the 
international community with his policies of empowering the black community and the western world 
sabotaged the realisation of such a goal by imposing illegal sanctions and this affected normalcy in 
Zimbabwe, a phenomenon that ZANU-PF could not handle leading to the party humbling itself and 
granting MDC power to also be in government.  The respondent also added that, ZANU-PF after 
delivering services to the black people and being sabotaged by the same people who were behind the 
formation of the MDC party had to wisely engage the latter for the sake of the people and economic 
recovery in the country. This henceforth led to the formation of the GNU as the Mugabe regime was 
trying to change the lives of the black people in Zimbabwe but not taking into account the fate of the 
economic security and social security of the individuals in the state.   
,  
5.5 Western Agenda for Regime Change  
A number of issues were raised as the researcher was gathering primary data. Related to the issue of the 
historical factor and Mugabe’s approach to change the plight of the black populace is the Western agenda 
for regime change.  R3 noted that it has to be appreciated in the academic or state practice lenses that the 
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move by the United Nations to create a Trusteeship Council to deal with the independence of states was 
well orchestrated to further imperialism. The respondent argued that:  
  
The United Nations’ creation was the idea of White imperialists who because of the changing 
times and for the reason that the wave of decolonisation had hit on colonialists, they had to create 
a body to serve their interests. In the colonial era it was direct control but the UN was made for 
many reasons, one of them being to falsely liberate colonized states so that control would be 
maintained indirectly.  In the Zimbabwean context, the way in which the Mugabe regime 
spearheaded emancipation of the black community was threat not only to former colonizers but to 
the Western world as a whole as it would stand as an example of a successful emancipation story. 
The education policy and the land reform for instance affected the interests of the Western world 
as the imperialist tendencies were exposed. The regime change agenda became the focal point.   
  
The respondent further argued that to end such a success story the Western world had to create a political 
agenda and sabotage Mugabe as they could not access resources and the colonial benefits which they had 
enjoyed before the land reform policy and Nationalization of various Parastatals in Zimbabwe. Therefore, 
the Western world in their bid to control Zimbabwe’s resources through a puppet leader formed the MDC 
and played a collaborative effort as the European Union and the US to cripple the economic fabric of  
Zimbabwe. Such a sentiment was also shared by a respondent from FGD1-R5 who argued that “… the 
goal of the Western world approach to Zimbabwe was that economic pain would create political gain…” a 
factor that the Mugabe regime resisted by other means such anti-democratic policing. The resultant effect 
according to the respondent was a crisis in the economic and political realm and these deleteriously 
affected the social fabric of the country. R2 on the same note was of the view that the MDC party 
provided an alternative solution to the crisis which was the goal of the Western World but could not be 
realised. The end result were tightly contested elections between 2000 and 2008, however, within a 
country that had one of the worst performing economy in Africa. The respondent also noted that the 
situation had reached a point where the ZANU-PF could not give-in but to negotiate with the MDC to 
reach a compromise in government for Zimbabwe to return to normalcy.   
  
On the same note the views of some of the members in FGD1 reflected on such analysis in that most of 
them concurred that the ZANU-PF regime had been incapacitated left, right and center because of its 
policies which did not favour the powerful states in the international milieu and the only solution was to 
join the enemy for the betterment of Zimbabwe, which would in turn assist them in gaining political 
mileage. In this way FGD1-R3 stated that ZANU-PF had tried to embark on a Look East Policy to 
circumvent the crisis because the Western World was isolating the country. The respondent further noted 
that the Look East Policy was disastrous or rather did not yield positive results as the foreign policy of  
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ZANU-PF since its creation had been based on the famous ‘no permanent friends or enemies but interest’ 
clause. The respondent on this noted that during the colonial era ZANU-PF leaders relied on Socialist 
States such as China and Soviet Union for its weaponry, trainings and everything and in this they were 
fighting a European power or a European agenda in colonialism. However, when the leaders managed to 
win independence they started associating themselves more with the old colonial enemy often flouting the 
Eastern and Socialist States. In this regard when relations soured between the leaders of ZANU-PF and 
the Western World, the leaders of the regime looked for an old friend that they had neglected after gaining 
independence. The respondent even added that the Eastern bloc of countries had to half-heartedly assist 
the Zimbabwean leadership in the crisis and the country never recovered.   
  
As such the regime had to devise a short-term strategy which was the inclusive government, 
encompassing the leaders of their rival party who had the support of the Western World to revive  
Zimbabwe’s economy and later on play the lone ranger game after political and economic stability in 
Zimbabwe. Accordingly it is the Western World’s agenda for regime change that led to a political and 
economic crisis in Zimbabwe as on one hand the Western Bloc created an economic crisis by sabotaging 
the ZANU-PF regime, while on the other hand the ZANU-PF regime used anti-democratic tenets in order 
to resist the external and or internal force resulting in a serious crisis that ended with the enemies being 
represented by MDC and the ZANU-PF regime coming together.  These events under the regime agenda 
notion accordingly led to the formation of the GNU in the Zimbabwean context.  
5.6 The Socio-economic and Political Environment vis-à-vis GNU Formation   
The social, political and economic environment of Zimbabwe in the post-independent period and before 
the formation of the GNU contributed immensely towards its formation. It was the need to return to 
normalcy in these sectors that inclined the political parties to embark on a collaborative effort in 
Zimbabwe. One of the respondents in FGD1 noted that these sectors were facing serious complex 
conundrums that required combined ideological policing approaches to resuscitate them and the 
interconnectedness of the sectors meant that a problem in one sector affected the other sectors in their 
essence.   
5.6.1 Economic Sector and Zimbabwe’s GNU   
The economic factor is a vital element that contributed to the formation of the GNU in Zimbabwe in the 
sense that the country faced various economic challenges especially in the post 1990 period. R2 noted 
that;  
It should be appreciated that Zimbabwe is one of the few states that inherited one of the most 
structurally developed economies and effective state systems in post independent Africa, and up 
until mid-2000 the manufacturing sector was a major contributor to the national economy in 
general…However, the rampant hyperinflation that soared to such a great level that the official 
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inflation rate once reached 231 000 000%; the Central Statistical Office (now Zimbabwean 
Statistical Authority), became unable to determine the magnitude of inflation, although 
economists assessed that the hyperinflation had soared to levels of several trillion per cent, a 
record figure…Consequently costs of production escalated at an unsustainable pace, with 
immense surges in wages and salaries, materials and consumables. The intensity of inflation 
almost wholly eroded the spending power of consumers, with most people even struggling to 
afford the most basic necessities. Such a scenario reduced market demand for many 
products…this led to a decrease in the demand for bare essentials…The upward surge in 
manufacturing costs, and concomitant decline in production levels to service the domestic 
market, inevitably escalated prices of products to export customers to such an extent that almost 
all export opportunities that had beneficiated industries ceased to exist. Concurrently, locally 
produced goods ceased to be competitive against imported products.   
The effect of such a trend according to the respondent was the economic insecuritisation of the ordinary 
individual in Zimbabwe. Views from FGD2-R2 reveal that the economic woes that characterised the 
Zimbabwe state were occasioned by poor policing on the path of ZANU-PF for instance its adoption of 
structural adjustments which were meant to further the hand of imperialists in the domestic affairs of 
Zimbabwe, its  Z$50 000 payment under the label of  gratuity to war veterans, the regime’s involvement 
of the Democratic Republic of Congo War and the disastrous fast track land reform program left 
Zimbabwe not only isolated but without enough capital power to reinvest in the country. Accordingly, 
without a proper strategy government embarked on various short term and long-term measures to revive 
the economy which included the Look East Foreign Policy, the use of the bearer cheques but all these 
efforts were fruitless.   
Data also gathered from members of FGD 1 reveal that the impact of mistimed and bad policies by the 
Mugabe led regime had severe effects on the general populace as living conditions were unbearable, 
however in a country where the top political brass was living a flamboyant life. This was happening in a 
country where the MDC-T party provided an alternative way of governance in promises. According to the 
respondents (R1 and those from FGD2–R1 and R3), the formation of the GNU therefore was done in 
order to revive the economy of Zimbabwe. R1 on the same note stated that the primacy of the GNU was 
economic recovery, “…although the political parties, being composed of politicians had the goal of 
pursuing party interests which is inevitable in any situation…”   In this regard, the revitalization of an 
economy that had faced blues for close to two decades was one of the goals of the GNU hence; the 
unconducive economic environment is one of the factors that led to the formation of the GNU in 
Zimbabwe in 2008.   
5.6.2 The Political Environment and its contribution to GNU Formation   
The formation of the GNU is strongly linked to the political variable. The central argument that was 
advanced by the respondents was that, the GNU being a product of a political settlement was advanced 
because of the political crisis that had engulfed the ZANU-PF and MDC. R2 in his contribution noted that 
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the Mugabe regime just like most post-independent African states tried to embark on a one party state 
system under the rubric term of the nation-state project. In his analysis R2 further stated that the 
Matabeleland disturbances in which over 20 000 people of the Ndebele origin were butchered illustrate 
how the Mugabe regime tried to stop possible opponents to his ideology. The respondent also further 
stated that:  
The wrong perceptions that gripped the ZANU-PF regime was that they would not face any 
opposition in the post-independent period especially from the black community as they led the 
war towards redemption of the majority black from white supremacy…in this way the slightest of 
opposition was met with state resistance and violence beginning in the mid-1980s and this 
became their approach to opponents before and even after the signing of the GNU in 2008…  
The above given narratives were also reflected in an interview with R1 who noted that from the onset 
ZANU-PF created a political environment that was intolerant to opponents as the people in the party 
structures assumed that their involvement in the armed struggle was more than enough for them to 
determine the fate of the country. However, according to the respondent, the ZANU-PF regime was to a 
greater extent able to resist most of the threats opposed to it and even tried without success to dismantle 
the MDC party by embarking on a brutal and nasty approach on its members and leaders. Accordingly 
such a political approach meant that ZANU-PF deviced a state approach to halt any progression by its 
opponents. Hence it used a securocratic approach in which the security sector was used to support the 
endeavours of ZANU-PF and against its enemies.   
  
R2 also made reference to the securocrat state that was created by the ZANU-PF regime by noting that, 
“…ZANU-PF established a fearsome political environment in which the Central Intelligence  
Organization was known as its own secret police responsible for only thwarting and silencing 
opponents…” In the end the major focus was on the security sector which was meant to prolong its stay in 
power at the expense of the economic sector denting the social fabric of the Zimbabwean society. R1 on 
the other hand stated that the CIO was well financed including the leaders of the police force, the 
correctional services and the military and these sectors especially the CIO was used to destroy without fail 
real political opponents. The political sector hence had a negative effect of the economic and social 
sectors of Zimbabwe as attention to economic development was relegated as secondary after politics. 
FGD1-R5 on the same note, asserted that the little that was produced in the struggling economy of 
Zimbabwe benefited the top political brass from ZANU-PF at the expense of the majority such that the 
MDC came sympathizing with the majority, a factor that led to its continued rise within  the space of 10 
years.   
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Therefore, the arguments raised by the three respondents point to the fact that the political environment 
brought about a negative impact on Zimbabwe as a whole. R1 further stressed that although ZANU-PF 
kept on using state resources to silence opponents, the MDC simultaneously kept pressuring the ZANUPF 
government and the clash between the two parties diverted the attention of ZANU-PF from economic 
recovery and by the time that they thought of embarking on foreign policies looking eastwards to save the 
economy the damage was already done. On the same note R2 hence stated that the 2008 crisis came as a 
blessing in disguise for both parties as the formation of the GNU was to provide a platform for both 
parties as political parties to pursue their agendas. The MDC hence engaged ZANU-PF for the GNU to 
effect institutional reforms that would make the political environment conducive in the forthcoming 
elections and for the ZANU-PF party, it was necessary for the MDC party to use its Western friends to 
revive the economy so that it would use state apparatus thereafter to cement its power. R1 in this said that 
the, “…GNU was an elite agreement that aimed at pursuing their agendas hiding under the 
anthropological concern…”  
  
On the same factor an opinion from FGD1-R4 focused on how the ZANU-PF regime after facing external 
pressure became robustly radical in its approach to the governance of Zimbabwe. The respondent said 
that, after the imposition of sanctions on Zimbabwe in 2000 and in 2001, the ZANU-PF regime had 
nothing to lose from the Western World and it became very harsh on political opponents legalizing 
antidemocratic legislation like the Public Order and Security Act under the necessity bracket. The effects 
of such a stance were intolerable political environment, a lot of fighting and a hostile environment which 
witnessed investors leaving the country for better countries with certainty.  The need to lure new and old 
investors, to revitalise the social fabric and to enhance unity which were damaged by the nature of the 
political environment hence was the core aim of the political settlement signed in Zimbabwe. In this, the 
political environment stands as one of the vital sectors that led to the formation of the GNU.   
5.6.3 The Social Environment leading into the 2008 GNU   
The malfunctioning of the economy of Zimbabwe, coupled with an unconducive political environment 
affected the social fabric of the Zimbabwean society, a factor that needed addressing especially at the 
peak of the Zimbabwe crises in 2008. In his opinion on this R1 noted that the social sector as a vital sector 
of any state encompasses the health sector, the education sector, such vital elements as employment 
benefit or employment guarantee schemes including sanitation. The respondent also noted that these 
sectors contribute to the all- round development of the society but their realisation is based on the 
performance of the economy and how established the political sector is, in the modern economy in terms 
of the democracy benchmark. Accordingly, the Zimbabwe social environment was broken such that the 
education sector from the primary level to the tertiary tier faced a myriad of challenges that needed 
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attention or Zimbabwe could be perceived as a failed state.  Sentiments related to such analysis were also 
aired out by FGD2-R3 who  noted that the education sector witnessed a massive exodus of senior teachers 
and lecturers who went to other countries for greener pastures and even those who remained behind went 
on a serious ‘go-slow’ of around 2 years which affected the education system in Zimbabwe. The 
unavailability of latest learning materials and resources to fund schools hence led to a downfall of the 
standards in Zimbabwe.   
  
In the same manner, the respondent noted that the health sector deteriorated and health deterioration 
included:  
…the loss of health workforce due to massive brain drain which negatively impacted on the 
capacity for health service delivery… It also eroded administrative capacity and accountability 
within the system…Low salaries, low morale and high staff turnover led to poor service delivery 
and increased cost negatively affecting the general populace…The network of primary care 
facilities which supported the delivery of equitable health services with low or no fees for basic 
services to target population was longer functional as international aid organizations from the 
European Union and United States withdrew their help after the imposition of sanctions… and in 
such an environment there was  a great need to revitalise the social sector…  
  
The failing education sector and an ailing health sector, in a state that was politically and economically 
crippled were affecting the country. Commenting on this view however from an international law point of 
view a member from FGD2 noted that the failure by the government of Zimbabwe to provide services to 
its citizens particularly in the 2008 era meant that the de jure government could not play the de facto role 
and because it had to a greater extent, “…ceased to be in effective control of the country letting the social 
and economic sectors to be controlled by other non-governmental forces, however maintaining its firm 
grip in the political sector, hence it could be regarded as a one-third state. In this way the respondent 
further noted that sanitation in its essence became non-existent and there was need for a change. Hence, 
ZANU-PF which was in control of the state could not change the social sectors of Zimbabwe and the 
MDC party which was not in control of the state but had access to the means that could transform the 
country had to embark on a collaborative effort hence the compromise of the global political agreement in 
2008. Therefore, the dilapidation of the major social sectors had a negative human security bearing on 
Zimbabweans and the GNU was born in order to transform such a phenomenon that had engulfed 
Zimbabwe for over a decade but was at its peak in the 2008.   
5.7 The Mediation Process in Zimbabwe - A SADC Effort   
The mediation process in Zimbabwe that led to the formation of the GNU can be traced back to as early as 
2007 in March. In an interview with R1, the respondent noted that the context of the 2008 GNU besides 
being similar to events that took place in 1979 at the Lancaster House Conference in which the Frontline 
States facilitated negotiations between the settlers and the black majority in events leading to the 
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independence of Zimbabwe. The respondent noted that when the Lancaster House negotiations were 
stalling, the Frontline States were prepared to use coercive measures against the nationalists, in the 
Zimbabwe Africa National Union party and those from the ZAPU, in order to get them to truly commit to 
negotiations and the outcome. In the SADC negotiation of 2007, the block shifted from its 
noninterference philosophy to adopt a more forceful stance to push for a negotiated settlement. However, 
a member FGD 1 noted that the political settlement of 2008 in Zimbabwe has a history that can be traced 
to events that transpired in March 2007 in Zimbabwe.   
5.7.1 The March 2007 Incident and the emergency SADC meeting in Dar-es-Salaam   
Politically motivated violence which rocked the main two political parties in Zimbabwe since the year 
2000 was flouted by the SADC region until the year 2007 where state sponsored violence was used 
against opposition members, an incident which became an immediate catalyst upon which the SADC bloc 
acted. According to a member of FGD 1:  
  
The March 2007 incident where opposition leader, the late Morgan Tsvangirayiand high-ranking 
members of the MDC were brutalized and arrested along with more than 110 activists by heavily 
armed riot police preventing a ‘Save Zimbabwe Campaign’ prayer meeting in Harare’s Highfield 
township brought to the attention of the SADC bloc that the Zimbabwe situation posed a threat to 
the SADC region as failure to pacify the political situation between ZANU-PF and MDC would 
lead to instability in Zimbabwe…this would pose a menace to the region as a whole as the 
violence between the two parties had been taken to the extreme and was likely to be the order of 
the day in the forthcoming 2008 elections.      
  
In the same manner R1 noted that politically-motivated violence had been the order of the day since the 
rise of the MDC in Zimbabwe around the year 1999 but the 2007 incident was unique and unacceptable in 
the sense that it brought to the attention of the international community that Zimbabwe’s Mugabe regime 
was using state-sponsored violence against its opponents and flouting such an incident to paint a 
deleterious image of the SADC bloc and friends of the democratic western world such the Republic of 
South Africa and Botswana.  Accordingly, in its response in the same month the SADC strategy for 
intervention in Zimbabwe became more forthright as evidenced by the emergency SADC meeting in 
Dares-Salaam. R1 further noted that the Extra-Ordinary Summit of the Heads of State and Government of  
SADC met in Dar-es-Salaam, United Republic of Tanzania on 29 March 2007 to discuss the political, 
economic and security situation in the region, with special focus on the situations in Lesotho, DRC and 
Zimbabwe and the meeting witnessed the formal designation of President Thabo Mbeki of South Africa 
as the mediator of the dispute between the ZANU-PF and the MDC.    
  
A fundamental issue was also raised in FGD1 in which there was general consensus among respondents 
that Thabo Mbeki had already started informally to engage the political opponents in Zimbabwe as the  
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Extra-Ordinary Summit mandated him to “…continue to facilitate dialogue between the opposition and 
the government and report back to the troika on progress”. Therefore, in the 29 March 2007 SADC 
Summit that formally established Thabo Mbeki as a mediator in the Zimbabwe situation. R1 on the same 
noted that the Mugabe regime was profound to circumvent regional isolation and condemnation, a 
phenomenon that had occurred at an international level, as a result they participated in the inter-party 
negotiations.   
5.7.2 Mbeki’s Role in 2007 (SADC)   
The 2007 March SADC Summit bequeathed on Mbeki, the role to critically establish a democratic 
framework in which free and fair elections would be held in Zimbabwe in 2008. R2 noted that Mbeki 
after being given the mandate greatly engaged the main political parties but he was being partisan and too 
soft on Robert Mugabe. The respondent noted that it has to be appreciated that “…the SADC bloc and the 
African Union are two organisations of dictators…and the SADC region for instance has the brotherhood 
notion, an ideology that supersedes substance…the end result is unnecessary support for each other in 
some conditions”. In this way the respondent noted that Thabo Mbeki representing SADC was too soft on 
the Mugabe regime although it had terrorized opponents in Zimbabwe. Supporting such an argument a 
member of FGD 2 stated that the widely condemned pictures and videos in 2007 which circulated in 
which opponents of the Mugabe regime had been injured after being beaten by the police were enough for 
Mbeki to take a radical stance on Mugabe but the regional brotherhood philosophy outmoded the 
anthropological concern in the SADC region. However, regardless of the fact that Mbeki took a soft 
stance on the Mugabe regime, his mediation in 2007 is credited with negotiating important electoral 
reforms, including Amendment 18 of the Constitution of Zimbabwe that was supposed to facilitate 
credible elections in Zimbabwe, according to the SADC Principles and Guidelines Governing Democratic 
Elections. The March 2008 elections that followed these negotiations resulted in the MDC winning 
parliamentary seats and Morgan Tsvangirai winning the majority of the vote ahead of Robert Mugabe 
however, Tsvangirai was short of the 50 per cent plus one vote threshold needed to become the outright 
winner, hence the decision to have a run-off election in June 2008. In the period leading to the Run-off,  
R2 noted that the Mugabe regime realised that they could lose power and initiated intimidation of political 
opponents where they were butchered, humiliated, tortured and eliminated a scenario which was totally 
against the agreement that was reached between the two parties and the  SADC bloc which was 
represented by Thabo Mbeki. In this way, Mbeki managed to assist in the electoral reforms for the March 
2008 elections but it became a threat to ZANU-PF and they used a state-sanctioned intimidation 
campaign. Morgan Tsvangirai withdrew from the election and Mugabe was controversially re-elected in 
the 2013 elections that were condemned and dismissed internationally.   
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5.7.3 The Third SADC Mediation Effort in Zimbabwe  
The mediation efforts in Zimbabwe involved a series of events which were narrated and explained by 
respondents in the process of gathering data. The events kicked off a few days after the June 27 2008 
Presidential Run-Off in which SADC through Thabo Mbeki tried to establish a dialogue between the two 
main political parties in Zimbabwe. The aim was to establish a joint or collaborative effort in which the 
parties could revitalise the Zimbabwean situation and end the political and economic crisis that had 
gripped the country for over a decade.   
5.7.3.i The 5th of July 2008 Exclusive Meeting   
The controversy that surrounded the June Run-off Elections required the SADC bloc through Thabo 
Mbeki to take a firm stance against the ZANU-PF and MDC parties especially MDC-T as joint effort 
between the two parties could lead to a long -asting peace. R3 noted that the fact that MDC-T had won the 
parliamentary seats and the first round of Presidential election and the way that the Run-off results came 
out was an outcome that the MDC-T as a party was not prepared to accept or legitimize. Therefore, the 
first attempt at finding a lasting solution to the Zimbabwe crises was initiated nearly a fortnight after the 
June 27 Run-off elections, on 5 July 2008 where Thabo Mbeki met with Robert Mugabe of ZANUPF, a 
delegation of the Movement for Democratic Change – Mutambara which was led by Arthur Mutambara. 
In the meeting concerned according to the respondent the MDC-T was not present as they were refusing 
Mugabe as the legitimate President of Zimbabwe who had been sworn in as the President of the Republic 
of Zimbabwe, a few days after announcement of the June Run-off election.  In the same note R1 noted 
that the MDC-T faction did not trust Thabo Mbeki considering that Mugabe and Mbeki had a long 
relationship since the revolutionary period hence the MDC-T wanted the presence of an African Union 
(AU) mediator. Therefore, accordingly the meeting was not a success as the main opposition political 
party was not involved in the meeting citing various issues of concern which it wanted addressed first.   
  
5.7.3.ii The Inclusive but Unsuccessful Meeting of 10 July 2008  
The appointment of Thabo Mbeki to the position of mediator in the Zimbabwe crises although viewed 
from different lenses was noble and strategic. Pointing on this view, a member of FGD 2 noted that the 
patience of Mbeki enabled him to convince the MDC-T within a week at a meeting held in Pretoria on 10 
July 2008. It has to be noted that, opinions raised by the various respondents in FGD 1 and 2; and R1, R2 
and R3 point to the fact that to the MDC-T, the sole reason why their delegation led by Tendai Biti was 
present was to simply explain the conditions that were necessary to engage in negotiation with a party that 
they claimed stole the election in their face. According to R3 for instance the major grievance of the 
MDC-T was the continued inhuman and degrading treatment that their members were going through at 
the hands of ZANU-PF militia and state security officers.    
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The respondent also noted that the MDC-T demanded the release of its members who had been 
imprisoned on political grounds. R1 in this regard noted that the “… the 10th of July Talks were not as 
progressive as everyone would have wanted them to be, considering that Zimbabwe was undergoing a 
crisis, were the foundation upon which the direction of the negotiations would take…” Thus, accordingly 
the two main parties had to clear the course for meaningful talks to occur and ZANU-PF had the sole 
responsibility to direct the path of such a trajectory. In this way R3 noted that in a few days that followed, 
under pressure from the SADC bloc, ZANU-PF had to release at least 14 MDC-T activists who had been 
detained under vexatious and frivolous basis. FGD2-R1 stated that the release of the activists by 
ZANUPF was the first victory of the MDC-T towards the negotiations and gave them the zeal to 
participate in the negotiations as their aim was to see the political paths and roads of Zimbabwe change. 
Therefore, after the release of the MDC-T activists in mid-July, the framework for negotiations was 
established.   
5.7.4 The Fourth SADC Effort in Zimbabwe - The Three Rounds of Negotiations (July – 
September 2008)  
The disagreements and dislike between the MDC-T and ZANU-PF were reflected in the fierce and 
political deadlocks that occurred over a month whereas the Zimbabwean populace was suffering. R1 
noted that, the negotiations were aimed at attaining a compromise between parties that never envisioned 
tolerating each other or even sharing the same platform agreeing with each other. Respondents noted that 
the details of most of the talks were unclear at this stage but the general assumption is that the talks were 
stalling for around a month because of the leadership role and the occupation of the fundamental positions 
of the government like the security sector. In this regard, accordingly after the talks had started on 22 July 
2008, they were adjourned on the basis that  parties to the agreement wanted to engage in party meetings 
to determine whether the compromise would be worthwhile as all the parties included had put to their 
table their requests vis-à-vis the requests of other parties. Commenting on this R3 stated that, “…the 
situation was difficult for ZANU-PF as it had to relinquish some of its powers and for the MDC parties 
sharing the podium with a party with members that had tortured and butchered them in the previous years 
was not going to be an easy task especially allowing them to maintain various vital positions in the 
governance of Zimbabwe…” In this way the first round of negotiations was a build-up to the negotiations 
that followed.   
  
The Second Phase of the Negotiation Process (August 2008) witnessed Mbeki, the SADC mediator, 
meeting with the two main leaders of the top political parties in Zimbabwe separately and power sharing 
negotiations continued. R2 stated that as in any compromise the second round of negotiations that 
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occurred in August ended in a deadlock but progress was taking place. According to the respondent in the 
August SADC Summit in Johannesburg, for instance MDC-T and ZANU-PF remained divided on the 
question of how executive powers would be divided in the inclusive government. In this regard, the 
respondent noted one could depict from the words of the leader that an agreement was on its way. The 
SADC Summit of August however did not bring any positive result. Respondents also noted that a lot of 
events of disagreement occurred in August notably the one in which the MDC-T gave its proposal to 
Mbeki where Tsvangirai wanted to co-chair the Cabinet with Mugabe, a decision that ZANU-PF rejected 
entirely.  It was in the Round 3 negotiations that an agreement was reached in September of 2008 in 
Harare where a Memorandum of Understanding was signed between the ZANU-PF party and the two 
MDC parties. According to R1 the compromise agreed on 11 September after three months of 
negotiations and it was signed on 15 September. The events henceforth led to the formation of the GNU 
in Zimbabwe which became operational in 2009. Although the GNU was created in the year 2009, several 
issues impacted negatively on the newly created government as members of the army vowed not to salute 
any leader who was not Robert Mugabe. Even the 2008 elections the army always meddled in 
Zimbabwean politics.  Mandaza (2015) notes that Zimbabwe’s transition has been characterized by the 
factors of (state) continuity, class, the primacy of “national security” over political and economic reform, 
and the conflation of (ruling) party and state as a necessary feature of the securocrat state. The latter term 
is also derived from the military-security factor in the Zimbabwean case, a feature that might also 
distinguish the latter from other postcolonial situations in Sub-Saharan Africa. Though the army did not 
interfere explicitly with the formation of the GNU, several sentiments made after the 2008 elections 
would have a bearing on the GNU had the opposition been given the power to rule.   
  
5.8 Conclusion   
The formation of the GNU in Zimbabwe can be examined from a historical point of view and several 
events that took place between 1980 and 2008 contributed towards the establishment of the inclusive 
government in Zimbabwe. The chapter was a presentation of empirical data that was gathered on the 
background to the GNU and factors leading to its formation. Several historical, internal and external 
factors contributed to the crises that ravaged Zimbabwe for a long period of time and they immensely 
contributed towards the formation of the GNU. The failure to overcome colonial governance practices, 
coupled with the need to change the plight of the black majority by the Mugabe regime, including the 
need for regime change agenda by the Western World to counter black progression were raised as 
fundamental issues that contributed to the crises in Zimbabwe, which in turn made combined effort to 
resolve the crisis between differing parties inevitable.  The interconnectedness of the social, political and 
economic sectors vis-à-vis the political and economic crises that ravaged Zimbabwe totally impacted on 
the social fabric of the community which became a menace to the SADC region. The anti-democratic 
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tenets of the ZANU-PF governance system led to the SADC bloc putting Zimbabwe on agenda in 2007 
bestowing a mediating role to former South Africa President Thabo Mbeki to resolve the political crises 
that had occasioned the dilapidation of the economic and social system of Zimbabwe.  The controversy 
that surrounded the second round of elections in 2008 which was occasioned by a political crisis of years 
in Zimbabwe coupled with the social and economic crisis in the country required a resolution between 
differing parties who were in different contributing positions. Through a series of talks that were initiated 
by the SADC bloc, an inclusive government was established in the year 2008 and became operational in 
2009.   
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CHAPTER SIX  
THE GOVERNMENT OF NATIONAL UNITY AND THE LONG-LASTING SOLUTION 
QUESTION IN ZIMBABWE  
  
6.1 Introduction   
Unity governments may not be a new phenomenon in the governance discourse in general and that of 
Zimbabwe in particular. However, the 2009-2013 Government of National Unity (GNU) that was 
established in Zimbabwe occasioned a new inclusive governance system explainable from the country’s 
context. Although, infused with various politically and ideologically-related clashes prior and even in the 
implementation of the Global Political Agreement (GPA) that established the GNU, the latter temporarily 
managed to restore sanity and contributed to stability in Zimbabwe. However, the extent to which the 
GNU could have provided a long-lasting solution to the Zimbabwean crises still remains a foundation for 
apprehension. Notwithstanding, the fact that the GNU came with a lot of economic and social changes in 
Zimbabwe, the motives behind the involvement of political parties in the GNU affected the hypothetical 
convention that an inclusive government could have led to an end to Zimbabwe’s political and economic 
crisis. Against such a backdrop, this chapter grounded on empirical data that was gathered through 
indepth interviews and focus group discussions explores the government of national unity in Zimbabwe in 
terms of three major themes namely; the Southern Africa Development Community (SADC)-mediated 
Government of National Unity In Zimbabwe; SADC mediation process and its goals in Zimbabwe and the 
effectiveness of the GNU vis-a-vis its intended goals in Zimbabwe. In order to observe the ethics of 
research which the researcher vowed to observe in the research methodology chapter, respondents of the 
in-depth interviews were termed R1 for Respondent 1 and R2 for Respondent 2 up to the last respondent.  
Respondents for the focus group discussions that were conducted were referred to as Respondent FGD11- 
end and FGD2-1-end.  The chapter was analysed using thematic analysis.   
6.2 SADC-mediated Government of National Unity in Zimbabwe   
The period of the GNU remains a vital phase in the history books of the Zimbabwean state as the 
inclusive government not only brought about stability in country after a period of serious chaos and 
instability but because rival political parties agreed to work together in the administration of the state. In 
as much as the conception of the GNU has been explored from various lenses, the application and 
interpretation of the term in Zimbabwe differs from what, is known generally. Such a stance is derivable 
from the data that was gathered from the various respondents who participated in the research as noted 
below.   
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6.2.1 Understanding the generic conception of the term GNU   
The SADC-mediated Government of National Unity in Zimbabwe was defined and perceived from 
different angles by participants of the research. However, there was a general trend from the respondents 
in which they started from the general and narrowed the definition to suit the Zimbabwe context. FGD1–1 
generally defined the government of national unity as a unity government between different political 
players that may not necessarily share the same ideologies and governance approach. The sentiments 
reveal that a GNU is a marriage of different political parties that do not have the same governance 
philosophies. Respondent 1 (R1) on the same point stated that the notion of GNU is not a generic term as 
it refers to an arrangement in politics in which different parties that have different ideologies and 
objectives collaborate to administer the state. R1 seemed to suggest that the notion of GNU has not been a 
common term in the governance discourse. This is based on the fact that GNUs are perceived as 
convenience governance arrangements meant to at least halt a chaotic nature in a given state.   
Respondent 2 (R2) arguing along the lines of R1 and revealing the convenience nature of GNUs stated 
that a GNU is a government formed on the basis that different parties meet to create one government that 
leads a given country. Implied in such a definition is that a GNU is a government that is composed of 
multiple parties tasked to lead a state. However, for Respondent 6 (R6) the parties in what is termed a 
GNU should be coming from a conflict as it as a government that accommodates different sides of a 
conflict. In the general conception of the term GNU, FGD2-3 examined the concept of GNU from a 
nation-state perceptive by stating that a GNU occurs in a nation with different political interests and it 
unites the nation by bringing in all political parties together that is all members of the nation. The 
rationale behind the creation of the GNU accordingly is that different political players come together with 
the objective of making progress in the country. What is derivable from the various definitions that were 
forwarded by the different respondents is that a GNU is a government of ‘convenience’ that is formed by 
different political parties, two or more regardless of party philosophy. GNUs are perceived as 
governments that are created out of chaotic situations which therefore calls for parties to the conflict to 
negotiate and agree on the possible way of administration of a given territory.   
In the Zimbabwean context, R1 noted that the GNU was a political arrangement between the Zimbabwe 
African National Union – Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF), the Movement for Democratic Change – 
Tsvangirai (MDC-T) and The Movement for Democratic Change - Mutambara (MDC-M) which was 
misleading. The respondent stated that, the actual position was that the GNU in Zimbabwe was formed as 
a result of chaos that was created by Robert Mugabe and his ZANU-PF party. According to the 
respondent, the GNU was occasioned by the 2008 election chaos where Mugabe had lost elections but 
was forced by his cronies to hang on to power. Accordingly, Mugabe had lost the election to Morgan 
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Tsvangirai but the latter was denied the chance to get into power which then resulted in a misleading 
GNU where Thabo Mbeki was bestowed with the right by the African Union and SADC to impose Robert 
Mugabe. The respondent further mentioned that even though the South African Ambassador to Zimbabwe 
at the time called for the June 2008 run-off cancellation, Thabo Mbeki did not take heed of such a position 
as he had the mission of restoring Robert Mugabe.   
The respondent further noted that the GNU in Zimbabwe was not just a government of convenience which 
was to be responsible for the administration of the state of Zimbabwe, rather it was “…an expedient 
arrangement to redeem Mugabe who had lost an election at the same time pacifying Tsvangirai who had 
won…” Implied in the statement of the respondent is that the GNU in Zimbabwe cannot be considered a 
real government of national unity in which different political parties negotiate and agree on the ways to 
govern a state. Rather, the GNU in Zimbabwe was a way of restoring Robert Mugabe who had lost the 
presidential election to Morgan Tsvangirai in March 2008. As such the GNU was used as a way of simply 
ensuring that the losing candidate who had been in power for 28 years could continue being in power as 
the president of the state of Zimbabwe. FGD1-2 commenting from the same position of R1 stated that the 
GNU in Zimbabwe was basically a unity of parties during the crisis in 2008 but the MDC was used by 
ZANU-PF to help the latter to solve problems in the country particularly economic and political 
problems. ZANU-PF had failed to resolve the crisis for a decade and MDC was invited to assist ZANU-
PF to resolve them.   
However, the above given sentiments on the conception of the GNU in Zimbabwe differ from the views 
that were aired by R7 who stated that in the Zimbabwean context, the GNU was a creation of the Global 
Political Agreement that was produced through a series of political processes and negotiations. According 
to the respondent, it was born out of an inconclusive electoral process as none of the presidential 
candidates got the 50%+1 threshold that was required to win. As such there was a re-run which was 
bloody and messy and the result was not accepted widely. In order to overcome the chaos that had 
engulfed Zimbabwe at the time, the SADC bloc mandated Thabo Mbeki to mediate between the 
conflicting parties in the country.  Therefore, the GNU in Zimbabwe was a result of the fact that there was 
a politically related crisis which manifested in the bloody June 2008 run-off which forced the SADC bloc 
to intervene in Zimbabwe to solve the crisis. R2 took the same position by stating that the mediation 
process started in 2007 but real negotiations started in 2008 due to the volatile environment at the time. 
However, R2 suggested that the volatile environment affected mostly members of the opposition that is 
the MDC-T such that it was vehemently obliged to join ZANU-PF to form an inclusive government to 
halt the persecutions that were directed at the party supporters. R2 thus noted that “…the opposition went 
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into the GNU not because they wanted but [because] there was widespread violence in which their 
supporters were being killed…There was tension…so the opposition went in to save lives…”   
Consequently, from the various analysis that were given by the respondents, it is plausible to observe that 
in as much as the GNU as a theoretical concept revolves around the formation of a government that is 
made of different political parties after a related conflict of some sort, in the Zimbabwe context the 
concept of the GNU is perceived in various ways. Whereas some respondents noted that it was a platform 
upon which the SADC bloc through Mbeki aimed at restoring Mugabe’s presidency, other respondents 
noted that it was a move that aimed at curtailing the situation that had affected Zimbabwe for a long time. 
Although the Zimbabwean conflict that resulted in the establishment of the GNU had started with the 
emergence of the MDC in the year 1999, the fundamental question that has been levelled against the  
SADC bloc is that, ‘Why did SADC intervene in 2008, close to a decade after the beginning of the crisis 
and not before or after?    
6.3 SADC’s timing in the Zimbabwean conflict.   
There were mixed views shared by respondents on whether or not it was the right time for SADC as a 
regional body to intervene in Zimbabwe in the crisis of 2008.  FGD2-4 for instance noted that SADC 
actually delayed in intervening in Zimbabwe considering that the Zimbabwean situation had been an 
agenda item internationally since the creation of the MDC around the year 1999. Accordingly, the 
Zimbabwean crisis had manifested, when one looks at the fact that members of the European Community 
and the United States had imposed sanctions on Zimbabwe over issues of disputed elections and the 
violation of basic human rights by the government of the First Republic especially in the Jambanja 
(chaotic fast-track land resettlement program, coupled with land grabbing and butchering of commercial 
farmers) episodes of the land question.  The respondent felt that it was the time at which SADC as a sub-
regional body would have intervened in Zimbabwe. The sentiments were also shared by FGD1-5 who was 
of the view that there is surely something wrong with the SADC early warning system as the body usually 
intervenes when the situation escalates into a fully blown crisis. As such the respondent stated that SADC 
was not in Zimbabwe at the right time as it should have sorted Zimbabwe’s issues before they got out of 
hand. FGD2-4 similarly said that, the question on why the SADC body delayed and waited for mutually 
hurting stalemate yet signs of disharmony were there since 2000 questions the efficacy of SADC. The fact 
that they instead engaged in informal mediation clearly revealed that Zimbabwe was in a crisis. In as 
much as one may argue that the concept of sovereignty blinkers SADC countries such that they delay in 
taking action in crisis situations, SADC is too reluctant to intervene in crisis situations sometimes.   
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Whereas FGD1-5 argued that SADC delayed its intervention in Zimbabwe, FGD1-6 took a different view 
by saying that SADC was simply a third party in the Zimbabwean crisis and it intervened at the right time 
because the situation had not been ripe for intervention as two of the major political parties ZANU-PF and 
MDC-T were not willing to settle their political differences which had turned into confrontational 
contestations. In support of the views of the FGD1-6, FGD2-4 noted that the SADC bloc intervened at the 
right time and this can be explained using ripeness theory. According to the respondent, “…since there 
was a mutually hurting stalemate for those in power and those aspiring to be in power, they [different 
political parties] had to meet halfway…those with pride had to give in to their pride and those with over 
towering ambitions had to downsize them. The sentiments of the respondent reveal that SADC as a third 
party could not simply intervene in Zimbabwe when the two conflicting parties were not yet ready to 
settle their differences and when the situation had not called for its input. FGD1-5 taking the stance of R1 
aired a view that is totally different from the last views mentioned in the foregoing as he stated that  
SADC’s intervention had nothing to do with the Zimbabwean situation being ripe for intervention, neither 
was it in the Zimbabwean case because both parties had become ready for dialogue. Rather it was in 
Zimbabwe as “…it was forced by the ruling party to do what they wanted…they were used by ZANU-PF 
to fulfil their wishes of solving the crisis in Zimbabwe…” Implied in the analysis is that the SADC bloc 
was only used by ZANU-PF to come to its aid by engaging the MDC-T which had the solutions to  
Zimbabwe’s crisis.  
  
FDG1-1 on the same issue, however, stated that despite the fact the formation of the GNU in Zimbabwe is 
perceivable from various angles, it is worth taking into account the fact that the intervention of SADC 
brought about changes in Zimbabwe entailing that it came at the right time.  The respondent further noted 
that “…we don’t need help when things are okay, SADC came to help solve our problems so they did 
well...It was the right time since they intervened to create the GNU…” In this regard, it is important to 
note that on the question of whether or not, the SADC bloc intervened at the right in the Zimbabwe crisis 
of 2008, three differing views were shared by the respondents. While, there is a belief that SADC delayed 
and intervened in Zimbabwe when the situation had gone out of control, it also was the perception of 
other respondents that SADC being a third party had to wait for two main scenarios. First was the ripeness 
of the conflict, that is, the situation had to reach the level of peak which happened when the bloc 
intervened; and secondly, both parties had to be ready for the dialogue before SADC could intervene. At 
the same time, analysis of the respondents suggest that SADC was simply invited by ZANU-PF to help 
and solve the Zimbabwean crisis through using the MDC. Ultimately one is bound to argue that whether 
or not SADC intervened at the right time in the Zimbabwean situation maybe contentious but its 
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intervention and role which led to the formation of the GPA which created the GNU, brought with it 
changes in the economic and political life of the Zimbabwean state.   
6.4 SADC-mediated GNU as an opportunity to end the political and economic crisis in 
Zimbabwe  
Data that was gathered from the respondents revealed that understanding the rationale behind whether the 
SADC-negotiated GNU provided an opportunity to end the political and economic crises in Zimbabwe 
requires one to examine the rationale behind the formation of the GNU from different perspectives 
particularly the reasons that were behind the involvement of the various parties to the agreement.  There 
was a general consensus that the various players who entered the GNU had selfish interests and as such 
the GNU was used as an opportunity for the players to forward their goals instead of ending the crises that 
had engulfed the state for a long time  
6.4. 1 The GNU as a Transitional Phase   
The GNU in theory provided a break upon which Zimbabwe could have escaped the economic and 
political crisis. Since it was a temporary union of convenience, the assumption was that the economic 
crisis in Zimbabwe was tied to the political crisis that had engulfed Zimbabwe with the establishment of 
the MDC around the early years of the new millennium. With regards to the rationale behind the GNU, 
R1 noted that the GNU was not supposed to last for more than 18 months as fresh elections were 
supposed to be held under the reforms that would have been facilitated by the inclusive government 
especially security sector reform.  As such the rationale behind the establishment of the GNU was for 
various economic, social and security reforms as management of the sectors which was ZANU-PF led had 
made the situation more complex.  Based on the view that ZANU-PF as the party that had ruled 
Zimbabwe for years, created a securocrat state in which state governance was conducted from security 
forces orientation, force was used to suppress all opponents to its rule. Securocrat state, derived from the 
concept of Securocracy is the very antithesis of democracy; ruling without or despite the popular will. A 
securocratic state is one in which the military-security apparatus is a dominant factor in the power 
complex that is the state. In Zimbabwe, this revolves around (but symbolic in that herein lies the centre of 
power) the President, Head of State and Government and Commander-in-Chief of the Defence Forces; 
according to Mandaza and Peterson (2015).  
  
However, the respondent stated that with the way in which the state of affairs were in disarray, the 18 
months became 5 years and during the GNU tenure ZANU-PF muzzled the MDC. Implied in such a 
sentiment is the fact that the MDC parties that were in the GNU played second fiddle to ZANU-PF during 
the tenure of the GNU. It hence can be noted that, the assumption and rationale behind the establishment 
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of the GNU was that it was supposed to act or at least be a transitional government of some sort which 
was supposed to take Zimbabwe out of the economic and political crisis that had affected the country for a 
long time. This was however, the theoretical assumption which could not be reflected during the 
implementation of the GPA even today. Rather, the GNU became a union that was shrouded in power 
politics and rivalry that defeated the rationale behind its creation. The 5 years of the GNU were full of 
serious skirmishing particularly between ZANU-PF and MDC-T but the fights were relegated to a 
nonimportant status due to the fact that the rudimentary services and elements became accessible and 
conditions in Zimbabwe started improving vis-à-vis the 2000-2008 period when Zimbabwe had turned 
from being the ‘bread basket’ of the Southern Africa region to a ‘basket case’ where literally everything 
was in severe shortages.   
  
6.4.2 The unforgotten Political Reality and the inevitable failure of the GNU to end the  
Zimbabwe’s crisis   
Although the central assumption that engulfed the political discourse in 2008 before the signing of the 
GPA that led to the GNU was that the latter would act as a platform upon which Zimbabwe’s crises could 
be ended, the fact that the different parties entered the agreement with different party agenda meant that 
such an assumption would prove difficult to turn into reality. R1 on this noted that whereas the MDC 
sought to create a parallel government along the Prime Minister’s office, the ZANU-PF party sought to 
recover using the GNU platform and the MDC-T tried to gunner relevance using the GNU. In fact, the 
respondent noted that the GNU had no impact on the ZANU-PF military state; instead it recovered as the 
MDC-T had been battered into submission in many aspects (supporters were killed). The respondent 
further noted that there was a coup in 2008, in which Constantino Chiwenga and Emmerson Mnangagwa 
were in control of the state, holding Mugabe and Tsvangirai hostage. On the basis of the GNU, ZANU-PF 
regrouped and looted (diamonds in Marange) mainly because they were not sure if they were going to win 
the 2013 elections. Thus, the GNU should have provided a platform upon which Zimbabwe could have 
escaped the political and economic crises that had haunted the country for a long time but the need to end 
the crises was superseded by political party interests. This hence truncated all the possible chances that 
the GNU provided or could have provided to end the Zimbabwean situation.  The respondent further 
noted that Robert Mugabe had given in to defeat but there was a military takeover of the government. The 
sentiments of R1 were also similar to the views of R5 who noted that Mugabe was pressured into a GNU 
by his security sector associates (they could not let go). The respondent further noted that:   
   
…the Kenyan example set precedence as a way of diffusing political interests, meant to achieve 
relative peace (soft landing). In Zimbabwe it allowed for breathing space for all parties involved.  
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ZANU-PF was adamant, couldn’t relinquish power, and had a sense of entitlement, liberation 
party concept within the SADC region. MDC T was on its own with little pockets of support from 
some SADC states like Botswana. It had won the election, had an upper hand in negotiation but 
had been battered and bruised (murder, displacement of supporters…  
  
The perspective of the respondent reveal that the playing field was not level for the two major parties that 
were in the GNU before they joined hands to form one government such that the MDC-T party that had 
won elections had little support from the region. The respondent further questioned the GNU in the 
Zimbabwean context noting that although the African union (AU) mandated SADC at the June 30 
Summit to intervene [in Zimbabwe] mainly because Zimbabwe had become a liability within the region 
with economic immigrants all over; and internally there were socio-economic and political dynamics at 
play; election dispute, SADC observer mission report, economic meltdown and social crisis in the form of 
cholera outbreak among others; the GNU was wrongly orchestrated.  Accordingly, the GNU was formed 
against the background of mistrust of MDC takeover of government since it had ‘won’ elections. (None of 
the mediators made reference to the MDC victory). On the other hand, as has been noted in the foregoing, 
R1 was of the view that the MDC sought to create a parallel government along the Prime  
Minister’s office. In this sense, the MDC-T entered the GNU with the objective of changing the status quo 
of the securocratic nature of the ZANU-PF led government that had been established by the regime of the 
First Republic. Ending the political and economic crisis on this basis played second fiddle to the need to 
limit ZANU-PF’s power for future purposes. In fact, FGD2-4 stated that:  
  
…there is no free dinner in politics and actions are pursued in the name of maximizing interests. 
The MDC-T entered the GNU bearing in mind past experiences in which they were literally 
butchered or beaten or where physical force was used against them by the ZANU-PF 
regime…they joined hands with their rivalries who had tortured them, killed some of their 
members, conducted massive abductions and oppressed their supporters with the need to change 
such a set up so that it would work for their benefit…One has to question why there was so much 
noise over various ministerial posts such as the Ministry of Home Affairs in which the police 
force is under and the Ministry of Defence …The party entered the agreement with the hope that 
they would transform the status quo and have an equal advantage in the elections that were to 
follow…  
  
Derivable from the analysis of the respondent is the fact that the GNU could not possibly have served as 
platform upon which Zimbabwe’s crises could have ended because the MDC-T had the objective of 
limiting the powers of ZANU-PF for futuristic purposes. Again it was noted that the GNU could not, from 
a practical point of view, be a platform upon which they could have ended the Zimbabwe crisis because 
the other opposition in Zimbabwe, MDC M had personality issues with MDC T and since it was the 
‘lucky’ party to be in the GNU, it aimed to gain relevance. According to R5, the party was to gain a lot 
because it was not so relevant. The theoretical assumption behind the GNU hence blinkered those who 
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were outside the political space in Zimbabwe such that the political reality of the pursuit of party interests 
was flouted in the context of the GNU. In this regard, it is the political reality that made the GNU in 
Zimbabwe a theoretical and yet not practical opportunity upon which the political and economic crisis 
that is manifest in the Second Republic could have ended. The pursuit of party interest in the GNU was 
inevitable considering that the union was of convenience due to the mutually hurting stalemate as noted in 
the foregoing.  
6.4.3 Political parties Inequality and its effect on a lasting solution to the Zimbabwe crisis 
The wretched but verity of politicking in Africa is that in most instances, the seasoned political parties 
usually revolutionary parties, continually use various measures to gunner or retain power. Such a notion 
was captured in the various sentiments that were gathered on political party inequality and the negative 
consequences of to the GNU as the lasting solution to Zimbabwe’s crises.  A retrospection of the GNU in 
Zimbabwe and the reality of the politicking that infused the 5 year period obliges one to argue that it was 
created on the basis of idealism yet it was expected to deal with realists who entered into the agreement 
not just because of the need to pursue party interest but also coming from different backgrounds. The fact 
that ZANU-PF as a political party had been in politics for a long time placed it at a greater advantage than 
the MDC-T and MDC-M. This was also coupled by the reality that ZANU-PF had the support of the 
SADC bloc, the African Union and controlled all state apparatus in Zimbabwe. In this regard, the 
negotiation table appeared to favour ZANU-PF at the expense of the other two political parties. R5 on this 
was of the view that ZANU-PF as a party understood statecraft, it knew how to negotiate for power, 
whereas, both MDC groups had inexperienced people trying to negotiate for power. As such the 
negotiations were unbalanced and the parties wrestled for power implying that they were not ready for a 
transformation of the Zimbabwean society. One can note that based on the narratives of R5, it is difficult 
not to argue that the GNU became a wrangle for power instead of being an opportunity upon which 
Zimbabwe could have escaped the political and economic shell of woes.   
  
In the same way, R1 noted that Thabo Mbeki has and had an African National Congress (ANC) 
background which is the revolutionary party in South Africa just like ZANU-PF in Zimbabwe. The 
respondent noted that on the basis it would not be erroneous to argue that Mbeki was biased towards 
ZANU-PF. The belief that revolutionaries act and behave like brothers is perceived to have been 
superseded by the need to change the Zimbabwean situation from a neutral venue. On this point, R5 even 
mentioned that MDC had problems with the facilitator (Mbeki) who was biased. At the same time ZANU-
PF had an added advantage since Mugabe was still treated as Head of State and Government as such 
ZANU-PF controlled the state more. MDC was at an advantage for having the majority in parliament. 
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MDC held council meetings where resolutions were made on dragging Mugabe to the negotiating table 
(saw Mugabe and ZANU-PF as both part of the problem and of the solution). Although the MDC-T knew 
that they had won elections in the March 2008 election, the fact that ZANU-PF remained in control of the 
state unleashing a reign of terror on the party towards the June Run-off election implies that dethroning 
ZANU-PF from power was a mission impossible hence dragging Mugabe to the negotiating table was the 
only possible and most feasible solution at the time.    
  
During the time of the GNU the rationale behind each party’s position manifested in the form of unending 
clashes which according to the respondent were a result of the fact that ZANU-PF did not acknowledge 
the sharing of power that was created in the GPA. As a party, ZANU-PF did not change its mentality that 
it was now a government based on combined efforts from different political parties.  As such instead of 
ending the political and economic crisis in Zimbabwe, the GNU became a field in which the political 
differences of the political parties became manifest for instance the renewal of the Police Commissioner’s 
contract was done by Mugabe, unilaterally despite having said to the power partners they would not 
renew (R5). There was complete disregard for the existence of another party in government by ZANU-PF 
and the MDC-T retaliated by bombarding the actions of ZANU-PF that made the GNU a contested space 
which could not serve as the platform upon which Zimbabwe’s crisis could have ended.  
  
The wrangle appeared to have between ZANU-PF and the MDC-T party as the MDC-M party acted as if 
it was given an ‘observer-status’ by the SADC mediator, Thabo Mbeki. The MDC-M was basically a 
nonentity in the GNU as its roles and actions appeared very limited. FGD2-1 on this noted that the 
inclusive government clocked up their five years with the status of deputy Prime Minister Arthur 
Mutambara in the Government of National Unity (GNU) as not just disruptive as it was relegated to 
nonexistence which led many to argue that his deputy premiership is seen as an accident of history. His 
aim accordingly was to raise the standards of his party.   One thing that is however derivable from the 
analysis was that the political parties had a hierarchy in Zimbabwe’s GNU which acted as hurdle to the 
chances of Zimbabwe escaping the Hobbesian nightmare which is now the order of the day 10 years after 
the establishment of the GNU. It was also revealed that during the negotiations, the MDC mooted the idea 
of having Mugabe and Tsvangirai addressing rallies together but it was rejected and the MDC just decided 
to have access to spheres that were out of reach by getting into the GNU. The acceptance by the MDC-T 
to join the GNU according to R5 can be depicted from the fact that the party wanted to experience the 
notion that comes with being in government in preparation for the future. Ultimately, because the political 
parties in the GNU were on unequal ground, the end result was that the GNU failed to serve as a platform 
which could have resolved Zimbabwe’s unending conflict.  
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6.4.4 Defection and the GNU in Zimbabwe   
For R6, the GNU was not a government that could have ended Zimbabwe’s crisis because the sides did 
not necessarily share the same vision. They had competing visions. The MDC-T had the objective to 
serve while ZANU-PF wanted consolidation of power. On this basis because ZANU-PF tried to 
consolidate power through the frustration of MDC and subverting clauses that were stipulated in the GPA, 
the GNU led to the MDC losing focus at party level resulting in them being swallowed (defection). What 
can be derived from the sentiments of the respondent is that ZANU-PF were the defectors as they 
abandoned the doctrine of the GPA which was supposed to bind them. The MDC was frustrated and lost 
all its focus. The respondent further noted that any GNU would not produce a lasting solution and 
ZANUPF understood that defection is possible if people are not principled and they used it to their 
advantage. The aura that was there was pierced through, MDC was individualized and weakened. 
Members of the party lost focus and turned into career politicians who aimed to at least get something out 
of the GNU flouting the fact that, it was supposed to act as a transitionary government in a bid to end the 
economic and political crisis that had ravaged Zimbabwe for a long time.  
  
On this basis, the GNU was bound to fail to provide a lasting solution to Zimbabwe’s crisis. The 
sentiments of the respondent resonated with the views that were aired out by FGD2-5 who noted that 
parties to a contract fail to meet and observe contractual obligations especially in the political fray unless 
there is a constant reminder of the objective behind a certain covenant. The respondent acknowledged that 
the reasons as to why political parties entered into a GNU included the fact that people were tired; some 
were given inducements - naivety to the extent that they thought most people were of principle and will 
hold on to the original ideals and vision of the party. At the same time, there were also political reasons to 
help the suffering masses. Eventually, the reasons to entering the GNU for the MDC-T party were 
justified but ZANU party played its cards well by frustrating the MDC-T and the latter ended up losing all 
its focus and vision.    
  
As was noted by R6, in the early tenure of the GNU, there was less corruption and there was genuine 
openness. However, when people defected, it started being closed and shrouded in mystery. The 
respondent further noted that there was need to separate constitutional power and duties with personal 
power and duties of the principals, when looking at Zimbabwean GNU. Constitutionally, the powers and 
duties of the President and Prime Minister were distinct and defined well although they were open to use 
and abuse. In terms of personal power and duties Tsvangirai was weaker than Mugabe irrespective of 
what the Constitution spelt out. This therefore meant that the MDC-T party was vulnerable in the GNU 
and the lost the vision that had inclined them to join the GNU. Implied in the analysis of the respondent is 
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the notion that the MDC-T party was frustrated during the implementation phase of the GNU, a move that 
was well calculated by ZANU-PF in order to distract the vision and efficacy of the party. As a result, the 
MDC-T focused more on fighting ZANU-PF and trying to limit and correct the errors of the party which 
hence affected the whole essence that led to the establishment of the GNU in Zimbabwe. The GNU was 
therefore created to serve a purpose as a transitionary government that was supposed to take Zimbabwe to 
a new dawn. The creation of the GNU was concealed with a lot of secret talks in which the general public 
in Zimbabwe was not only unaware of but did not largely participate in despite the fact the outcome was 
going to directly affect them. FGD1-2 noted that the most baffling debacle of the GNU formation in 
Zimbabwe was that the people voted but the entire process of voting was a waste of time and the 
resources were simply wasted because the political elites decided the outcome of the governance 
structures after the 2008 election. The respondent seemed to suggest that the GNU and the entire process 
of its establishment was an insult to the Zimbabwean people who basically voted and brought all their 
activities to a halt only for the votes to be rendered invalid by the creation of the GNU. In this way, 
various respondents were asked to comment on whether or not the GNU was a product of en masse 
consultations.   
6.5 Consultations prior and the implementation of the GNU    
The general public holds a vital stake in the governance of the modern state. On the basis of the fact that, 
the powers over governance of the contemporary state should be derived from the people simply implies 
that the participation of the general public in the overall decisions making process of the state is central.   
FGD2-3 on this point noted that though in the process towards the GNU, no consultations were made with 
the general populace, there were few cases of implementation consultation, the notable one being 
consultations done around constitutional referendums. FGD1-3 on the same point asserted that there was 
no consultation that was done in the formation and implementation of the GNU.  The respondent further 
highlighted that, “...it was a forced marriage of political parties…they were forced to unite…grassroots 
were not consulted since it was a crisis… The same sentiments were also shared by FGD2-6 who was of 
the view that:   
  
In as much as it has to be acknowledged that Zimbabwe being a ‘democratic society’, people 
should have been consulted for the reason that the policies, programs, that were to be 
implemented under the GPA were not only going to affect the people concerned but the whole 
set-up was supposed to reflect the best interests of the people. However, people were not involved 
because in the year 2008, “…people were fighting along political lines…it was an elite affair 
otherwise it was going to be something else had they involved the people… there was no 
consultation because of time, the matter required a solution urgently so it was going to take time 
to consult people on what their respective parties should do…  
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It can be noted that during its tenure (time of the GNU) there was no involvement of the general people, 
R5 also supported the claims that the GNU was a product of elite drive motive as the respondent stated 
that political elites (MDC-T) and even the SADC bloc did not consult the people because they did not 
want the MDC to have power over ZANU-PF. Consultation could have derailed progress of restoring  
ZANU-PF’s power and legitimacy.  R5 mentioned that there was a disconnection between leaders and 
supporters particularly from civil society. All top officials had been in government, leaving the party to 
suffer, leaders became arrogant and ignored their structures. The MDC-T for instance believed that the 
people will reward them for the work done whilst in government but the assumption proved to be 
unrealistic after the 2013 election as ZANU-PF won resoundingly.  The respondent further highlighted 
that for ZANU-PF, they aimed at bringing the MDC-T closer and give them a chance to work for them.  
Accordingly, the MDC-T was ‘used’ in the process to clean up the mess that had been created by 
ZANUPF while the latter was getting breathing space to restrategise while focusing on the 2013 election.  
Accordingly, it was just a union of the elites that battled for power and the people were never consulted.  
  
The analysis of R5 points to the fact that the MDC-T and ZANU-PF had different visions in the GNU in 
practice. While, the former worked tirelessly in good faith, the latter entered the government with an eye 
on the 2013 election where they simply wanted to return to their unimpeded power and governance of the 
Zimbabwean state.  In the process of the GNU henceforth, the ZANU-PF strengthened its party as they 
breathed and mobilized their supporters. In this period the respondent emphasised that as way of 
preparing for the 2013 election, there was a militarization of ZANU-PF as a party. All the chronicles of 
the political parties were done at a party level and with the government without the involvement of the 
general public.   
  
On the same issue, R3 stated that the GNU had multiple interests and multiple actors at play but had 
politically defined interests. It hence became a political process by political actors only. The process thus 
alienated civil society. According to the respondent the fact that the MDC was born out of civil society, 
should have at least obliged it to consult civil society organisations but the entire process prior and even 
in the implementation of the GPA became an elite set up that had no involvement of the masses. 
Although, FGD2-6 noted that there was no time for consultation, R3 on the historiographical development 
of the establishment of the GNU in Zimbabwe stated that, April-June 2008 saw the intensification of 
negotiations which had started in March 2007, triggered by the Build Zimbabwe Alliance prayer meeting 
disturbances where MDC leaders were severally beaten up (SADC intervention). The agreement was 
signed in September 2008.  The fact was that SADC convened a meeting where Zimbabwe featured 
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highly but political parties never made an effort to engage their supporters or followers. The respondent 
further noted that the pre-election process involved civic actors especially advocacy at SADC and Organ 
meetings but during the GPA negotiation, civil society was deliberately side-lined (negotiating in secret).   
  
There was the strategic alienation of civil society as the civil society was seen as organisations that were 
highly inclined towards the MDC-T. FGD2-5 with regards to civil society and the strategic flouting of 
them in the entire process that led to the establishment of the GNU stated that the 3rd generation of civil 
society organisations in Zimbabwe which advocated for human rights had objectives that resonated with 
the MDC ideology which is deeply rooted in the democratic philosophies. According to the respondent 
civil society was hence perceived as nemeses of ZANU-PF and as associates of the MDC which could 
have possibly compromised the entire GNU debacles had they been consulted.  R6 however, noted that 
the MDC consulted the standing Committee, National Executive and National Council on whether or not 
the party should get into talks with ZANU-PF. After agreeing on the GPA terms, the party informed 
supporters who also witnessed the signing of the GPA. Overally as was noted by R3, the GNU was an 
elite settlement or coalition, the grassroots did not participate as no party was keen on involving the 
people. In fact, the framework that Mbeki came up with was for fewer negotiators for the better of the 
negotiations outcome (ZANU-PF had an idea- the less people get involved the better. ZANU-PF roped in 
the military intelligence secretly and CIO, gathering general population’s views. Civil society was 
regarded as spoilers the MDC and Tsvangirai agreed to underutilize their leverage, it remains a mystery as 
to why). The MDC was bought into the hook-line and sunk. Although R1 stated that the GNU allowed 
losers to remain in power through the back door and its formation was out of internal pressure for 
Tsvangirai to sign the GPA, pressure from ordinary people who were suffering, the economy was self-
dollarizing, he sought relevance as well, there was pressure from SADC and also self-ambition pushed 
him; the general populace was not consulted overally.   
6.6 Successes of the GNU in Zimbabwe for ZANU-PF   
Although, a few respondents noted that the GNU that was created in Zimbabwe achieved successes, there 
were some respondents who noted that the GNU in Zimbabwe was not a success. At the same time as 
noted by R7 the successes of the GNU are very subjective because stakeholders that went into the 
agreement particularly political parties formed the covenant with the objective of achieving party goals. 
As such in as much as the GPA defined and clearly stated that goals of the establishment of the GNU, the 
three main political parties to the agreement had their party objectives. R5 on the same noted that it is 
plausible to examine the GNU’s success in terms of its achievements vis-à-vis why it was created.   
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6.6.1 The political party matrix of the GNU   
R1 from the onset dismissed the question on successes of the GNU in that the respondent stated that that 
GNUs work if actors negotiate in good faith and in Zimbabwe it would have provided a solution to the 
problems that were being faced. However, ZANU-PF was not doing it in good faith, they were hoping for 
a repeat of 1987 where they swallowed PF ZAPU. The respondent was of the view that the GNU was not 
established in good faith such that every clause that was in the GPA was agreed upon but ZANU-PF knew 
that it was not going to follow some of them. On this basis the GNU was not a success for Zimbabwe as a 
state but the ZANU-PF party. R3 supporting such sentiments noted that for ZANU-PF it was a resounding 
success (not in terms of performance) since they took it as a mechanism to give themselves breathing 
space to recover. Thus, the respondent further stated that:  
  
Since electoral defeat in parliamentary and presidential elections was painful for ZANU-PF, they 
managed to keep the main price, the presidency and used it to recover from all lost parts, 
ZANUPF managed to strengthen their party in terms of its grassroots reach and accumulation of 
resources in preparation for the 2013 elections. The GNU saved ZANU-PF from collapse and 
repaired the damage that had been done, asymmetry of power became more pronounced 
(allocation of governors, security sector reform, security council not implemented, military 
pronouncing they would not salute a sellout). ZANU-PF was not bound by such precepts, 
guarantors had no will power to compel ZANU-PF to comply. The MDC hoped for their 
performance to translate into votes but that didn’t happen…SADC in its wisdom felt that 
Zimbabwe was not ready for election in 2013 and advised against holding them but the MDC 
argued for elections thinking that their performance would be rated in the ballot box but that did 
not happen ZANU-PF cannot resist rigging, they plugged all loopholes and the MDC lost because 
they deserved to lose.  
  
Implied in the analysis of the respondent is the notion that the GNU was the restoration podium of power 
for ZANU-PF in Zimbabwe as the party had succumbed to a defeat in the parliamentary and presidential 
elections of March 2008. The party hence managed to strengthen its power and used the period of 
temporary economic recovery to accumulate funds which they used for the 2013 election campaign. The 
respondent seemed to suggest that the MDC-T having participated in the GNU where they played a vital 
role in the social and economic changes that took place in Zimbabwe became confident that an election 
was necessary. At the same time, the MDC-T was longing to end its partnership of convenience with 
ZANU-PF because the latter remained powerful and frustrated the former. In this regard, having 
recovered, ZANU-PF consolidated its power and access to state resources, including the major state 
institutions which led to its 2013 resounding victory.   
  
On the other hand, besides losing the 2013 election, the MDC party greatly became irrelevant to 
governance in Zimbabwe. R3 hence stated that the GNU simply destroyed party’s structures, the party 
disintegrated and did not recover until the death of Morgan Tsvangirai. (Still weak organizationally up to 
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this day despite having a good leader). In as much as the MDC demonstrated that they could deliver as a 
rehearsal of governance, the party was discredited by neglecting the party’s norms and values as the party 
even moved to government building and out of Harvest House. The respondent even noted that all party 
leaders were given government posts and they got busy in government and lost focus on the party.    
  
The GNU was hence a success for the ZANU-PF project as the MDC was dismantled and instead of 
rebuilding, they ignored and focused on government such that in 2013 they were at their weakest. In the 
same vein, R4 stated that the heavy-duty ministries were grabbed by ZANU-PF, (Defence and Home 
Affairs), organizational capacity that was there before the reign of terror was intensified during the GNU 
and surveys held in 2012 pre-election (2013) showed that ZANU-PF was stronger than MDC. MDC 
ignored calls to action by dismissing scientific evidence pointing to their weakness. It can be noted that 
the GNU’s success can be viewed from the perspective of the two political parties MDC-T and ZANU-PF 
and data gathered in the field suggest that both parties entered the GNU with the role of attempting to 
fulfil party objectives. On this basis, ZANU-PF was able to outweigh the MDC-T party and since then 
they have regained control of over the governance of the state of Zimbabwe. However, in terms of what 
the GNU was created for especially issues of economic recovery, sanctions issues, the land question, the 
creation of a new constitution, equity and justice, security of persons and prevention of violence and 
human rights related and food security issues, the GNU managed to achieve a bit of success.   
6.6.2 The GNU and the Zimbabwean Society   
The period prior to the establishment of the GNU, Zimbabwe was an apt depiction of a primitive political 
society in which physical confrontations infused the political space of the state of Zimbabwe. The 
Zimbabwean community was divided on party lines such that it was terribly difficult for members of 
different political parties to relate peacefully. However, R3 noted that with the GNU there is a difference 
in terms of how people relate now. The period of the GNU ended the physical and even the hate speech 
that affected the Zimbabwean society which was based on party lines and inclinations.  This therefore can 
be cited as a long-term success of the GNU.   
  
On the successes of the GNU, R3 stated that the GNU managed to improve livelihood and standard of 
living for the people. The respondent viewed it as a golden age which explains the nostalgia for GNU at 
the moment (2019). The nation saw the benefits of political parties appearing to be working together 
although there were conflicts and power struggles, the GNU never collapsed but managed to achieve more 
than both had achieved and could achieve alone. Even FGD2-3 stated that the GNU was a success 
because the period between 2009 and 2013 registered economic and political development, inflation 
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declined; economic improvement, politically there was the introduction of dialogue. In this way, political 
parties working as a unit yielded good results.  R5 noted that the GNU was a better devil than what is 
there now. FGD2-4 noted that the “…GNU was successful in restoring sanity though it was successful for 
a given period, after that the 2008 situation returned…” The respondent further stated that ZANU-PF 
agreed to some things that they did not want knowing well that on implementation they would act 
otherwise. The respondent however, stated that the GNU managed to stabilise the situation in Zimbabwe, 
politically, economically and laid groundwork for re-engagement with the international community. On 
security sector reforms the GNU did little to change the partisan elements within the civil servants 
particularly the uniformed forces leaders who remained loyal to ZANU-PF.   
  
R4 also noted that the GNU was done out of regional interest to solve the Zimbabwe crises, but it was 
disappointing except for a few individuals such as Tendai Biti who did well as Finance Minister. The 
respondent stated that “…ministerial title didn’t mean much for opposition ministers since ZANU-PF 
policies and executive powers were implemented…constitutional Affairs minister had an empty title as 
they never practiced anything…The long-term effects of the GNU are still being felt now…the legacy 
disappeared. The GNU’s effects can be analysed vis-à-vis the current situation in Zimbabwe as it was 
supposed to change the status-quo in Zimbabwe. However, the current Zimbabwe situation is a 
manifestation of the failure of the GNU.   
  
R3 also noted that under the GNU things stabilized and improved but now the situation has gone back to 
what it was then with ZANU-PF in control, harassing any opposition, the GNU did not achieve much. 
Furthermore, the MDC suffered political damage, giving up principles in the GNU and had their values 
eroded. Junior parties always suffer in such a scenario (Britain, Germany). It has to be noted that, R7 even 
noted that in the implementation of the GNU, ZANU-PF pretty much remained the same, being dominant. 
Accordingly, although, the GNU managed to produce a new constitution which departed from the 
Lancaster House Constitution due to SADC pressure, the new Constitution (6Yrs old) is in place but the 
human rights situation does not recognise that. Approximately 10 years after the establishment of the 
GNU which was supposed to bring about long lasting changes in Zimbabwe, the human rights situation 
looks decidedly bleak with serious and massive unnecessary abductions at the peak in a new dispensation 
under the banner of the Second Republic. In as much as the GPA contains all the conditions that are 
required to restore Zimbabwe, it was affected by political issues which made the GPA difficult to 
implement, particularly the reform of the security sector which has had implications up to this day as 
noted above. As noted by R7 in the current times, power hungry individuals have now swayed the ship off 
the course and only negotiations can resolve the current crisis. Zimbabwe has thus been at the centre of 
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international news since 2018 as the regime of the Second Republic that has been using force to thwart 
political opponents of the state as noted in the August 1, 2018 shooting in Harare and the massive human 
rights violations that have been spearheaded by the Zimbabwe National Army.   
  
Regarding why the GNU failed to bear positive long lasting results to the state of Zimbabwe R7 stated 
that the terms of the GNU, spelt out in the GPA should have been stricter on; freeness and fairness of 
elections, access to media and information, human rights abuse but that was not the situation which hence 
rendered it a failure. FGD1-1 noted that the GNU was a failure because there was no trust between the 
parties that were parties to it. In fact, the respondent noted that:  
  
 …it was a trial which was short-lived which helped politicians enjoy the benefits of being there, 
but it did not help the general people...parties didn’t click they were all geared towards trying to 
serve their own party interests, blame game was at play and mistrust reigned supreme … parties 
pretended to be together because disagreements remained and MDC was not in the limelight at 
all, they appeared more to be competing…  
  
On this basis, it is plausible to note that the GNU was shrouded with the blame game besides the fact that 
parties to the agreement benefited from the covenant at the expense of the general populace. The 
sentiments that were shared above reveal that although the GNU came with benefits, they were shortlived 
and a continuation of the old system or way of governance is still manifest in Zimbabwe. There was a 
general agreement among respondents that the current Zimbabwean situation is almost similar to the 2008 
situation where basic commodities are slowly becoming out of reach for many. This to an extent reveals 
that the way in which the Zimbabwean GNU was created and the way in which it was implemented did 
not provide an opportunity for Zimbabwe as a state to evade the political and economic crisis which is at 
its peak in less than a decade after the GNU ended.   
6.7 Success of SADC-Mediated Process   
The successes of the SADC-mediated process were called into question during the various interviews and 
FGDs that were conducted by the researcher. As has been mentioned in the foregoing, the fact that there 
were respondents who argued that SADC took a stance that was inclined to ZANU-PF greatly affects the 
credibility of the SADC mediated process. However, it needs to be appreciated that the SADC-mediated 
process resulted in the creation of a GPA and a government of national unity in Zimbabwe. As noted by 
FGD2-6, despite that fact there were various interests of political parties that were at stake in the 
implementation of the GNU, the SADC bloc managed to bring together rivalries who had engaged in 
confrontational contestations for a decade. The political space in Zimbabwe was generally infused by 
serious fighting between the two main political parties that is ZANU-PF and MDC, a scenario that started 
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at the top tiers of the political parties’ structures and went down to the grassroots. The rivalries conveyed 
and managed to negotiate a settlement that brought about sanity in Zimbabwe.    
  
Such sentiments were supported by FGD2-4 who narrated that the fact.  FGD1-1 noted that the mere fact 
that the ruling party engaged with the opposition to come up with an inclusive government is apt portrayal 
of the fact that the SADC mediated process was a success. SADC through Thabo Mbeki helped parties to 
relate despite a history of serious rivalry. In the same vein it was also noted that the mediated process was 
successful because things went well, the opposition was not causing chaos, and there was development in 
the nation (FGD1-5). FGD1-3 buttressed such thoughts by observing that the settlement was worth it as 
“…prices went down, shortage of commodities was resolved, USD introduction stabilized prices, there 
were no dissenting voices since all parties were in government, there was relative peace…” FGD2-2 on 
this stated that the process was a success as problems were resolved that engulfed Zimbabwe such as 
affordability and shortage of goods, the health situation improved because of the SADC initiative.  
However, there are other respondents who noted that the SADC mediated process was a temporary 
solution, which was for a period too short as 2019 has signaled the return of the year 2008 and its related 
crisis. At the same time, there was a general consensus among the respondents that SADC did not manage 
to balance the interests of political parties that participated in the GNU. FGD2-1 noted that ZANU-PF and 
MDC were fighting over ministries like Home Affairs, Finance and Foreign Affairs and the MDC settled 
for less. It was noted by R1 that the GNU was based on presidential run off and not the March 2008 
election which therefore calls into question the SADC mediation process.    
  
It is plausible to accept that the GNU in Zimbabwe which was a product of the SADC-mediated process 
brought about changes in the Zimbabwe state. However, the changes were short-lived in most instances as 
the political parties entered into the agreement with serious intentions to fulfil their party ambitions. From 
a theoretical point of view, the GNU provided an opportunity upon which Zimbabwe could have ended 
the political and economic crises that had engulfed the state for a decade or so and continue to exist up to 
this day. However, power ball politics in the implementation phase of the GNU rendered such a noble 
assumption utopian. With the level of power politics and pursuit of party interest that imbued the GNU in 
Zimbabwe, the GNU could not possibly have been an opportunity upon which Zimbabwe could have 
escaped the political and economic crisis which has robustly manifested itself with the coming in of the 
Second Republic under the guidance of Emmerson Mnangagwa.  
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6.8 Conclusion   
The chapter was a presentation of first-hand information that was gathered from interviews and focus 
group discussions. The rationale behind the chapter was the need to explore the GNU in Zimbabwe in 
terms of its successes, the successes of the SADC mediated process that led to its formation and the extent 
to which the GNU provided a platform or opportunity upon which Zimbabwe’s political and economic 
crisis could have ended. The chapter initially focused on respondents’ views of the concept of the GNU 
and it was noted that the GNU is simply a concept that involves the union of political parties in the 
administration of the state. In the Zimbabwean context, there was a general consensus that the GNU was a 
union of convenience that was imbued with party interests which not only defeated the purpose behind its 
creation but rendered it useless as a lasting solution to the need of the Zimbabwean state in terms of 
ending the political and economic crisis of the state. Although, the SADC-mediated process was 
considered a success in that it managed to create the GNU, the purported reasons of the SADC and even 
of the mediator and their relations with ZANU-PF at the time affected the principle of good faith which 
was supposed to be the basis of the formation of the GNU. Rather from the onset, the GNU was skewed 
towards ZANU-PF, which the party used not only to retain power but also to pursue power in the 2013 
elections. The MDC-T hence ended up fighting for its survival in the GNU and the MDC-M was a 
nonentity. Ultimately, the GNU in Zimbabwe had challenges from its onset and it could practically not be 
a platform that was meant to save Zimbabwe from the crises of the time, a notion that was captured in 
some of theoretical assumptions that led to its formation.   
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CHAPTER SEVEN  
SUCCESSES AND FAILURES OF THE GOVERNMENT OF NATIONAL UNITY IN 
ZIMBABWE  
  
7.1 Introduction   
Approximately a decade ago, the Government of National Unity (GNU) was set up in Zimbabwe based on 
the Global Political Agreement (GPA). As an agreement that was occasioned by inconclusive elections 
which had seen President Robert Mugabe being defeated by Morgan Tsvangirai and Zimbabwe African 
National Union Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF) losing its parliamentary majority to the two Movement for 
Democratic Change (MDC) formations, the historic GNU in the country and its implementation 
framework experienced successes and failures. Although the GNU in Zimbabwe experienced successes in 
its initial stages where it attained economic success, social stability and some sense of political tolerance 
in Zimbabwe; it also experienced failures that have continued to impact on the state of Zimbabwe, 6 years 
after its end. The measurement of the successes and failures of the GNU are best explicable using the 
framework that created the GNU, which is the GPA. The latter focused on various critical areas which 
included the restoration of economic stability and growth; sanctions and measures; the land question; the 
constitution; the promotion of equality, national healing, cohesion and unity; issues of external 
interference; free political activity; issues of the rule of law, respect for the constitution and other laws; 
freedom of assembly and association; state organs and institutions; traditional leaders; national youth 
training; humanitarian and food assistance,  legislative agenda priorities; security of persons and freedom 
of expression and communication among others. Consequently, the following chapter focuses on the 
successes and failures of the GNU in Zimbabwe by examining and analysing the implementation phase of 
the GPA. The chapter is based on first-hand information and secondary information as there exists a broad 
swathe of literature on the successes and failures of the GNU in Zimbabwe.    
7.2 Successes of the GNU in Zimbabwe  
Subsequent to a prolonged political and economic crisis that impacted the human securitization of 
Zimbabweans, the three main political parties; ZANU-PF and the two MDC formations entered into an 
agreement that aimed at ending the Zimbabwean crises. As compromise that was SADC-mediated 
compromise the GNU set up objectives that were meant to change the status quo in Zimbabwe. 
Commenting on the GNU objectives R6, noted that the GNU had at the minimum three objectives which 
were:    
i. To at least ease hostilities among the political rivalries especially the ZANU-PF party and the  
MDC-T  
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ii. Rescue the deteriorating situation, and;  
iii. Ensure magnificent long term political and economic changes in Zimbabwe   
Accordingly, the GNU hence aimed at attaining all the other objectives from the lenses of the three 
objectives raised above. In this regard, the successes of the GNU are hence measured against its 
foundation objectives. It needs to be appreciated that as noted by Dodo et al (2012) the relationship was 
expected to last for not more than 24 months during which period, a new constitution would have been 
written before another election was held. However, the GNU lasted for approximately 48 months. In the 
process it managed to achieve various successes socially, economically and politically which were tagged 
the immediate term, short-term and long-term labels by some respondents in the research. R4 for instance 
noted that the GNU attained its immediate term, short-term, long-term successes that are or were based on 
observations and various statistics that were realised by organisations such as the World Bank, the 
International Monetary Fund and even the Ministry of Finance which was led by Tendai Biti.    
  
The following sections hence discusses the various successes of the GNU in Zimbabwe and it is based on 
the notions, perspectives, standpoints and views of several respondents who participated in the research. 
In the analysis, the researcher also presents the variations on certain points as they were considered a 
success by some respondents and at the same time, some respondents perceived them as failures. The 
information is also buttressed with literature as there is exist a lot of literature on the successes of the 
GNU in Zimbabwe.    
7.2.1 The GNU, Zimbabwe’s political turmoil and the hope for democracy  
Perhaps the most discernible achievements of the GNU immediately after its formation was the end of the 
political turmoil that had lasted for decades. Since the formation of the MDC in the late 1990s, the 
political space in Zimbabwe had been infused with serious confrontational contestations between the 
MDC members and ZANU-PF members, from the grassroots to the top tiers of the party structures. On 
the successes of the GNU in terms of ending the political turmoil in Zimbabwe, R4 noted that, “…the 
GNU came with a form of tolerance as rivalries agreed to sit and talk about their differences. It hence 
calmed the situation…” Such an observation was also made by R6 who noted that before the GNU, 
especially after two decades of independence in Zimbabwe, the political environment in Zimbabwe was 
saturated with mayhem with the ZANU-PF party using all necessary measures at its disposal to silence 
the MDC members, with the latter retaliating in some instances. It can be observed from the two different 
but related viewpoints raised above that the GNU brought an immediate end to the political disorder that 
was in Zimbabwe at the time. After years of fighting, with the GNU came some form of political 
tolerance.   
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At the same note FGD1-3 commenting on the successes of the GNU in Zimbabwe in terms of ending the 
political turmoil and occasioning feelings and an environment of political tolerance noted that:  
  
 …it will be far-fetched for a discussion on the successes and failures of the GNU not to look at 
the fact that it brought an end to political turmoil in Zimbabwe…Look, before the GNU, 
Zimbabwe had undergone a series of serious political fights even before the formation of the 
MDC…Zimbabwe attempted to embark on a one party-state project like most African countries 
and the ZANU-PF party used forms of violence and cruelty to silence and end opposition….The 
discourse of political intolerance continued but became worse after the formation of the  
MDC…An apt portrayal of the extent to which there was a serious rift between ZANU-PF and  
MDC can be observed in the 2004 Brawl in the Parliament of Zimbabwe between the late former  
Movement for Democratic Change Treasurer Roy Bennett and the former Justice Minister Patrick 
Chinamasa during a debate on proposed amendments to the country’s stock-theft laws…The 
political space was occupied with hate speech, speeches that fuelled intolerance but credit must 
be given to the GNU for changing such levels of political parochialism in Zimbabwe.   
  
Consequently, what is derivable from the views of FGD1-3 is that the GNU ended political mayhem in 
Zimbabwe which even witnessed a physical fight in parliament in 2004. In this regard, on the successes of 
the GNU is that it brought together political players that had a long history of rivalry. On the levels of 
political tolerance that were occasioned by the GNU, R5 stated that the mere mention that ZANU-PF and  
MDC especially Tsvangirai’s party were about to conduct dialogue, immediately led to high levels of 
tolerance amongst the politicians and even the people at the grassroots. The respondent further stated that  
“…sometimes people forget that some of the MDC members were personally tortured by ZANU-PF 
members and the hatred that existed between the players beats any form of imagination…”   
  
The GNU hence changed the status quo in Zimbabwe leading to successive periods of political tolerance. 
The respondent further observed that as it stands, there are high levels of political tolerance in Zimbabwe 
if one compares the election period of the first decade of the new millennium and the election period in 
the second decade of the 21st century after the formation and end of the GNU. What can be observed from 
the analysis is that the GNU set a tone of political tolerance in Zimbabwe. Again, previously putting on 
party regalia resulted in various skirmishes between political opponents but that era has changed in 
Zimbabwe. The Tsvangirai-Mugabe era witnessed the worst politically-related violent cases than has been 
witnessed in the Chamisa-Mnangagwa era. Therefore, it is plausible to cite political tolerance as a central 
attainment of the GNU in Zimbabwe.   
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7.2.2 Creation of the COPAC draft constitution   
Although Zimbabwe has been a constitutional democracy since independence, the fact that the Lancaster 
House Constitution that came with several amendments was not people-driven questioned the legitimacy 
of the constitution in independent Zimbabwe. R1 on this noted that even parties to the GNU 
acknowledged such a fact as can be noted in Article VI of the GPA in the introductory section of the 
clause. The article hence states that:  
  
Acknowledging that it is the fundamental right and duty of the Zimbabwean people to make a 
constitution by themselves and for themselves; Aware that the process of making this constitution 
must be owned and driven by the people and must be inclusive and democratic; Recognizing that 
the current Constitution of Zimbabwe made at the Lancaster House Conference, London (1979) 
was primarily to transfer power from the colonial authority to the people of Zimbabwe…  
  
Article V1 hence acknowledged as noted by R1 that there was a direct response to questions that were 
raised on the level to which Zimbabwe’s old constitution should have been accepted by the people as it 
was simply a compromise that was meant to transfer power from the colonial authority in Zimbabwe. As 
such the constitution was exclusionary and elite-centered hence the GNU came with the objective of 
changing such a questionable feature, (GPA: 2008). Sentiments on the questionability of the Lancaster 
House Constitution were also shared by R4 who argued that in the first three decades of independence, 
Zimbabwe used a constitution that was to an extent democratic yet it was not people-driven. As such the 
old constitution accordingly was not just a compromise but it was elite-driven which theoretically meant 
that the people played second fiddle to the elite in decision making. According to the respondent such a 
set-up obviously questioned the foundation of the democratic constitution. FGD2-4 on the old constitution 
observed that “…it is erroneous to mention that the old constitution was not democratic and it is also 
erroneous to state that people participated in the making of the constitution…Although democratic the 
constitutional making process defeated the essence of democracy in which people participate in the 
overall constitutional making processes…” Therefore, against such a backdrop, it needs to be appreciated 
that the GNU led to the creation of a new constitution that was to an extent people driven.   
  
With regards to the draft constitution and the role of the GNU, R1 asserted that initially the GNU was set 
to deal with a new constitution that was people-driven and that limited the powers of certain positions that 
had been established by the old constitutions that ZANU-PF had taken advantage of. The respondent 
further noted that, “…the old constitution was largely a creation of the ZANU-PF elites and the 
Rhodesian Front, including the British government…as has been the case in international politicking an 
agreement after a ceasefire always favours parties to an agreement, especially the victors…This can also 
be observed in the formation of the United Nations where the victors have controlled world affairs 
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through the UN since 1948…” The narrations of the respondent suggest that the GNU was successful in 
creating a constitution which was a chief priority before its formation. The respondent using inference of 
the United Nations noted that the Lancaster House Constitution favoured the ZANU-PF party at the 
expense of Zimbabweans because the party had been victorious in the redemption struggles of the country 
just like the permanent 5 members of the United Nations who are World War 2 victors. As such the way 
that France, Britain, China, United States of America and Russia have taken advantage of the system that 
they created is the same way that ZANU-PF had been taking advantage of the system that it had created.  
Consequently, the creation of a people driven constitution is a key success of the GNU. FGD2-3 also 
noted that although a lot of controversy surrounds the constitutional making process in Zimbabwe 
particularly in terms of certain people being silenced and abducted after making robust contributions in 
the processes, the constitutional making process that was spearheaded by the GNU led to a new form of 
democracy in Zimbabwe where people were called to air our their views on a new constitution. Through 
the GNU, Zimbabwe has attained one of the most democratic constitutions in the world that has a clear 
preamble on page 15 and a clear comprehensive bill of rights that aims at edifying individuals in the 
society. Such a move was in accordance with Article 6 of the Global Political Agreement in which the 
three parties acknowledged that it is the fundamental right and duty of the Zimbabwean people to make a 
constitution by themselves and for themselves. This new constitution would create a conducive 
environment for elections and for the rule of law.   
  
The constitution making process was successfully completed though it had some hitches and did not beat 
the target time as some cases of violence were reported. The constitutional referendum was held on 16 
and 17 March 2013, and 94, 5% voted for it (Makuhlani, 2014). People voted peacefully for the supreme 
law of the land.  However, the establishment of democratic conventions does not ipso facto translate into 
implementation. This has been the case in Zimbabwe where various constitutional provisions have been 
violated by the state and state apparatus in the country. With regards to the GNU as successful or a failure 
in terms of the establishment of a new constitution, it needs to be appreciated that the GNU recorded a 
success in the creation of a draft constitution that was established in 2013. The 2013 Constitution has 
been credited for setting the tone for a democratic Zimbabwe in the overall democratic consolidation 
process especially in terms of limiting the presidential terms in office. In crediting the GNU for such a 
remarkable success, R2 was of the view that the GNU must be credited for enhancing democracy in 
Zimbabwe through the creation of a people driven constitution. Despite, the flaws that were associated 
with the process which were inevitable, the GNU players managed to come up with a constitution which 
when implemented in its essence can result in Zimbabwe being one of the most democratic states in the 
world. It was noted however by R3 that the constitution was not followed and still remains on paper not 
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being followed anywhere in Zimbabwe, thereby dismissing any likelihood of constitutionalism being 
upheld.   
7.2.3 GNU and the availability of Social Services in the country  
Prior to the year 2009, Zimbabwe had gone beyond the notion of a failed state as the state was failing not 
only to supply basic services to its citizens but some of the social services were not available. The most 
affected sectors were the health sector and the education. An appreciation of the efficacy of the GNU in 
reviving these two sectors is attainable by revealing the Zimbabwean situation before the formation of the 
GNU. Such sentiments were said by R4 who observed that:  
  
Zimbabwe’s health had key areas that showed health deterioration before the year 2009 and these 
include the loss of health workforce due to massive brain drain which has negatively impacted on 
the capacity for health service delivery…It has also eroded administrative capacity and 
accountability within the system….Low salaries, low morale and high staff turnover led to poor 
service delivery and increased cost negatively affecting the general populace. The network of 
primary care facilities which supported the delivery of equitable health services with low or no 
fees for basic services to target population were no longer functional as international aid 
organizations from the E.U and U.S withdrew their help after the imposition of sanctions. This 
saw priority funding for basic health being neglected in favour of central hospital funding. Before 
the GNU the health sector was negatively impacted and this had devastating effects on people’s 
lives as the services offered were substandard, unaffordable to the majority and the sector became 
largely understaffed with inexperienced health personnel.     
              
  
However, the respondent noted that after the signing of the GNU, the status quo was reversed, there was 
restoration of sanity in the health sector, health services in the private and public sectors became 
functional with enhanced service delivery. He further noted that staff became available for duty though 
with difficulties. The GNU hence managed to at least change the Zimbabwean situation health wise 
between 2009 and 2013 compared to the lost decade period (1998-2008).  
  
In the same realm, the education sector was another area that had been negatively affected prior to the 
signing of the GNU. After sections of the international community particularly the European Union and 
the US introduced sanctions in 2001 and various measures against Zimbabwe over issues of disputed 
elections, governance and the Land Reform, the education sector levels in Zimbabwe continued to 
deteriorate. Raftopoulos (2009:217) for instance asserts that the response of the Western governments to a 
series of human violations before, during and after the 2000 parliamentary and 2002 presidential elections 
was to impose a series of what were called “targeted sanctions” against selected individuals from the 
Mugabe regime. In the Land Reform Program of June 2000, acquisition of the farms was effected without 
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awarding due compensation to the farmers as is required under international law thus property rights were 
violated, Dube (2007:8). The U.S government responded in 2001 by imposing economic sanctions under 
the Zimbabwe Democracy and Economic Recovery Act (ZIDERA) which among other things prohibits 
budgeting assistance to Zimbabwe by International Monetary Fund, the World Bank and other lending 
institutions in which it stakes. This international isolation of Zimbabwe resulted in a negative view of the 
country thereby reducing the availability of credit lines and foreign investment contributing to further 
decline of the economy and poor living conditions, which automatically impacted on the education sector, 
(ibid).  
  
It can be observed that after the moves of the Western World, The Education Support Programme which 
was established in 1996 supported by donors from European Nations was suspended after completion in 
2000 and no new programs were introduced. The project was critical in the education sector as it 
facilitated the supply of text books, special education needs, construction of school buildings and the 
promotion of gender equity in education especially in the rural areas but all this was put to a halt due to 
low education standards. Reports from the Education Ministry (2012) indicated that the percentage of 
education budget from the state budget shrunk from about 22 percent in 1991 to 13 percent in the year 
2006. The Scientific and Industrial Research and Development Centre (SIRDC) reported that during the 
years of 1990-2003, out of the 535 609 Zimbabweans who left the country about 25% of were trained 
doctors, nurses and pharmacists, 23% engineers and scientists, 20% teachers and 17% accountants. The 
country’s education sector had collapsed and R4 noted that, the fact that Zimbabwe’s most prestigious 
university, the University of Zimbabwe shut down in 2009 for six months due to incapacity levels reveals 
that the education sector was on the downfall before the GNU. Information by the SIRDC was also 
buttressed FGD2-4 who highlighted that because of the robust nexus between the economy and social 
service: …due to the economic collapse since 2001, Zimbabwe witnessed a number of challenges namely 
mass emigration decade such that information from officials at the Emigration Office of  
Zimbabwe reveal that migrants to neighbouring countries amounted to less than 600 000 in 1998. 
By the year 2002 the number had increased to 800 000. There was a sharp increase between 2004 
and 2007 where over 1 200 000 people left the country. In 2009 alone, over 1 400 000 people left 
Zimbabwe to seek greener pastures in neighbouring states like South Africa and Botswana.   
  
What can be derived from the analysis is an apt portrayal of the fact that Zimbabwe before the GNU 
especially in the new millennium experienced serious social challenges that were changed by the coming 
in of the inclusive government. Based on the information that was raised above, it is plausible to note that 
the GNU managed to tame the social challenges that impacted on Zimbabwe, normalizing social sectors 
such as the education sector and the health sector. However, after the formation of the GNU, it brought up 
positive outcomes in the education sector which witnessed the opening of the closed University of 
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Zimbabwe in 2009, the normalization of the sector as a whole from primary school to the tertiary 
education. With the advent of the GNU schools reopened and universities opened their doors to the 
public. Even Mukuhlani (2014) confirms such a finding by noting that government negotiated deals with 
United Nations Children Education Fund (UNICEF) and textbooks were availed to schools. Schools were 
given the leeway to use the incentive system and some teachers began to receive incentives from parents. 
In this regard, the GNU can be credited by changing the social fabric in Zimbabwe which had been badly 
affected prior to its establishment.   
7.2.4 The GNU and noticeable positive changes within the economic terrain    
The GNU in Zimbabwe is often credited for the short-term economic stability that it brought to the state 
of Zimbabwe. R2 on this noted that the way in which the GNU managed to stabilise the economy within a 
few months of its establishment reveals that, it was supposed to be an opportunity upon which Zimbabwe 
could have evaded the economic and social crises that has continued after it ended. The respondent noted 
that the economic gains that were created by the GNU were critical to a better Zimbabwe but issues of 
identity politics permeated the GNU politicking. The respondent made it clear that the GNU came with 
economic benefits but it was affected by party politics as was noted in the previous chapters. In terms of 
the positive economic changes that came with the GNU, R7 noted that before the formation of the GNU 
Zimbabwe was seriously economically troubled. The depiction of the Zimbabwean economy before the 
GNU is clearly articulated by Bond and Manyanya (2003:32) who argue that when Zimbabwe was 
troubled after the first 10 years of the independence, the government adopted the Economic Structural 
Adjustment Program (ESAP) and the structural adjustment programs failed miserably. This is based on 
the fact that the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) growth reached 5% during one year (1994) and averaged 
at 1.2% from 1991 to 1995. The scholars also observe that the inflation rate averaged above 30% during 
the period and never dropped anywhere near the 10% goal. The failure was also worsened with the 1992, 
1993 and 1995 drought which deleteriously impacted on the agricultural sector. The economy further 
experienced a slump as the African Economic Development Institute (2009) notes, that by 2000 the 
inflation rate had reached a massive 58.4% and in 2008, it was pegged at 231 million percent.  Therefore 
by 2008 Zimbabwe had stagnant development characterized by widespread poverty, a high youth 
unemployment rate, graduates moving to other countries, rising inflation, dwindled export earnings and 
unbearable living conditions.   
  
Basic commodities became unattainable for the majority of the people and economic security was largely 
compromised due to the closure of industries. R7 noted that the GNU brought about positive changes to 
the economic set-up of the country as, soon after the signing of the GPA, the country adopted a 
multicurrency regime that immediately tamed the hyperinflationary environment that had been caused by 
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the inoperable Zimbabwe dollar. It needs to be appreciated that although the GNU attained such 
positivity, R3 was of the view the GNU failed to promote the production of local goods as the markets 
were permeated by goods from outside Zimbabwe during its years of existence. Such analysis is 
complimented by literature on the GNU by Mukuhlani, (2014). The author argued that though the GNU 
managed to bring sanity to the economy through the Short Term Emergency Recovery Programmes 
(STERP) which managed to address issues pertaining to runaway inflation and economic instability, basic 
commodities such as bread, milk and mealie-meal became available in the country’s supermarkets that 
were flooded with foreign products to the detriment of locally produced goods and the inclusive 
government was not really addressing that. The GNU hence made basic commodities available in shops 
and changed the economic set-up in the country and some industries which were mal-functioning, 
underperforming and struggling were revived in the process but most commodities were imported into 
Zimbabwe.  
  
Ultimately, the GNU managed to change the economic set-up in Zimbabwe and changed the economic 
security in the country. R5 observed that the majority of the changes that came with the GNU were hinged 
on economic changes that came with the dollarisation process. The respondent hence noted that,  
“…the changes in the social sector, the fact that people could now be paid, doctors could be available at 
work and basic commodities became available in various shopping outlets was a result of the economic 
stability that was brought about by the dollarization process. In this regard, the GNU that was formed 
between 2009 and 2013 made a robust economic change to the state of Zimbabwe which was however, 
short-lived. The inclusive government by ending the economic crises ended up contributing positively to 
the social sector of the country. Mukuhlani (2014:173) on the economic successes of the GNU noted that, 
with the inception of the GNU, multi-currency system was introduced. This gave birth to stability in the 
financial sector where there was now the resurrection of defunct services such as Medical aid, Insurance 
and Pension schemes. Basic goods such as cooking oil, sugar, reappeared in supermarkets and fuel was 
now available. Due to the availability of fuel at filling stations the transport system normalized. However, 
through the introduction of the multicurrency systems other sectors realised the erosion of Zimbabwe’s 
self-identity and sovereignty due to failure to use its own currency for instance Botswana is identified by 
its Pula, South Africa by its Rand and Zambia by the Kwacha.  
  
7.3 Failures of the GNU   
Although the GNU, recorded a number of successes during the implementation of the Global Political 
Agreement between 2009 and 2013, credit to the GNU has been disregarded on the basis of its failures to 
overcome and solve Zimbabwe’s problems on a long-term basis. There was a general consensus among 
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respondents that although the GNU provided the opportunity for Zimbabwe to escape the economic and 
political crisEs that had continued to affect the country for a long time; parties to the GNU acted upon 
their party interests at the expense of the rationale that was behind the formation of the GNU which 
rendered it a failure. Although the section largely focuses on the failures of the GNU, it has to be clearly 
stated from the onset that in some of the discussions (FGDs), some of the perceived failures were 
countered by other participants. The section will also present such variations.  
7.3.1 Political reforms   
Perhaps the most debated section in the successes and failures of the GNU from the gathered data 
revolved around the GNU and political reforms. Respondents shared different perceptions on the extent to 
which the GNU managed to bring about political reform in Zimbabwe. Article X of the GPA that focused 
on the Free Political Activity stated that:   
Recognising that the right to canvass and freely mobilise for political support is the cornerstone of 
any multiparty democratic system, the Parties have agreed that there should be free political 
activity throughout Zimbabwe within the ambit of the law in which all political parties are able to 
propagate their views and canvass for support, free of harassment and intimidation.  
  
Based on such a clause, it is plausible to argue that parties to the GNU concurred that Zimbabwe’s 
political ground had been very restrictive and allowed less freedom in terms of political activity. R1 on 
the need for political reforms in the formation of the GNU stated that it was conventional wisdom prior 
the formation of the GNU that ZANU-PF had created a bad culture of intolerance for political opponents 
and those who shared different political ideologies and the GNU needed to change such a culture. The 
respondent further noted that the GNU was an opportunity upon which Zimbabwe’s political system 
could have changed had political parties not been adamant to change in the process.  As has been noted in 
the foregoing some respondents felt that with the GNU, came elements of political tolerance in the 
political space of Zimbabwe. However, FGD1-5, noted that although the GNU brought about political 
tolerance in Zimbabwe at least from the top tiers of political parties and to the grassroots, it failed to 
ensure that there would be political reforms in Zimbabwe. According to the respondent political reforms 
relate to improvements in the political set-up of any entity where the political environment should be 
enabling and conducive. Such a view was also shared by FGD1-3 who argued that “…the GNU was 
created to reform the political set-up in Zimbabwe which simply meant reducing levels of political 
instability; ending political violence which would create a political environment that enabled free political 
activity…” However, the respondents concurred that the political operating environment remained very 
restrictive during the time of the GNU there was continued infringement of free political activity. FGD1-5 
on this stated that in the GNU process there was serious interference of rallies, marches that were meant 
to be peaceful and some meetings that were organised by rivalry political parties to ZANU-PF and even 
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civil society. The respondent further noted that “…yes we can talk of changes in political tolerance but the 
GNU failed to change the systematic disruption of politically related events in the country…”  R1 in 
support of such sentiments argued that, the GNU changed nothing in terms of political environment in 
Zimbabwe as ZANU-PF using the security forces continued to ban and halt efforts of anti-ZANU-PF 
organisations from enjoying political freedom in the country. Even Nhede (2012) in his analysis noted 
that between 2010 and 2011 March, the Crisis in Zimbabwe Coalition had recorded that 23 events by civil 
society organisations and both formations of the MDC were disrupted or barred by police and ZANU-PF 
supporters and the biggest victims in respect of this were the political parties in the inclusive government 
who had 18 rallies disrupted by police and ZANU-PF supporters without any arrests confirmed. The 
scholar even cited several cases in which he noted that there was the murder of certain people for instance 
the murder of Cephas Magura (67) on 26 May 2012, an MDC Ward 1 chairperson in Mudzi North, 
Mashonaland Province who was murdered while seven party members were injured after an attack by 
ZANU-PF supporters at Chimukoko Business Centre at a police-sanctioned rally.   
  
On the same note, R3 noted that, it was difficult to argue that the GNU brought about political reforms in 
Zimbabwe as political violence continued in Zimbabwe. The respondent noted that ZANU-PF had created 
terror groups such as Chipangano in Mbare and the Mandimbandimba groups which were immune to the 
law and committed various atrocities against opponents in Zimbabwe. However, as noted previously, 
some respondents argued that the GNU ended political mayhem in Zimbabwe as it brought together 
political players that had a long history of rivalry (FGD1-3, R4 and R5). Nhede (2012) even added to the 
fact that the GNU did not bring about political reforms in Zimbabwe as Zimbabwe Peace Project (ZPP) 
recorded 2186 incidents of human right violations between January 2012 and May 2012 directly linked to 
electioneering and rising political tensions. R1 supporting such elements noted that since independence 
there has been the selective application of the law, unnecessary arbitrary arrests, issues of long 
incarcerations, and impunity to violators of human rights therefore the GNU never changed such old 
ZANU-PF led shenanigans.  The respondent further noted that the battle in the political space of  
Zimbabwe is no longer between political supporters but it’s a battle between state agents that are being 
used by ZANU-PF and opposition political parties. Overally, it is important to note that what can be 
derived from the different analysis of the respondents is the notion that, there might have been changes 
that were brought about by the GNU in terms of political tolerance but the political space remained 
infused with various elements of party fights.  As such it is grim to argue that the GNU brought about 
political reforms in Zimbabwe.   
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7.3.2 Zimbabwe’s National reputation and the failure of the GNU    
The position of Zimbabwe as a rogue and pariah state has not changed internationally especially to the 
Western World. This is despite the fact that there was the GNU that supposed to ensure that positive 
changes would occur in Zimbabwe’s governance system. R1 on this noted that the GNU was a 
transitionary government that was supposed to eliminate how Zimbabwe is perceived internationally 
setting the ground for a new political system. The respondent however said that nothing positive came 
with the signing of the GNU. The sentiment seems to suggest that prior to the GNU, Zimbabwe had a 
negatively perceived national reputation and the GNU failed to ensure that such views about the country 
would change.  The failure of the GNU to change Zimbabwe’s national reputation was also noted by 
FGD2-1 who connoted that the first port of call is to understand the concept itself which in practice 
signifies the beliefs or opinions that are generally held about a country. The respondent on this stated that 
the collective judgments of Zimbabwe’s foreign image and characteristics that are then used to predict or 
explain a nation’s culture, policy, conduct, and future behaviour never changed with the coming in of the 
GNU and this led to a breakdown in the reengagement exercise.   
  
FGD2-3 supporting such sentiments stated that in “…in the 21st century and even before, most states have 
always defended themselves for the actions that they pursue internationally or domestically. In fact, states 
try by all means not to be labelled pariah states or rogue states…the GNU could not change such a 
stance”. It can be derived from the analysis that the GNU was supposed to change Zimbabwe’s 
international image that had been created by the Mugabe regime as a state that violated people’s rights 
that was hence slowly turning to be a threat to other states as well. Zimbabwe has continued to be labelled 
as a rogue state. R6 on the same note, noted that there were high expectations that Zimbabwe’s national 
reputation would change internationally as the MDC formations had a democratic reputation and with 
their close relations with the Western World, the GNU was hence viewed as a platform upon which the 
internationally damaged reputation would change. Zimbabwe had become a prime example of a fragile 
state as it has failed to deliver on many aspects relating to human security as generally understood and has 
declined in many respects due to poor governance. There has been however, slight improvement during 
the process of GNU in 2008 but these changes did not change the country’s international reputation. 
Asked on why national reputation is an important concept in international politics, the respondent noted 
that national reputation, being rooted in international public opinion, indicates the presence or absence of 
international legitimacy accrued to a certain nation hence by virtue of having the desired image and 
reputation, a state can often be of greater use to other states. The respondent further noted that a nation’s 
reputational capital may affect the country’s ability to build coalitions and alliances to achieve 
international political objectives, to influence perceptions and purchase decisions, and to attract foreign 
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investments. Accordingly, the GNU came and it is now history but Zimbabwe’s position has not changed 
internationally.  
  
It can be concluded from the analysis above that since the GNU had members of the MDC formations 
who were often considered democrats, it was expected that it would transform Zimbabwe’s outside image 
but the inclusive government could not attain such an objective. FGD2-1 on the reasons why the state of 
Zimbabwe failed to attain a reputable national image internationally during the GNU transitionary period, 
stated that the players in the GNU entered into the partnership with ulterior motives other than edifying 
the Zimbabwe state as a whole. In this regard, the international community could not change its stance on 
Zimbabwe. It thus has to be noted that the respondent suggested that the GNU could not change 
Zimbabwe’s national reputation globally as the political parties that were involved in the agreement 
namely ZANU-PF and the two MDC formations fought their party battles ignoring the fact that the GNU 
was a revival period.   
7.3.3 The GNU’s failure to reform the security sector    
Prior to the GNU and after, Zimbabwe is often labelled a rogue state based on the fact that the security 
forces have been used by ZANU-PF to pursue its agenda in various instances. As such it was the aim of 
the GNU to change such a set up in Zimbabwe as the security sector especially the fact that the forces had 
a bias towards ZANU-PF. In fact, Article XIII of the GPA stipulate that   
  
State organs and institutions do not belong to any political party and should be impartial in the 
discharge of their duties. For the purposes of ensuring that all state organs and institutions 
perform their duties ethically and professionally in conformity with the principles and 
requirements of a multiparty democratic system in which all parties are treated equally, the 
parties have agreed that there be inclusion in the training curriculum of members of the 
uniformed forces of the subjects on human rights, international humanitarian law and statute law 
so that there is greater understanding and full appreciation of their roles and duties in a multiparty 
democratic system, all state organs and institutions should strictly observe the principles of the 
Rule of Law and remain non-partisan and impartial, laws and regulations governing state organs 
and institutions are strictly adhered to and those violating them be penalised without fear or 
favour and recruitment policies and practices be conducted in a manner that ensures that no 
political or other form of favouritism is practised.   
  
The GNU hence envisioned the need to change such a status quo but in practice it failed as provisions on 
security sector reforms were either ignored or blatantly violated. Such elements were shared by R1 who 
noted that the GNU in Zimbabwe is often discredited for its failure to transform the security sector in 
Zimbabwe. Such a view was also shared by R4 who stated that the Zimbabwean state prior to the GNU 
had the reputation of violating the basic human rights of its citizens and the GNU set the objective of 
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security sector reforms but the objective was not attained. In fact, R3 was of the view that Zimbabwe 
prior, during and after the GNU has been a securocratic state in which the security sector controls state 
machinery and runs every government institution. Mandaza (2015:15) in describing the securocrat state in 
the Zimbabwean context from a historical point of view notes that:  
  
Securocracy is the very antithesis of democracy; ruling without or despite the popular will…the 
securocrat state is one in which the military-security apparatus is a dominant factor in the power 
complex that is the state. The scholar further noted that in Zimbabwe, this  revolves around (but 
symbolic in that herein lies the centre of power) the proverbial office of the President, Head of 
State and Government, Commander-in- Chief of the Defence Forces…Of special significance in 
contemporary Zimbabwe is the extent to which, under the direction of the president himself, the 
military-security factor has, since 2000 in particular, sought to pervade social and political 
relations, compromise or contradict public policy issues, subvert the electoral system and purge 
political rivals to the incumbent “Big Man”…  
  
The GNU hence failed to change such a status quo in Zimbabwe as the role of the military and security 
services in the governance of Zimbabwe has increased. R3 further noted that the security reforms were 
not fully implemented and from an MDC perspective which inhibited the fair application of the rule of 
law, there was continued selective application of the law which contributed to the tense relationship 
among officials in the inclusive Government. Security chiefs openly declared their allegiance to 
ZANUPF. This made the application of the rule of law very difficult in that junior officers could not be 
seen to be contradicting or working against their superiors. A research by Tumbare (2013) on the GNU in 
Zimbabwe, focusing on security sector reforms confirmed the findings that were gathered in this research.  
The scholar notes that a National Security Council (NSC) was created but it was dysfunctional and there 
was no effective civilian oversight and the security forces remained under tight control of the President 
and ZANU-PF controlled ministries. The scholar also confirms the views that were shared by R1 by 
stating that ZANU-PF claimed that the security issue was “off limits” and instructed its negotiators not to 
deliberate on it as mandated by the GPA. R6 on the fact that ZANU-PF brought boundaries to the 
negotiating tables meant that the GPA was bound to fail in terms of security reforms. FGD2-4 stated that 
security reforms could not take place during the time of the GNU because ZANU-PF as a party was not 
prepared for such changes. The respondent further noted that the party had used the security sector to 
consolidate its power in running the state of Zimbabwe. Thus, letting the security sector slide into the 
hands of the opposition was going to be a disaster for the party. Based on the points that have been raised 
above, it is plausible to argue that the GNU failed to bring about positive changes in the security sector as 
there were serious elements of continuity from the period prior to the GNU. Security sector reforms were 
never realised because ZANU-PF as a fundamental player in the GNU was not prepared to ensure that the 
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reforms would be realised as this would have compromised its position in the state of Zimbabwe as it has 
relied on the forces for its consolidation of power.   
7.3.4 Sanctions   
The GNU in Zimbabwe has also been discredited for its failure to call for the removal of sanctions in 
Zimbabwe. FGD1-3 on the issue of sanctions noted that, the foreign policy tool of the Western World 
against the state of Zimbabwe has placed Zimbabwe in a compromising position where members of the 
international community fear to establish relations with the state of Zimbabwe. The respondent noted that 
since the MDC formations that had close links with the sanctions imposers were not in government, it was 
expected that sanctions would be removed but the GNU failed to act accordingly on the issue. However, 
FGD1-5 took a different stance by stating that in as much as the GNU was expected to ensure that 
sanctions would be removed in Zimbabwe, there were conditions that were set by the international 
community that can lead to sanctions removal. The respondent further stated that the conditions were not 
met during the time of the GNU as people’s rights were still violated and ZANU-PF continued with its 
oppressive policies in various sectors such as the Media and even in terms of selective application of law. 
Derivable from the analysis of the respondent is that the GNU failed to initiate a successful sanctions 
removal campaign because certain acts that led to sanctions imposition continued in the state of 
Zimbabwe.   
  
Article IV on Sanctions and Measures  in the GPA in summary noted that the parties to the GPA 
acknowledged that sections of the international community imposed various sanctions and measures 
against Zimbabwe, since the year 2000 which led to the economic and political isolation of Zimbabwe by 
the United Kingdom, European Union, United States of America and other sections of the International 
Community over and around issues of disputed elections, governance and differences over the land 
reform programme that affected Zimbabwe. The parties hence noted that the isolation worsened 
Zimbabwe’s position internationally which further led to serious economic and social woes. 
Consequently, parties to the GPA agreed that it was necessary for sanctions to be removed.  Although in 
principle the parties reached such an agreement, R7 on this stated that the sanctions was, is and has 
always been polarized in Zimbabwe, with ZANU-PF on one side accusing the MDC of reneging on its 
promise to have these restrictive measures removed, and the MDC on the other hand arguing that the 
removal of such measures is dependent upon visible democratic reforms by ZANU-PF. As such, the 
failure by the ZANU-PF to democratize in the period of the GNU led to the failure of the inclusive 
government to call for the removal of sanctions. As was noted by R1 “…the removal of sanctions before, 
during and even after the GNU is dependent on ZANU-PF which has to reform and change its autocratic 
tendencies…” Therefore, the sanctions issue according to the respondent was dependent upon ZANU-PF 
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to reform and its failure to reform meant that sanctions would not be removed. Even though the issue of 
sanctions has been blamed on ZANU-PF and its chronicles on the governance of Zimbabwe, it is critical 
to appreciate that the GNU principals agreed on the removal of sanctions but such an objective was never 
realized rendering the GNU a failure in terms of the sanctions issue.   
  
7.3.5 GNU in Zimbabwe and Media Reforms: A Failure   
One critical failure of the GNU was to ensure that there would be media reforms in Zimbabwe. In fact, 
media reforms were envisaged in the GPA as being key to the transition of Zimbabwe and such a notion 
was agreed by the Principals to the GNU. R4 on media reform noted that “… the issue of comprehensive 
media reforms which includes introduction of more and diverse players in both the print and electronic 
media as well as the immediate cessation of hate speech was an objective that was set by the GPA 
principals…” However, the respondent noted that apart from print media, the media in Zimbabwe 
remained exclusively monopolized by Zimbabwe Broadcasting Cooperation. Such sentiments were also 
shared by FGD2-1 who noted that the media in Zimbabwe remained monopolized and served the interests 
of ZANU-PF. The respondent stated that “… during the time of the GNU, ZTV broadcasted ZANU-PF 
related activities ignoring the fact that Zimbabwe was under inclusive government…” However, FGD2-4 
shared different views on the media reforms by stating that the GNU did a marvellous job in that during 
its time, new radio stations, news publications and upgrading of the mobile service providers were 
realised which meant that there were positive changes that were made towards the realisation of plurality 
and diversity.  The respondent further noted that the two new radio stations; Zimpaper's Talk Radio (Star 
FM) and AB Communications ZiFM were given the green light to operate representing a landmark 
development in the country’s broadcasting sector. According to the respondent these were positive 
changes that were brought about by the GNU as previously, it was difficult for media diversity and 
plurality in Zimbabwe.   
  
In countering the sentiments of the respondent, FGD2-1 noted that adding media houses was one thing 
whilst the independence of the houses was another. The respondent hence noted that without doubt, the 
media houses were not and have not been independent because of Zimpapers and AB Communications 
links to ZANU-PF. The respondent even further stated that in practice Star FM and ZiFM were merely 
other ZBH subsidiaries, which were and have been used by ZANU-PF to pursue its interests in  
Zimbabwe.  In an interview with R2, the respondent noted that the GNU was simply a failure in media 
reforms due to the fact that various stations not linked to ZANU-PF witnessed their license requests being 
rejected. The respondent cited the cases of Radio Dialogue and Community Radio Harare (CORAH) 
which applied for licences 10 years prior the establishment of the GNU. To buttress such elements and 
158  
  
clarify that they were no media reforms that came with the GNU, R1 noted that attacks against journalists 
and news vendors continued and these were spearheaded by ZANU-PF and this was in violation of media 
freedoms and freedom of expression. It needs to be appreciated that the violations and rejections took 
place despite the fact the GPA in article XIX had explicitly stated the need for freedom of expression and 
communication. R1 noted that “..Even the Second Republic the trends have continued, with the 
Emmerson Mnangagwa government continuing with serious monopolization of media houses which 
simply shows that the GNU never changed anything…” As such, the GNU is often cited as a failure in 
ensuring that there would be media reforms in Zimbabwe.   
7.3.6 GNU as a failure in the Reconciliation Process  
There was a consensus among the respondents to the research that the GNU failed to bring about a 
successful reconciliation process in Zimbabwe. This was on the backdrop that Zimbabwe as a state had 
experienced serious injustices in the past and perpetrators were not brought to book. ARTICLE VII of the 
GPA on Equality, National Healing, Cohesion and Unity noted that:   
   
The Parties hereby agree that the new Government:  a) will ensure equal treatment of all 
regardless of gender, race, ethnicity, place of origin and will work towards equal access to 
development for all;  b) will ensure equal and fair development of all regions of the country and 
in particular to correct historical imbalances in the development of regions;  c) shall give 
consideration to the setting up of a mechanism to properly advise on what measures might be 
necessary and practicable to achieve national healing, cohesion and unity in respect of victims of 
pre and post-independence political conflicts; and  d) will strive to create an environment of 
tolerance and respect among Zimbabweans and that all citizens are treated with dignity and 
decency irrespective of age, gender, race, ethnicity, place of origin or political affiliation.  e) will 
formulate policies and put measures in place to attract the return and repatriation of all 
Zimbabweans in the Diaspora and in particular will work towards the return of all skilled 
personnel  
  
The clause was an acknowledgement that Zimbabwe needed healing to ensure that there would be 
cohesion and unity. However, R1 noted that “…the issue of national healing and issues of reconciliation 
played second fiddle to the fights that took place between the parties to the GNU…” The respondent 
further noted that ZANU-PF and the MDC formations were occupied with politically related issues 
flouting the need for a successful reconciliation process such that the GNU came and it is now history but 
the state of Zimbabwe is still divided. Machakanja (2010) on the issue of national reconciliation and the 
failure of the GNU in Zimbabwe noted that although the GNU assigned three ministers to spear-head the 
reconciliation process, the effort was not very fruitful as the noble effort to promote national healing and 
reconciliation were met with arguments as to whether the national healing and reconciliation project 
should be led by politicians, given the politics of partisanship that have characterised the political 
landscape of Zimbabwe before the formation of the GNU). In the same manner Nhede (2012) noted that 
while the GNU players were busy on fulfilling the GPA agreement on national healing, ironically a group 
of youths known as Chipangano was allegedly forcing non-ZANU-PF Harare residents to attend 
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ZANUPF functions. R6 on the policy of reconciliation noted it appears that there was no remorse on the 
part of ZAU PF to clear their name by letting justice take precedence in Zimbabwe. The respondent noted 
that the reconciliation process was simply based on the fact that victims of violence were to an extent 
simply encouraged to forgive, forget and move on without any justice being served in the country.    
  
The respondent further asserted the reconciliation process was not only affected by the actions of 
ZANUPF but there were allegations by the state media that MDC-T youths beat up police officers who 
were on duty. The reconciliation process hence was not attained in Zimbabwe. The clauses in the GNU 
simply reveals that there are areas that needed serious attention to make Zimbabwe a better state hence the 
GNU provided an opportunity upon which the country could have escaped its political and economic 
crisis. Such a remark was made by R3 and the respondent further noted that Zimbabwe as a state has been 
divided and the division has been a hurdle to all elements of development. The respondent narrated that 
Zimbabwe lacks a sense of belonging that is required for development and the GNU was a platform upon 
which such a serious feature of the state could have been addressed but the inclusive government failed 
dismally.  Therefore, from the sentiments that were shared by the various respondents, it is grim not to 
argue that the GNU failed to ensure that the process of national reconciliation would attain positive results 
in the state of Zimbabwe. The failure is depicted by the fact that while Zimbabwe has been affected by 
periodic phases of ‘moments of madness’ like the 1983-87 Gukurahundi fiasco and the 2008 state 
sponsored reign of terror, in the process of reconciliation, political parties to the GNU initiated measures 
that also needed to be redressed. As such, the GNU hence failed to heal Zimbabwe and make it a better 
state where there would be cohesion and unity.   
7.3.7 The GNU and its failure on issues of transition management and long-term 
development goals   
Several respondents noted that the GNU was an opportunity upon which Zimbabwe could have escaped 
its crises situation. However, players in the GNU failed and intentionally ignored the need to focus on 
long-term goals for Zimbabwe choosing to focus on their political party goals. Nhede (2012) for instance 
noted that the GNU failed to properly handle the transition that took place from the Zimbabwe-dollar to 
the multi-currency system, dominated by the American dollar. The scholar noted that one of the inclusive 
government’s biggest failure was the poor management of the transition from the Zimbabwean dollar to 
the multi-currency system. This has dealt a heavy blow to the country’s economy as the 
governmentprovided services that were too expensive for instance passport fees, import permit charges, 
vehicle number plates, Environmental Management Agency permit to move pit sand and TIMB tobacco 
registration fee. This is why farmers failed to register because they could not afford these exorbitant rates. 
The extent to which the government failed to properly manage the transition has had negative 
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consequences years after the end of the GNU. R5 on this noted that “…if one is to compare prices in the 
GNU and the current prices of basic commodities and services, it is easy to safely say that things were 
expensive during the period. Perhaps that is the sole reason why the government of Zimbabwe failed to 
keep up with the demands that came with the US dollar…”   
  
The analysis is also reflected in the analysis of R1 who noted that since the GNU was elite driven, the 
principals to it failed to consider the implications of such a transition on the people of Zimbabwe. It hence 
can be noted that the GNU failed in ensuring that there would be a transition that would have reflected the 
previous period as prices were over stated by the government and even from the private sector. FGD2-3 
on the same noted that “…in the initial stages of the GNU, one could buy 10kg of mealie meal at 10 USD 
or 100 rand, a feature that changed later on as the same product was bought for less than 5USD…” It can 
be derived that the GNU period witnessed the overcharging of products and from the information that was 
gathered by the researcher, this was a result of the poor management of the transition. However, FGD2-4 
countered such arguments by stating that handling transitions is not an easy task hence the GNU players 
cannot be discredited for the overpriced goods as they were faced with a lot of issues that needed their 
attention. The respondent further noted that although products were expensive, they were now available 
which contributed towards the improvements of human security in the Zimbabwe context. Based on the 
different points, it can be noted that although the GNU brought about positive changes on product 
availability as has been noted above, it failed to ensure that products were charged at their average prices.  
This was occasioned by poor transition management on the part of the players that were in the GNU.   
  
Consequently, although the GNU that controlled the government machinery in Zimbabwe between 2009 
and 2013 managed to attain successes, the analysis that has been given in the foregoing reveal that the 
successes of the GNU were short term successes. The GNU in Zimbabwe analysed vis-à-vis the GPA 
framework attained less successes than failures. It was noted in this chapter and even in the previous 
chapters that parties to the GNU agreed on clauses that they never devoted to in the implementation 
phase. Rather, the players concentrated more on the need to establish political mileage in preparation for 
the 2013 election. This therefore resulted in more failures than successes.     
7.4 Conclusion   
The GNU that was established in Zimbabwe based on the GPA of 2008 was seen as a transitional 
government that aimed at changing Zimbabwe’s political and economic situation that had been created 
largely by policies of the ZANU-PF party. The GPA set a framework that required GNU parties to attain 
changes on the land question; the constitution; the promotion of equality, national healing, cohesion and 
unity; issues of external interference; free political activity; issues of the rule of law, respect for the 
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constitution and other laws; freedom of assembly and association; state organs and institutions among 
others. Although the GNU managed ensure that levels of political tolerance were attained amongst party 
supporters; change the economic set up by taming the hyperinflationary environment in Zimbabwe, which 
resulted in certain social and economic services being restored in Zimbabwe, it largely failed in various 
sectors that were agreed upon in the GPA. Apart from failing to ensure security sector and political sector 
reforms, the GNU failed to deal with the sanctions issue and reconciliation issues among others. The 
reasons behind the more failures than successes of the GNU in Zimbabwe were deeply rooted in the 
pursuit of party interests at the expense of the GPA agreements. Therefore, the GNU recorded more 
failures than successes. Based on this, the GNU hence provided a platform and opportunity in which 
Zimbabwe could have escaped its economic and political crises but its failures contributed to the current 
Zimbabwe situation which has remained complicated 6 years after the end of the GNU.   
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CHAPTER EIGHT  
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS  
  
8.1 Introduction   
The formation of a Government of National Unity (GNU) between 2009 and 2013 in Zimbabwe is an apt 
portrayal of the nature of the changing trends in African politics. A decade of political rivalry that 
witnessed confrontational politicking ended with the union of the former political opponents and the 
process was spearheaded by the Southern African Development Community (SADC) bloc. Bearing in 
mind that the period before the GNU particularly in the first decade of the new millennium and the era 
after the inclusive government have been imbued with serious economic and political crisis, the central 
thrust of the thesis was to unpack the multiple realities on the GNU (2009-2013) as a platform upon 
which the former and now continuing Zimbabwe crises could have ended. The SADC mediated GNU 
brought about temporary changes to the Zimbabwe’s crises and the question on whether it could have 
provided the opportunity to permanently end Zimbabwe’s crises was the gist of the research. The 
following chapter in consequent focuses on the conclusions and recommendations of the study. The 
chapter is thusly divided in two major themes namely the conclusion section and the recommendations 
section.   
8.2 Conclusions    
The current Zimbabwe situation stands as one of the worst crisis situations in the second decade of the 21st 
century facing states in the Global South. The economic and political crises situation actually question the 
fact that Zimbabwe had a government of national unity between 2009 and 2013 which was supposed to 
act as a transitional government in a transitional phase in terms of the economic and political set-up of the 
country. Thus, bearing in mind the continued repetition of events in Zimbabwe after the GNU, which 
came with a period of political and economic stability, the study proposed to respond to the following 
research objectives namely:   
 To establish whether the SADC-mediated GNU provided an opportunity to end political and 
economic crisis.  
 To ascertain whether the SADC-mediation process achieved its goal in balancing political 
interests in the GPA.  
 To assess the effectiveness of the GNU and the extent to which it achieved the intended goals.  
 To evaluate the extent to which the general populace was consulted prior to the establishment of 
the GNU and during its implementation; and,  
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 To recommend ways of enhancing the effectiveness of inclusive government vis-à-vis crisis 
situations in states.   
  
While, all the objectives except for objective five were attained as outlined in the preceding chapters, the 
latter is established later in this chapter. Based on an extensive analysis of data that was gathered 
qualitatively from multiple sources namely in-depth interviews, focus group discussions and documentary 
analysis as demonstrated in the research methodology, this study concludes as follows:   
8.2.1 The Economic and Political Crisis of 2008 emerged in the first decade of Zimbabwe’s 
Independence   
 
Zimbabwe’s crisis which has a history is deeply rooted in the colonial era became manifest in 1986 with 
the introduction of Amendment no. 7 to the Lancaster House Constitution which created an Executive  
Presidency and abolished the Prime Minister’s Office. In the subsequent year after serious skirmishes in 
the Matabeleland region of the country the Zimbabwe African National Union Political Front (ZANU-PF) 
consolidated its grip to power by swallowing the Zimbabwe African People’s Union (ZAPU). The move 
was designed as a way of turning the newly established state into a one-party state.  Apart from 
resoundingly winning the elections from 1980 and the subsequent periods until the year 2005; ZANU-PF 
established domineering political policies and measures coupled with not less than 15 economic noble 
blue prints that produced unmistakable results between 1980 and 2008 because of the nature of identity 
politics that infused policy implementation.   
  
The legitimacy of ZANU-PF’s governance and election victories became a cause for concern for the 
international community and civil society groups in Zimbabwe especially the 3rd generation civil society 
as the political victory did not come with economic triumph. The party’s politics of acrobatics could not 
deal with the economy of the country such that as early as 1984, the country’s economy began to face 
serious economic woes. However, the latter became manifest in the mid-1990s which led to sharp rise in 
the cost of living. Inevitably, the consequent disillusionment led to the formation of a new political party 
in 1999, the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) led by former leader of the Zimbabwe Congress 
of Trade Unions (ZCTU) and later Prime Minister Morgan Tsvangirai. The MDC party came with two 
major objectives namely:   
i. To restore democracy; and   
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ii. To revive the hemorrhaging (bleeding) economy (to resuscitate the collapsing 
economy).   
  
The two objectives were ‘music to the souls’ of many Zimbabweans who were starting to feel the 
economic and political heat at the period such that the MDC immediately attracted a large following 
especially the urbanites. The elections that took place between 2000 and 2005 were shocking to 
Zimbabweans and more shocking to ZANU-PF as for the first time in history it lost many parliamentary 
seats to an opposition party. The party resorted to political and election-related violence, hate speech and 
all forms of the Machiavellian brands of politicking which attracted the attention of powerful states in 
international politics. With politically-related violence, a breakdown in the rule of law and the ‘jambanja’ 
phase of the party’s land reform program, that is the initial stages of the Fast Track Land Reform 
Programme, the party was lashed with targeted sanctions by the European Union and the United States of 
America in 2001 and 2002 respectively.   
  
The government of the first republic became more repressive under sanctions silencing opposition party 
members. Although, the international community reacted to events that were unfolding in Zimbabwe, the 
SADC bloc remained silent on the basis of the fact that it is clouded by the sovereignty principle which 
limits it to intervene in crisis situations of member states. However, it is the 2007 Save Zimbabwe Prayer 
or Campaign Meeting in the Highfields area that the ruthlessness of ZANU-PF became so manifest to 
SADC. MDC members were beaten and tortured by police forces. There was an international outcry over 
such events. Zimbabwe was hence placed under SADC’s agenda in the Communiqué of Extra-Ordinary 
SADC Summit of Heads of State and Government, held between 28th and 29th March, 2007 in Dar-es-
Salaam. With regards to the Zimbabwe situation:   
i. The Extra-Ordinary Summit noted and appreciated the briefing by His Excellency 
President Robert G Mugabe on the current political developments in Zimbabwe.  
ii. The Extra-Ordinary Summit recalled that free, fair and democratic presidential election 
was held in 2002 in Zimbabwe.  
iii. The Extra Ordinary Summit reaffirmed its solidarity with the government and people of 
Zimbabwe.  
iv. The Extra-Ordinary Summit mandated His Excellency President Thabo Mbeki to 
continue to facilitate dialogue between the opposition and the government and report 
back to the troika on progress.  
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v. The Extra-Ordinary summit also encouraged enhanced diplomatic contacts which will 
assist with the resolution of the situation in Zimbabwe.  
vi. The Extra-Ordinary Summit mandated the SADC Executive Secretary to undertake a 
study on the economic situation in Zimbabwe and propose measures on how SADC can 
assist Zimbabwe recover economically.   
vii. The Extra-Ordinary summit reiterated the appeal to Britain to honour its compensation 
obligations with regards to land reform made at the Lancaster House.  
viii. The Extra-Ordinary Summit appealed for the lifting of all forms of sanctions against 
Zimbabwe.  
  
Point IV noted that the Extra-Ordinary Summit mandated His Excellency President Thabo Mbeki to 
continue to facilitate dialogue between the opposition and the government and report back to the troika on 
progress. It can be noted that the Zimbabwe situation was already a crisis maybe in its preliminary stages 
but the SADC failed to firmly have a grip on the Zimbabwean situation such that when ZANU-PF was 
defeated in the March 2008 elections, the following year, with the MDC failing to reach the required 
minimum threshold for the Presidential polls ZANU-PF unleashed a reign of terror across the country on 
MDC supporters.   
  
It was established in the research that in the past 39 years ZANU-PF has unleashed 2 reigns of terror, the 
first one being the 1983-1987 Matabeleland Disturbances and the Pre-Run Off 2008 Massacres. Whereas, 
the events infused the political space of Zimbabwe, the economic sector appeared to have been neglected 
by ZANU-PF which was employing elite-driven policies that benefited those in the party’s top tiers. In a 
period often cited as the lost decade in Zimbabwe’s spheres, the country became a basket case, in which 
there was serious food insecurities; a healthy crisis and massive brain drain. SADC through Thabo Mbeki 
engaged the three major political parties which were the MDC-T led by the late Morgan Tsvangirai, 
ZANU-PF led by Robert Mugabe and the other MDC-M which was led by Arthur Mutambara. The talks 
that occurred from 22 July to 15 September 2008 led to the signing of the GNU which had the objectives 
of ensuring that Zimbabwe would escape from the political and economic crises that had impacted 
negatively on the human security of Zimbabweans.   
8.2.2 GNU’s are Compromises of a Mediation Process often for Progression sake  
The thesis also concludes that GNUs have been established across the globe with the aim of attaining 
progress especially in a country undergoing turmoil. However, GNUs are established through a series of 
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negotiations or mediation processes. Mediation involves the use of a third party in a manner that is distant 
from the use of condign power but of attraction, co-opting and of persuasion as a means of averting or 
even terminating the escalation of a disagreement. In the formation of a GNU, it was established that 
mediation does not necessarily and literally mean that only a single group or individual can lead the entire 
process, but a combination of representatives from international, regional and sub-regional organisations 
can all participate as third parties. The GNU formation process in Zimbabwe, that is the Mediation 
Process, involved stages where representatives were engaged by the SADC Mediator and having to refer 
to their Principals before decision making.  The GNU in Madagascar for instance involved the AU which 
established the International Contact Group (ICG) through which the AU coordinates and harmonizes her 
efforts with the UN, the relevant REC and other regional bodies as well as the permanent and the African 
members of the UN Security Council.   
The thesis also concludes that although the process of mediation has been used throughout history, it is 
however hinged on certain various factors such as mandate which relates to the fact that the mediation 
process has to be authorised by an established organisation of some sort for instance in the Zimbabwean 
context, the AU gave SADC bloc the greenlight to intervene in the 2008 crises situation. Another factor 
worth considering is impartiality and inclusivity in which third parties must run a balanced process that 
engages with all actors and deals with them fairly. Thirdly, the issue of entry and consent in which parties 
to a dispute must agree to the mediation process. The third party of a mediator should devise a strategy 
upon which they have to execute the entire mediation process. The strategy has to be authorised by the 
authorizing organisation. Lastly is leverage which refers to the aptitude of go-betweens to direct the path 
of belligerents. These factors are a basis upon which the success of mediation can be executed. Mediation 
has hence been the foundation upon which GNUs have been created. It was established and it is being 
concluded in the thesis that that GNUs are associated with power sharing in which two or more political 
parties establish the institutions of government. While, GNU can be horizontal where agreements are 
based on the elite’s decisions, they can also be vertical in which the agreements emanate from the people.  
 It was established that governments of national unity are also known as national unity governments, or 
national union governments that are designed specifically to accommodate all participating political 
players such as the presidium, legislature, cabinet, security sector and the civil service in governmental 
structures.  From gathered literature, it can be concluded that the formation of GNUs has been occasioned 
by a myriad of reasons that include but not limited to the need to end conflict or at least limit the outbreak 
of a potential conflict.  At the same time, it can be concluded that GNUs are born out of legitimacy related 
factors in which the party in office can be severely weakened such that it is incapacitated to govern the 
country alone. GNUs also serve three purposes namely the incorporation of diverse political interests 
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particularly the main antagonists in the preceding conflict to compel them into political cooperation; 
secondly, for the public at large, it is meant to serve as a practical and symbolic form of reconciliation; 
thirdly and lastly, it is designed for the antagonists as a period during which they can learn to know each 
other better, to reduce the negative stereotypes about each other and to increase the level of trust in each 
other.    
 
On one hand the need to need to fulfil a constitutional requirement, as transitional arrangements meant to 
ensure smooth transfer of power to majority rule or to resolve political quagmire can be the rationale 
behind the formation of GNUs.  On the other hand, governments of national unity have particularly been 
established to resolve political disputes emanating from political stalemates. GNUs hence act as 
transitional measure, a vehicle to reduce tension and to create the space to derive durable peace and 
sustainable change.  GNUs in general have been cited as a key attribute to the cessation of hostilities in 
instances of violent conflict for instance the post 2007 Kenyan Presidential elections, and the Malagasy 
case of September 2009 which brought peace in the countries after a series of serious conflicts. They are 
also critical in the democratisation phase. Although GNUs have been received with mixed feelings in the 
academic discourse, in the media and everyday parlance, it can be concluded that available literature 
focused on the relationship between mediation and the formation of GNUs, the reasons behind the 
formation of GNUs and the politics of GNUs. The study henceforth set to establish the best approach that 
can be used in the creation of GNUs hence in the process offering alternative and well-grounded 
theoretical and methodological approaches to GNUs.  
8.2.3 A theoretical Analysis of the Zimbabwean GNU  
It was also established that Zimbabwe’s GNU is fathomable from three main theories of international 
politicking namely the Ripeness Theory, the Readiness Theory and the Elite Theory.  The Ripeness 
Theory informed the phenomenon that was understudy from the perspective of that which inclines parties 
in a clash to negotiate and reach an amicable solution and when to act while the Readiness Theory as an 
extension of the Ripeness Theory revealed the motivation to act that ended the Zimbabwean conflict, an 
optimism that shrouded the outcome of conciliation and negotiation or mediation. At the same time the 
Elite Theory sought to reveal that the GNU in Zimbabwe was an elite-driven theory, a perspective that 
was confirmed from the multiple realities that were attained in the data collection process. In the Ripeness 
Theory is the notion that parties resolve their conflict only when they are ready to do so and when the 
alternative, usually unilateral, means of achieving a satisfactory result are blocked. As such parties to a 
disagreement may feel that they are in an uncomfortable and costly predicament; hence at that ripe 
moment, they seek or are amenable to proposals that offer a way out. It hence is the ripe moment that 
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inclines parties to a disagreement into an agreement to act and this can be noted in the Zimbabwean 
context prior the formation of the GNU.   
  
Parties to the disagreement mainly the ZANU-PF and the MDC-T were caught up in serious predicament 
shells that required the attribution of the other party to be escapable. The former was failing to deal with 
the economy of Zimbabwe which had in essence impacted on the social fabric of the society and at the 
same time, the latter had failed to secure the position of the presidium for many years and even in 2008 
when it had won in the March Harmonized elections. It therefore became the ripe moment for both 
parties.  The time for ripeness did not occur in a vacuum as certain conditions necessitated the ripe time in 
the Zimbabwean context. It was established that the mutually hurting stalemate (MHS), which is a period 
optimally associated with an impending, past, or recently avoided catastrophe had been reached by the 
two major political parties in Zimbabwe.  The ripe moment is described as the juncture in a dispute when 
the parties are in a predicament that cannot be escaped without compromise. It is by virtue of there being 
a mutually hurting stalemate (MHS) that parties to the GNU chose to find a solution to the crises that was 
in Zimbabwe. Although vital in revealing the ripe time for Zimbabwe’s political situation of the year 
2008, it is concluded that the Ripeness Theory fails in answering some of the events that unfolded in 
Zimbabwe and examines the Zimbabwean situation from a single lens bracketing the political parties on 
the basis of the mutually hurting stalemate.    
  
The understanding of the position of the parties prior to the formation of the GNU in Zimbabwe can be 
informed by the readiness theory. The Readiness Theory is a revision and elaboration of Zartman’s 
Ripeness Theory. The Readiness Theory is a characteristic of a single disputant that encourages 
movement toward or participation in negotiation. The theory informed the study on the basis of the factors 
that encouraged political parties to engage in the Zimbabwe 2008 crisis. For ZANU-PF, getting into 
negotiations with the MDC especially the Tsvangirai party was about economic stability to gunner 
political mileage in a country which was frenzied because of an economy that had robustly deteriorated 
since the late 1990s. On the other hand, because the MDC-T had suffered numerous electoral defeats on 
alleged election rigging by the ZANU-PF government, getting into a negotiation was vital as it entailed 
that their party members were going to get influential ministerial posts that they intended to use in 
changing every factor that had contributed to ZANU-PF’s survival. The MDC-M in the same vein sought 
to enhance its relevance in a period where they attracted a small following.  
  
Therefore, despite the mutually hurting stalemate, it can be concluded that parties to Zimbabwe’s GNU 
were encouraged by party and environmental conditions to enter into the agreement. The Readiness 
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Theory also focuses on a third party or mediator who is responsible for bringing parties into an agreement.  
The SADC mediator, Thabo Mbeki played a crucial role in revealing to different parties the need to 
establish a GNU for the progression of Zimbabwe. The Readiness Theory just like the Ripeness Rheory 
focus much on the factors that affect the political elites, a factor that side-lines the involvement of the 
general masses in the overall decision making of the state. Such neglection regarding events that led to the 
formation of the SADC mediated GNU in Zimbabwe between 2009 and 2013 can be explained by the 
Elite Theory.    
  
In the theory is the concept of ‘elites’ which is based on the notion that every society holds a ruling 
minority, a group that controls and disputes the most important power sources. It can be concluded that 
such a view of the elite theory informed this study as the formation of the GNU in Zimbabwe was 
controlled and spearheaded by a few people in the top political brasses of the three main political parties 
that became parties to the global political agreement which gave birth to the government of national unity. 
The GNU was thus an offspring of the ruling minority in Zimbabwe from the MDC-T, MDC-M and 
ZANU-PF parties. The GNU itself was an elite settlement as the masses played a spectator role while the 
elites determined their fate.  The Elite Theory is also based on the premise that the elites dispute power 
(reaching different levels of conflict and violence), but new elites also enter the game through different 
mechanisms of elite recruitment. While, the elites that ran the government in Zimbabwe between 1980 
and 2008 were largely from ZANU-PF the GNU provided the opportunity for elite recruitment of the 
MDC-T and MDC-M members.   
  
Consequently, the theories that have been used in this study greatly play a vital role as a theoretical base 
upon which this study is hinged. Whereas the Ripeness Theory focuses on the situation and time that led 
to the formation of the GNU, the theory fails to tackle what the readiness theory fills; the motivation and 
optimism of the political parties and including SADC members states inter alia some hidden motives of 
the SADC mediator of the South African state which saw the crises in Zimbabwe as perilous to its 
survival. However, the Readiness Theory also fails to account for the players that were involved in the 
conciliatory actions that led to the signing of the global political agreement which in turn gave birth to the 
GNU in Zimbabwe. Such a variable also applies to the Ripeness Theory. The Elite Theory hence comes in 
to fill such a gap but being the frame that best explains that the SADC mediated GNU was elite driven in 
Zimbabwe as has been mentioned and explained in this chapter. Consequently, events that unfolded in the 
mediation of the GNU were occasioned by a mutually hurting stalemate in which the environment 
presented the conflicting parties with grave troubles in their need to control Zimbabwe in the immediate 
and long run. Parties to the agreement were expectant of a way out hence they agreed to negotiate and 
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bring forth the GNU.  This is explained by the Ripeness Theory. The time was ripe and the parties were 
ready for negotiations. However, the process was elite driven as the elites ignored the majority, creating 
an elite settlement.    
  
8.2.4 Conclusion on the research methodology   
The research established whether the GNU provided an opportunity to end the Zimbabwean crises 
through the use of qualitative research approaches. This was based on the fact that the nature of research 
which sought an in-depth understanding of the of the GNU’s usefulness in ending the crises in Zimbabwe 
through inquiring various perceptions from different individuals. It sought multiple realities and it was 
informed by the interpretivist paradigm to establish whether the SADC-mediated GNU provided an 
opportunity to end political and economic crises in Zimbabwe. The interpretive social science research 
used a case study to answer the why and how questions in ascertaining whether the SADC mediated GNU 
was a lost opportunity to end the economic and political crisis in Zimbabwe. The case study research 
design had unique strengths over others such as phenomenology, grounded theory, ethnography and 
narrative analysis in that it reflects on four essential tests of validity, namely construct validity, external 
validity, internal validity and reliability.   
  
The population sample included persons or organisations who and that directly and indirectly participated 
in governance issues during the time of the GNU, are well versed with events that unfolded during the 
time. Their in-depth knowledge of political developments in the country was the reason for their selection. 
The targets were selected through non-probability sampling methods and they allowed the researcher to 
reach the desired target quickly though with difficulties related to postponement of interviews and 
resistance from prominent political figures. The researcher used purposive sampling and snowballing. 
Data was collected through in-depth interviews, focus group discussions and documentary analysis. The 
primary and secondary data collection sources are vital in getting information that has a historical 
connotation. The GNU was hence examined in retrospect. Data was analysed through thematic analysis 
and qualitative content analysis. The former for primary data and the latter for secondary data.  In 
ensuring reliability, the researcher utilised structural corroboration and respondent validation. Structural 
corroboration involves the use of multiple techniques of data collection and in this research indepth 
interviews, focus group discussions and documentary analysis were used. On the other hand, respondent 
validation was also used. The researcher conducted a dialogue forum in which players in the GNU were 
asked to comment on the gathered data. Principles such as the informed consent; respect for privacy, 
anonymity and permission to conduct the research and avoidance of harm were ethical principles that 
were observed by the researcher. Gender issues were also observed by the researcher but the 1:1 ratio was 
not attained. Most of the respondents were in FGDs and male. The conclusion that has been made 
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concerning the research methodology is that the qualitative approach provides a rich form of data, 
particularly the multiple realities of the phenomenon understudy. It also can be concluded that research of 
political nature faces a lot of resistance and the witting or unwitting evasion of certain questions for 
political reasons. However, structural corroboration is vital in getting a comprehensive analysis of the 
phenomenon under study, which is the use of various data collection methods.   
8.2.5 Formation of the GNU in Zimbabwe   
The period of disagreements theoretically culminated into a manifestation of an explicit clash between 
opposing structures of independent Zimbabwe. In the period towards the new millennium there was 
accumulation of differences between ZANU-PF and leaders of the ZCTU as the latter blamed the policies 
and practices for having a deleterious impact on the state of Zimbabwe. This hence led to the formation of 
the MDC which was led by the former ZCTU leader, the late Morgan Tsvangirai. The period was 
followed by serious fights between the newly formed MDC party and ZANU-PF with the latter viewing 
the former as a party that was formed by former colonial master. In the phase conflict between ZANU-PF 
and MDC escalated over the best governance practices and such a period was followed by the impasse 
period. This is the period under which both ZANU-PF and the MDC party could not win unless 
compromising their positions. It was the period after the 2008 June Runoff elections, in which the 
ZANUPF regime retained the power to rule Zimbabwe which was in a crisis and at the same time the 
MDC party was crying foul because of the unconducive nature of the political environment in which 
ZANU-PF intimidated citizens to vote for them. This hence led to the Battle De-Escalation Period in 
which both parties admitted that the fights were not solving issues before hand and contributing to their 
party objectives. This therefore led to the Settlement and combined effort stage in which Southern African 
Development Community (SADC) bloc facilitated negotiations through the warring parties in Zimbabwe 
leading to a combined effort under the label Global Political Agreement of September 2008 which created 
the Government of National Unity and became effective in February of 2009.   
  
It was noted that the formation of the GNU is best understood from a historical view because after the 
1884-5 Berlin Conference in which white European countries superimposed their dominion in the African 
continent, in the famous ‘Scramble for Africa’ brought about intense changes in the socio-economic and 
political status-quo of the territory. The conference created the out-groups and in-groups and the former 
became the controller, which was powerful and ruled in a way that it reckoned indispensable. These were 
the whites who were few who constituted the group. The in-group, were the majority blacks. The system 
that was created favoured the out-group at the expense of the in-group which led to the armed struggle 
resulting in the independence of Zimbabwe. It was established that the post-colonial state did not change 
the colonial set-up such that the ZANU-PF elite became new wine in old bottles. In this way, they 
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maintained grip to power by all means such that when the party was challenged by the MDC in the new 
millennium, it increased the use of force in managing MDC and other political opponents. The GNU was 
thus a result of the historical factor. It was also established that the GNU was a product of earlier policies 
in which the Mugabe regime tried to transform the life of the black people soon after independence.  As 
such extending several goods and services to various areas of an independent state which was part of 
redressing colonial imbalances constrained the budget of the country. Mugabe’s socialist approach in an 
independent Zimbabwe led the country into serious economic woes.   The opposition to his rule was a 
direct manifestation of his policies of suppression which emanated from the failure to manage the 
economy. Losing power Mugabe used condign power to restore his legitimacy and the serious 
suppression became a cause for concern in 2008 after the Run-off election.   The conclusion that is 
reached in the research is that the GNU is an indirect manifestation of earlier policies by the Mugabe 
regime.   
  
At the same time, it was established that, the Western agenda for regime change also led to the GNU. On 
one hand, the Western Bloc created an economic crisis by sabotaging the ZANU-PF regime, while on the 
other hand the ZANU-PF regime used anti-democratic tenets in order to resist the external cum internal 
force resulting in a serious crisis that ended with the enemies being represented by MDC and the 
ZANUPF regime coming together.  These events under the regime agenda notion accordingly led to the 
formation of the GNU in the Zimbabwean context as Zimbabwe plunged into an economic and political 
crisis that required a helping hand from the outside. ZANU-PF’s stance since 2000 had led to the state 
being labelled a pariah state and the Zimbabwean state became isolated. The social, political and 
economic environment of Zimbabwe in the post-independent period and before the formation of the GNU 
contributed immensely towards its formations. It was the need to return to normalcy in these sectors that 
inclined the political parties to embark on a collaborative effort in Zimbabwe.   
  
The mediation process in Zimbabwe that led to the formation of the GNU can be traced to as early as 
2007 in March. It is the March 2007 incident where opposition leader, the late Morgan Tsvangirai and 
high-ranking members of the MDC were attacked and arrested along with more than 110 activists by 
heavily armed riot police preventing a ‘Save Zimbabwe Campaign’ prayer meeting in Harare’s Highfields 
Township. The issue was brought to the attention of the SADC bloc that the Zimbabwe situation posed a 
threat to the SADC region as failure to pacify the political situation between ZANU-PF and MDC would 
lead to instability in Zimbabwe and the region as a whole. The 2007 incident was unique and 
unacceptable in the sense that it brought to the attention of the international community that Zimbabwe’s 
Mugabe regime was using state-sponsored violence against its opponents and flouting such an incident to 
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paint a deleterious image of the SADC bloc and friends of the democratic western world such the 
Republic of South Africa and Botswana.    
  
Thabo Mbeki was given the role to mediate in the Zimbabwe crisis and his mediation in 2007 is credited 
with negotiating important electoral reforms, including Amendment 18 of the Constitution of Zimbabwe 
that was supposed to facilitate credible elections in Zimbabwe. Mbeki managed to assist in the electoral 
reforms for the March 2008 elections but it became a threat to ZANU-PF and they used a state-supported 
intimidation campaign especially in the June 2008 Run-off election.  Morgan Tsvangirai withdrew from 
the electoral race in the process and Mugabe was controversially re-elected thereafter in an event that was 
condemned and dismissed internationally. Mbeki continued with his role and on the 5th of July 2008 an 
exclusive meeting was held with the different parties which led to the inclusive but unsuccessful meeting 
of 10 July 2008; and the three rounds of negotiations (July – September 2008). It was in the final Round 
of the three negotiations that an agreement was reached in September of 2008 in Harare where a 
Memorandum of Understanding was signed between the ZANU-PF party and the two MDC parties. This 
brought about the GNU.   
8.2.6 The GNU as a long-lasting solution to Zimbabwe’s crisis    
The GNU in the Zimbabwean context was defined as the amalgamation of different political parties after 
a series of political conflict. Although the GNU was facilitated by the SADC bloc, SADC’s timing was 
questioned and is questionable that the bloc delayed in intervening in Zimbabwe considering that the 
Zimbabwean situation had been an agenda internationally since the creation of the MDC around the year  
1999.  It was established that the SADC bloc’s early conflict prevention mechanism has always been at 
fault as the bloc awaits the situation to escalate into a crisis before it intervenes.   It was also established in 
the research that SADC-mediated GNU provided an opportunity to end the political and economic crises 
in Zimbabwe. However, such notions were more on the theoretical side as practically, the way in which 
the parties to the GNU acted and behaved affected the essence of having the GNU as a transitional phase 
in Zimbabwe. The political parties that participated in the GNU had gone into the agreement with selfish 
party interests.  At the same time, it was noted that the political party inequality affected the functioning 
of the GNU in Zimbabwe which had an effect on making it an opportunity upon which a lasting solution 
to Zimbabwe’s crisis could be established. The GNU was supposed to be an opportunity of solving 
Zimbabwe’s crises but the fact that it was elite driven meant that formation of it excluded the opinion of 
the masses. As such the elites who participated in the GNU did not have the consent of the people and 
neither were they answerable to the people. It can be concluded that GNU’s without the involvement of 
the masses are bound to fail as parties to the agreement are not accountable to the masses.   
174  
  
Ultimately, the GNU was an opportunity that could have solved Zimbabwe’s crises but it was established 
in the wrong context and the different viewpoints of political parties, including their intentions in the 
agreement impacted on it negatively. While, ZANU-PF entered the agreement with the aim of being 
helped to revive the economy of Zimbabwe by the MDC-T party that appeared to have had the means to 
it, the latter agreed to be part of the agreement because it wanted to limit the powers of ZANU-PF in the 
governance of Zimbabwe. At the same time, the MDC-M party that was led by Mutambara wanted to gain 
political relevance as it attracted very few people in the 2008 elections. As such besides being established 
on the wrong footing, the GNU in Zimbabwe was composed of political parties that were interested in 
pursuing party objectives instead of permanently ending Zimbabwe’s crises. The manifestation of such 
claims were noted in the way in which the parties fought in the period of the GNU with the MDC-T party 
members being labelled cry-babies because of ZANU-PF’s failure to fulfil its contractual obligations. In 
fact, ZANU-PF wittingly failed to act according to the clauses that were written in the global political 
agreement because it still maintained a grip to state machinery. The purposes of the GNU which were 
amongst others the need to facilitate a process of economic and political reforms played second fiddle to 
identity politics in the GNU between 2009 and 2013. It is on this basis that, it is established in this 
research that theoretically, the GNU was an opportunity which was supposed to end Zimbabwe’s crises. 
The period of temporary stability created great economic opportunities for Zimbabweans. However, the 
GNU failed to be a success in the long-term process of Zimbabwe’s political and economic situation 
because of several factors summed up above. As the practice part of the GNU has impacted on Zimbabwe 
years after the end of it.  
  
Against such a backdrop, it is the gist of this chapter to present the measures that are necessary to enhance 
the relevance of governments of national unity and how they can be a lasting solution to a crisis situation. 
In fact, Zimbabwe as a state has the potential to establish GNUs in the future. The thesis will hence 
outline the factors worth considering in the formation of an inclusive government, composed of different 
political parties. In the same vein, the thesis will suggest ways in which the SADC bloc as a sub-regional 
body can improve its conflict prevention early warning systems which have always faulted in the region.    
8.3 Recommendations   
The following recommendations are based on the data that was collected by the researcher. Due to the 
nature of the central thrust which aimed at ascertaining whether the GNU in Zimbabwe offered an 
opportunity upon which Zimbabwe’s crises could have been ended. Although, the recommendations focus 
on how to make GNUs work, they also focus on the enhancing the SADC bloc and measures that the 
Zimbabwean government and nation as a whole can adopt to overcome the current crises created by the 
failure of the state especially the elite to use the GNU as a platform of ending it.   
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8.3.1 Involvement of the masses   
The governance of the modern state relies on the general masses. On such a basis it was established that 
prior to the GNU the masses were not consulted and their opinions were not considered such that the 
entire process was elite driven as explicated by the Elite Theory. As such the GNU in Zimbabwe was an 
elite settlement in which the elite were neither responsible nor answerable to the people. It is on this basis 
that, it was suggested that the creation of such a major decision should involve the masses. The decision 
in the formation of a compromise must emanate from the people so that the drivers of the compromise 
must be accountable to the people. Although, members of the GNU argued that everything was done on a 
short notice, it has to be appreciated that the talks started in July 2008 and the agreement was reached on 
15 September 2008. This gave the political parties time to consult their party members but the parties 
chose not to. Based on this, R 4 noted that “…GNUs are always a challenge because different political 
parties with different ideologies are forced into a marriage of convenience. As such without a social 
contract between the parties and the people, the parties are bound to act otherwise when push comes to 
shove...” The respondent hence suggested that GNUs are supposed to come from the bottom and elite 
have to better the ideas of the masses and make them feasible.  
  
 FGD1-2 on the same note illustrated that grassroots involvement is fundamental before the formation of 
GNUs because they result in elements of answerability. The people that are charged to execute the GNU 
will at least be answerable to the people rather than a sub-regional body or the other political party. Such a 
lesson can be derived from the Zimbabwean GNU which was infused with serious defections and 
fighting. The GNU hence became a lost opportunity for ending Zimbabwe’s crisis because it was 
erroneously established without the hand of the masses. Even, R4 on this stated that, the GNU was 
created with a lot of disrespect on the part of both ZANU-PF and MDC supporters. The respondent on 
this further noted that the Zimbabwean population participated in an election where they chose Morgan 
Tsvangirai as the leader of the nation in March 2008. The June 2008 result raised and still raises a lot of 
questions. However, despite the people’s voices, the elite had to establish their own settlement without the 
say of the people who were coming from an election. As such the people needed to be consulted in 
Zimbabwe. Therefore, it is plausible to note that the formation of GNUs must be approached from a 
holistic point of view where the masses are involved to ensure that they are not elite settlements. The role 
of civil society must not be ignored in the formation of GNUs as they bridge the gap between the masses 
and the government. As such it should be the priority of regional bodies like SADC to identify and work 
with civil society in the formation of GNUs. Consulting civil society may be critical in establishing the 
factors worth considering when dealing with parties to a GNU.   
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8.3.2 Political parties should enter GNUs with good intentions   
The need for political parties to enter GNUs with good intentions was also emphasized by various 
respondents during data collection processes. It was noted that in the Zimbabwean case, political parties 
wittingly and unwittingly flouted certain agreements of the GPA opting for political party goals which 
destroyed the essence of having an inclusive government meant to change the status-quo of a country. As 
such there is need for parties to a political agreement to understand the rationale behind the establishment 
of the settlement. At the same time, political parties must work towards the attaining the set goals of a 
political settlement. This was noted by R7 who noted that it is critical for political parties to understand 
the essence of political settlements and must work towards the fulfilment of agreed clauses. However, the 
respondent noted that with the nature of politics it was impossible to simply ask political parties to act 
accordingly. This hence requires the participation of the masses, regional and sub-regional bodies to 
monitor the implementation of the political agreement. The respondent in this way argued that bodies 
such as AU and the SADC had a role to impartially monitor the implementation of political settlements or 
GNUs. The masses ought to be consulted so that they participate in the implementation of GNUs or 
political settlements by evaluating the implementation of their input.   
  
Thus, from the onset GNUs must be established with political parties that have to be told their relevance 
and duties to the agreement. The consequences of failing to the agreed elements must be noted from the 
onset. In the Zimbabwean context R1 noted that “…ZANU-PF besides the fact that it entered through the 
back door also ignored the provisions of the agreement knowing that nothing was going to it…it had all 
the powers…SADC actually listened to ZANU-PF… The sub-regional or regional bodies must ensure 
that they retain power to act when agreements are not fulfilled. GNUs may not be desirable but in the 
event that they are established the right foundations must be emphasised as they can have long term 
consequences on the actual process of GNU implementation.  Political parties, as such have to enter 
GNUs with the right intention which has to be made clear by authorizing bodies such as SADC and AU. 
The groups have to also monitor implementation together with the general populace to make the 
participants of GNUs answerable.  
8.3.3 Neutral Transitional Authority in crises situation    
GNUs as compromises that involve the different political parties have not worked in the African context.  
The Government of National Unity, also known as the ‘grand coalition cabinet’ that was a designation for 
the coalition government in Kenya from April 2008 to April 2013 and the Malagasy 2007 GNU together 
with the Zimbabwe GNU did not yield positive results in terms of reform for the countries. Kenya has had 
successive disputed elections after the end of the GNU and Zimbabwe is a state in a crisis. Based on the 
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history of political parties, it is cognisant for organizations such as the African Union (AU) and the SADC 
bloc to consider neutral transitional authorities to run government in a transitionary period manner. 
Political parties must not be seen in the entire transition period so that reforms are done genuinely. The 
powers in the transitional period must belong to these bodies so that they can help states to enter into new 
phases of reforms. The GNU in Zimbabwe did not work because ZANU-PF maintained firm grip onto 
power and state structures such that reform was grim to inculcate.  Such suggestions were made by R2 
who was of the view that SADC a sub-regional body and the AU have to devise strategies that assist 
states in the transition periods. As such the respondent further noted that it has to be accepted that 
elections in Africa are often contested hence it has to be the role of regional and sub-regional 
organizations to set up bodies that are responsible for the governance of  a state until the period where a 
credible election can be held. The groupings have to ensure that impartiality and fairness are at the centre 
of the bodies that are established to lead the transitional phase. R6 on this noted that both the AU and 
SADC are often cited as groups of dictators. In the event that there is a crisis, the groups should not 
favour any political party as they lead the transitional phase. The solution can have a two-fold implication 
viz.  
i. It can lead to real reforms  ii. It can lessen conflicts in a state between political parties fearing the 
intervention of the regional groupings which should lead to genuine reforms.  
Consequently, it is the suggestion in this thesis that political parties must not make up transitional 
governments. Rather, the AU and SADC should establish clauses in which transitional periods are 
entrusted in them so that there can be real changes. In the Zimbabwe context, the GNU was filled with 
serious fights as political parties focused more on party agendas rather than on permanently solving the 
crises in Zimbabwe which has robustly returned. GNUs that are composed of political parties as can be 
learnt from the Zimbabwean situation are never fully embraced by political parties as they will be busy 
strategically positioning themselves for the next election. It hence has to be the role of AU and the SADC 
bloc to provide transitional governments so that political parties strategise outside the government. 
Elections must also be led by the two bodies once their transnational mandates are over so that changes 
can be real and acceptable.  Zimbabwe’s GNU hence serves as a lesson upon which SADC and even the 
AU can move away from handing power to parties that will abuse it yet the crises situations continue.   
  
8.3.4 Political will of actors involved in GNU a necessity   
Related to the point raised above is the notion that political settlements without political will are bound to 
fail. As such R2 noted that for a “…GNU setup to succeed, there is need for political will of actors who 
should act in good faith, people should not be forced into it (if forced they will do it for the sake of it 
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without commitment to its success) and at the same time any GNU must have provision for 
disengagement such that whoever feels it’s not working well can pullout (in the 2009 one people were 
stuck in the SADC GNU)… Implied in the respondent’s riposte is that political will of seeing a GNU 
work is a basis upon which GNUs can work. As such without political will or commitment, GNUs are 
bound to fail. The respondent further noted that GNUs should be open such that a party is given the 
provision to pull out if the other party is not honouring the agreement. Even FGD2-4 noted that political 
settlements similar to the GNU that was created in Zimbabwe between 2009 and 2013 should be treated 
as events that impact the country as a whole hence only patriotic states can make them work. The 
respondent further noted that once politics of identity takes centre stage in GNUs, political will and 
commitment to fulfil settlement agreements are less.  
  
The GNU could not provide an opportunity upon which Zimbabwe could escape the Hobbesian nightmare 
environment that continues to negatively impact on the politico-economic and social fabric of the state 
because parties lacked the political will to make it work. R1 blamed the ZANU-PF party for its reluctance 
to ensure that political and economic reforms could be realised in Zimbabwe. R3 on the same note noted 
that the failure of the GNU to ensure that they would have security sector reforms in Zimbabwe was seen 
by the way in which the army toppled Robert Mugabe in 2017. The respondent noted that it became clear 
after the 2017 November events that in the GNU phase ZANU-PF maintained a firm grip on the security 
sector because the same guys who toppled Robert Mugabe are now are the top brass of ZANU-PF as 
party. Thus it become important that any formation of a government of national unity emphasise political 
will and commitment which should be the basis upon which GNUs have to operate. Such a lesson is 
depicted in the Zimbabwean context as a lack of political will and commitment on the part of ZANU-PF 
which resulted in the GNU being a missed opportunity upon which Zimbabwe could have escaped its 
political and economic crises.   
8.3.5 SADC should improve on its early warning mechanisms   
The Zimbabwean crisis and the formation of the GNU cannot be treated as national phenomenon as they 
had and have had sub-regional and even regional consequences. However, it has to be questioned why 
SADC intervened at the peak of a crisis when it could prevent it from escalating into a fully blown 
conflict. R5 on this noted that if one is to look at the Zimbabwean crisis, it would be erroneous not to cite 
the ruthlessness of the ruling party coupled with serious politically motivated fighting which infused the 
political space of Zimbabwe. According to the respondent the SADC bloc indirectly acknowledged that 
the Zimbabwean system needed intervention as early as 2001 through the famous Campbell case. The  
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2007/2008 Campbell case in which the SADC tribunal ruled that the Zimbabwean government could not 
evict Mike Campbell and other white farmers from their land as this amounted to discrimination against 
whites is an apt portrayal of the fact that Zimbabwe was in a crisis.   
  
Even the persecution that targeted political opponents who were offered asylum in countries such as South 
Africa and Botswana, including states in Europe such as the United Kingdom demonstrated that 
Zimbabwe was in a crisis. Despite all the signs of the crisis, the SADC bloc was reluctant to act in  
Zimbabwe. After the March 2007 Highfields incident, SADC still maintained a low profile in the 
Zimbabwean case. It was only in 2008 that the sub-regional body intensified its efforts after ZANU-PF 
had unleashed a reign of terror on its opponents in a state that was hit by the cholera epidemic which 
claimed over 4000 people.   It hence should be the role of SADC to intervene in states before situations 
reach a crisis state. SADC’s early warning mechanism should be enhanced so that potential conflicts are 
detected before they escalate into fully blown conflicts. The SADC bloc can hence engage parties to a 
conflict early when the conflict is still in its infancy phase particularly when political leaders are 
exchanging words or in serious periods of hate speech. This may go a long in lessening the tension and 
potential for a situation escalating into a serious crisis. The SADC body hence dismally failed to act in 
Zimbabwe, only acting when intervention was inevitable. Based on such notion, the SADC bloc hence 
must work towards improving its early warning mechanisms so that conflicts are detected in their infancy. 
The fundamental question however is, can SADC strengthen its early warning mechanisms? Of course, it 
can, but the problem will probably revolve around the political will to act at the decisive time.   
8.3.6 Establishing a national brand in Zimbabwe  
There is the need to establish a national brand in Zimbabwe which refers to a sense of belonging among 
all the people. Zimbabwe is a state that is divided on the basis of various historical and state related 
connotations. As such any coalition government is bound to be infused with serious fighting because the 
nation is already divided not only on the basis of political inclinations but even tribal inclinations. It hence 
should be the role of political parties in Zimbabwe to assist in ending the disunity in the country and 
devise strategies that aim towards creating a sense of identity of the Zimbabwe context. The lack of 
having a national brand that unites the people as Zimbabweans has led to crisis situations time and again. 
By creating the national brand, that which divides the people can be substituted by that which unites it. It 
can be noted that the GNU in Zimbabwe failed to be an opportunity for Zimbabwe to capitalize on in 
order to escape its political and economic crisis because Zimbabweans with different beliefs and visions 
entered into the settlement. It hence should be the role of the government, political parties as alluded to in 
the foregoing and even several other non-governmental players to establish measures that can occasion a 
sense of belonging in Zimbabwe.   
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In the need to ensure that there is a national brand, R1 noted that, it has to start from the grassroots where 
school syllabuses should teach citizenship awareness that is, teach people to be morally upright towards 
the constitution. The respondent further noted that the teachings at primary school must mold the citizens 
from a young age to understand the difference between being partisan and patriotic. Zimbabwe’s GNU 
failed because of the emphasis of the former word at the expense of the latter. R6 suggested that 
Zimbabwe is a state that has been affected by serious injustices since independence hence justice must be 
served in the country through neutral parties or actors. As such, issues of transitional justice which remain 
unresolved even up to this day should be addressed through an amnesty instead of just national healing so 
that past transgressions will not be revisited. The respondent however noted that there should be 
reparations for the victims, the transitional justice part be buried for good. It is through the creation of a 
national brand that any policies and measures established to serve Zimbabwe and help it move from the 
economic and political crises shell can work. Such a factor can lead to the embracement of the 
developmental state model as alluded below.   
8.3.7 Adoption of Developmental State Traits to Revamp the Economy by the Zimbabwean 
Government   
There was a group of respondents who noted that in as much as advocating a workable GNU is necessary, 
it must be the concern of the Zimbabwean state to move from the GNU as a lost opportunity for ending 
the economic and political crises that have impacted on the country even the GNU era. It was noted that 
the Zimbabwean state must concentrate on factors that can end the crises that the GNU failed to 
permanently resolve despite the SADC bloc’s efforts that led to the formation of the compromise. In 
suggesting the possible way forward, the adoption of the developmental state was advocated.  Therefore, 
in revamping the economy and ending the crises in Zimbabwe, various respondents called for the need to 
embrace traits of the developmental state model in Zimbabwe.   
  
A developmental state is frequently theoretically located between a free market capitalist economic 
system and centrally planned economic system, and called a plan-rational capitalist system, ‘conjoining 
private ownership with state guidance, (Woo-Cummings 1999).  The ability to promote and sustain 
development, understanding by development the combination of steady high rates of growth and 
structural change in the productive system, both domestically and in its relationship to the international 
economy is the essence of the developmental state model. R6 on this noted that the Zimbabwean 
government must not be moved to surrender the role of leading development in Zimbabwe, hence it has to 
compromise and deal with the developed states, even those from the Western world for Foreign Direct 
Investment. As such the respondent noted that there is the need for the protection of their embryonic 
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domestic industries, aggressive acquisition of foreign technology, export-oriented economics and even the 
creation of social cohesion. The elements can result in a revamp of the economy. To add, policies have to 
be consistent and predictable so as to attract investment in the country. Zimbabwe as a third world country 
needs investment in the development process hence investors must be given the platform to invest under a 
fair and predictable policy and political environment. The state “must” take the lead just like how the 
Asian Tigers did it in the 1950s.  
8.3.8 The need to end the party-state conflation in Zimbabwe   
The rationale behind the failure of the GNU was the party-state conflation that infused the first republic 
governance in Zimbabwe. There was no difference between the ruling party, ZANU-PF and the state 
before the GNU and at the period of its operation, the scenario continued. There was no difference 
between ZANU-PF and the state such that in the GNU period the party maintained its power over 
everything in the state especially the national institutions. The effect of such a governance phenomenon is 
that the national institutions serve a political party instead of the general populace. There is therefore the 
need to end the party state conflation in Zimbabwe where ‘ZANU-PF is the state and the state is 
ZANUPF’. The failure to realise unity at the national level was orchestrated by the fact that the state is 
governed from a party politics window which continues to impact on issues of fairness and justice. 
ZANU-PF as a party must move from running all the institutions of the state. Even, if a second GNU is 
created in Zimbabwe in the 21st century, the compromised institution is likely not to change anything in 
Zimbabwe as state institutions are captured by the political party. Zimbabwe hence needs a period of 
transition that is headed by regional bodies so that the infiltration of ZANU-PF is eliminated in all the 
institutions operating in Zimbabwe. The Zimbabwe state hence ought to be freed from ZANU-PF chains 
as the state is being governed from party lines which has not yielded positive results economic wise and 
politically in the past 39 years. The state has to be separated from the party such that institutions serve 
their purposes and not the purposes of ZANU-PF.   
  
The Zimbabwean crises that failed to be permanently resolved by the SADC mediated GNU requires a 
holistic approach which requires all the institutions from within the state and the outside world to assist 
the state. Although GNUs are undesirable, it needs to be appreciated that they are bound to be established 
in crises situations. As such making GNUs work is noble but at the same time, Zimbabwe’s crises 
situation ought to be addressed from the non-GNU perspective because the GNU stands as a lost 
opportunity upon which the economic and political crises in Zimbabwe could have ended.  Various 
players ought to be involved and various factors or conditions considered at the state level, sub-regionally 
and regionally. There is also need for the creation of strong, independent, credible and self-sustaining 
democratic institutions that will stir socio-economic and political development at national and sub-
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regional level. This will help to counter most of the crises of governance that the region faces. Some civil 
society groups have been created with this vision but have fallen into the pit of party politicking.  
  
8.4 Conclusion  
The GNU was a result of the SADC-mediated process but the reasons that led to its formation have a 
historical connotation that goes as back as the 1880s with the formation of the Berlin conference where 
European powers superimposed their dominance on the state now pigeon-holed Zimbabwe. The process 
led to the creation of a system that benefited the minority at the expense of the majority, a system which 
was inherited by ZANU-PF as the elites in the party could not resist colonial continuity. At the same time 
the post-independent policies had serious impacts on the economic and political set-up of the country 
which led to serious resistance from several organisations and political parties. The ZANU-PF party used 
ruthlessness to deal with political opponents which was manifest to the SADC bloc in 2007 where it 
called for intervention in Zimbabwe. The 2008 June Run-Off contested election left Zimbabwe in an 
undesirable position in the region and SADC had to call for negotiations between different political 
parties in the country. This led to the GNU which was an opportunity upon which Zimbabwe’s crises 
could have ended. However, the politicking in the GNU could not solve the crises in Zimbabwe. As such 
the chapter captured the conclusion of the thesis. It also contains the recommendations of the thesis which 
were approached from a holistic point of view encompassing three main variables viz. regional bodies 
namely AU and SADC, GNUs and the Zimbabwe state. It has been argued that the success of GNUs is 
hinged on various conditions that have to be manifest at a party level, country level and within setting of 
regional or sub-regional groupings. This may go a long way in resolving crises that hit states, Zimbabwe 
included.     
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APPENDIX 3: KEY INFORMANT INTERVIEW GUIDE  
  
Key Informants   
Topic: SADC Mediation in Zimbabwe: Lost Opportunity for  
Lasting Solution to the Zimbabwe Crises  
Introduction  
My name is Petra Chinyere and I am a PhD Student under the Department of Conflict 
Transformation and Peace Studies at the KwaZulu-Natal University. I am conducting a research 
on SADC’s Mediation in Zimbabwe as a lost opportunity for a lasting solution to the Zimbabwe 
crises. The research has been authorised by the Kwazulu-Natal University and I have the honour 
to request you to assist me with a few questions that aim to answer the objectives of the study. 
The rationale behind the academic research is to interrogate whether the Government of National 
Unity in Zimbabwe was established at the right time for political transition and whether it was the best 
alternative. The respondents were selected based on people’s professional position/experience and 
knowledge about the subject of the study. The data from this is solely for study purposes, and 
will be treated with confidentiality and anonymity is guaranteed. Participation in this research is 
voluntary. During the course of the interview, the researcher will not record names or addresses 
of participants. You reserve the right to refuse to answer any question or to change your mind at 
any point during the interview. We will require your permission to record your responses through 
writing them down in summary and using a voice recorder.   
  
A - SADC MEDIATED GOVERNMENT OF NATIONAL UNITY IN ZIMBABWE  
1. What do understand by the notion ‘Government of National Unity’?  
2. Do you think that the year 2008 was the right time for SADC as a regional body to mediate a 
Government of National Unity in Zimbabwe? (Kindly provide a justification for your 
answer).   
3. In your opinion, did the SADC mediated GNU provide an opportunity to end the political and 
economic crisis in Zimbabwe?  
4. Was the general populace consulted prior to the establishment of the GNU?   
5. During the implementation of the GNU, was the general populace consulted?   
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B - SADC MEDIATION PROCESS AND ITS GOALS IN ZIMBABWE   
6. Do you think that the SADC mediation process was a successful story in the Zimbabwe 
context?  
7. Did the SADC mediation process achieve its goal in balancing political interests in the GPA?   
  
C - THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE GNU VIS-À-VIS ITS NTENDED GOALS  
8. Do you think that the Government of National Unity was generally a successful story in 
Zimbabwe?  
9. Was the GNU successful in fulfilling its mandate of creating conditions conducive for restoring 
political and economic sanity in Zimbabwe?  
  
F – RECOMMENDATIONS    
10. What are the critical successful measures to consider when establishing a GNU?  
11. What can be done to make GNUs work?   
12. What other alternatives are available for conflict resolution, other than GNUs?  
  
  
                                        ******Thank You******  
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APPENDIX 4: NEGOTIATORS QUESTIONNAIRE  
  
NEGOTIATORS.  
  
SECTION A - RESPONDENT CONSENT  
Dear Sir/Madam  
My name is Petra Chinyere and I am a PhD Student under the Department of Conflict 
Transformation and Peace Studies at Kwazulu-Natal University. I am conducting a research on 
SADC’s Mediation in Zimbabwe as a lost opportunity for lasting solution to the Zimbabwe 
crises. The research has been authorised by the Kwazulu-Natal University and I have the honor 
to request your permission to conduct an interview with you, if you may to help me get first-hand 
information that will substantiate my study.   
The rationale behind this academic research is to interrogate whether the Government of National 
Unity in Zimbabwe was established at the right time for political transition. The respondents 
were selected based on professional position and knowledge about the subject of the study. The 
data from this is solely for study purposes, and will be treated in strict confidentiality and 
anonymity is guaranteed. Participation in this research is voluntary. The interviewer will not 
record names or addresses of participants. You reserve the right to refuse to answer any question 
or to change your mind at any point during this interview. With your permission, may I record 
your responses purely for study purposes, to enable transcription later.   
  
  
1. Can you please explain the major objectives your party was pursuing when they engaged 
in the negotiations with the other 2 parties in 2007?  
2. In your assessment what were the major factors and developments that shaped the course 
of the SADC mediated negotiations.   
3. What has been your party’s perspective with regard to the two succeeding mediators? Did 
they manage to display mediation skills and impartiality?  
4. How did the mediation team manage to bring together parties that were fundamentally 
coming from diametrically opposed ideological stand-points?  
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5. Do you think the mediators had a clear mandate from the SADC body?  
6. Can you highlight the major achievements of the SADC mediated negotiations between 
2007 and 2008.  
7. Did your party manage to achieve its objectives when SA concluded its mediation role in 
2013.  
8. What can you say about the mediation procedure, particularly on the issue of negotiators 
reporting to their principals and the mediator? Were they given an opportunity to make 
presentations at the troika level?  
9. Did the SADC intervention manage to arrest the Zimbabwean crises?  
10. What are your comments with regard to the role played by the AU and other international 
players during the negotiations?  
11. What can you say about the behaviour of the other parties to the negotiations?  
12. Do you have other views and comments you would like to put across with regard to the 
SADC mediated process in Zimbabwe?  
The End  
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APPENDIX 5: FOCUS GROUP DISCUSSIONS INTERVIEW GUIDE  
  
                                Focus Group Discussion Guide   
Topic: SADC Mediation in Zimbabwe: Lost Opportunity for  
Lasting Solution to the Zimbabwe Crises  
Introduction  
My name is Petra Chinyere and I am a PhD Student under the Department of Conflict 
Transformation and Peace Studies at the Kwazulu-Natal University. I am conducting a research 
on SADC’s Mediation role in Zimbabwe as a lost opportunity for lasting solution to the 
Zimbabwe crises. The research has been authorised by the Kwazulu-Natal University and I have 
the honour to request you to participate in this discussion. The rationale behind the academic 
research is to interrogate whether the Government of National Unity in Zimbabwe was established at the 
right time for political transition and whether the GNU was the best approach? The respondents 
were selected based on people’s professional position/experience and knowledge about the 
subject of the study. The data from this discussion is solely for study purposes, and will be 
treated in strict confidentiality and anonymity is guaranteed. Participation in this research is 
voluntary. During the course of the discussion, the researcher will not record names or addresses 
of participants. You reserve the right to refuse to answer any question or to change your mind at 
any point of the FDG.  We request your permission to write down your responses and record an 
audio for study purposes, these recordings will be kept by the researcher and not used for any 
other purposes.   
  
A - SADC MEDIATED GOVERNMENT OF NATIONAL UNITY IN ZIMBABWE  
1. What do you understand by the notion ‘Government of National Unity’?  
2. Do you think that the year 2008 was the right time for SADC as a regional body to mediate a 
Government of National Unity in Zimbabwe? ( Kindly provide a justification for your 
answer).   
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3. In your opinion, did the SADC mediated GNU provide an opportunity to end the political and 
economic crisis in Zimbabwe?  
4. Was the general populace consulted prior the establishment of the GNU?   
5. During the implementation of the GNU, was the general populace consulted?   
  
B - SADC MEDIATION PROCESS AND ITS GOALS IN ZIMBABWE   
6. Do you think that the SADC mediation process was a successful story in the Zimbabwe 
context?  
7. Did the SADC mediation process achieve its goal in balancing political interests in the GPA?   
  
C - THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE GNU VIS-À-VIS ITS NTENDED GOALS  
8. Do you think that Government of National Unity was generally a successful story in 
Zimbabwe?  
9. Was the GNU successful in fulfilling its mandate of creating conditions conducive for restoring 
political and economic sanity in Zimbabwe?  
  
D – RECOMMENDATIONS    
10. What are the critical successful measures to consider when establishing a GNU?  
11. What can be done to make GNUs work?   
12. What other alternatives are available for conflict resolution, other than the GNU?  
                                                        ******Thank You******  
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APPENDIX 6: CIVIL SOCIETY QUESTIONNAIRE  
  
Civil Society   
  
Research Interview Guide on the Topic: SADC Mediation in Zimbabwe: Lost opportunity for 
lasting solution to the Zimbabwe crises.   
  
SECTION A - RESPONDENT CONSENT  
Dear Sir/Madam  
My name is Petra Chinyere and I am a PhD Student under the Department of Conflict Transformation and  
Peace Studies at Kwazulu-Natal University. I am conducting a research on SADC’s Mediation in 
Zimbabwe as a lost opportunity for lasting solution to the Zimbabwe crises. The research has been 
authorised by the Kwazulu-Natal University and I have the honour to request you to complete this 
interview guide, if you may to help me get information that will substantiate my study.   
The rationale behind the academic research is to interrogate whether the Government of National   
Unity in Zimbabwe was established at the right time for political transition. The names of respondents 
were selected based on people’s professional position/experience and knowledge about the subject of the 
study. The data from this is solely for study purposes, and will be treated with confidentiality and 
anonymity is guaranteed. Participation in this research is voluntary. The interview guide does not record 
names or addresses of participants. You reserve the right to refuse to answer any question or to change 
your mind at any point, when answering this interview guide. There are two extra answering sheets at the 
end of this interview guide. Kindly fasten them to this interview guide if you use them and indicate 
question number at the left top margin of the answering sheet.  
If you consent to answering the questions on this guide you are requested to tick in the ‘Yes’ box and if 
you do not consent please tick in the ‘No’ box.              
                        
SECTION B – SADC MEDIATED GOVERNMENT OF NATIONAL UNITY IN ZIMBABWE  
1. What do understand by the notion ‘Government of National Unity’?  
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……………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
………………………………………………………………………………………………  
2. Do you think that the year 2008 was the right time for SADC as a regional body to mediate a 
Government of National Unity in Zimbabwe? ( kindly provide a justification for your answer).   
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
………………………………………………………………………………………………  
3. In your opinion, did the SADC mediated GNU provide an opportunity to end the political and 
economic crisis in Zimbabwe?  
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
………………………………………………………………………………………………  
4. Was the general populace consulted prior the establishment of the GNU?   
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
………………………………………………………………………………………………  
5. During the implementation of the GNU, was the general populace consulted?   
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
………………………………………………………………………………………………  
  
SECTION C - SADC MEDIATION PROCESS AND ITS GOALS IN ZIMBABWE   
  
6. Do you think that the SADC mediation process was a successful story in the Zimbabwe context?  
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
………………………………………………………………………………………………  
7. Did the SADC mediation process achieve its goal in balancing political interests in the GPA?   
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
………………………………………………………………………………………………  
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SECTION D - THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE GNU VIS-À-VIS ITS NTENDED GOALS  
8. Do you think that the Government of National Unity was generally a successful story in Zimbabwe? 
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………
… 
………………………………………………………………………………………………  
9. Was the GNU successful in fulfilling its mandate of creating conditions conducive for restoring 
political and economic sanity in Zimbabwe?  
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
………………………………………………………………………………………………  
  
SECTION E – RECOMMENDATIONS    
10. What are the critical successful measures to consider when establishing a GNU?  
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
………………………………………………………………………………………………  
  
11. What can be done to make GNUs work?  
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
………………………………………………………………………………………………  
  
12. What other options can be considered as alternatives to GNUs?   
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
………………………………………………………………………………………………  
                                                             ** THE END **  
               THANK YOU FOR YOUR COOPERATION!!!  
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